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ABSTRACT
INFORMATION-THEORETIC LIMITS ON
STATISTICAL MATCHING WITH APPLICATIONS TO
PRIVACY
MAY 2020
NAZANIN TAKBIRI
B.Sc., UNIVERSITY OF TEHRAN
M.Sc., BOG˘AZIÇI UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Hossein Pishro-Nik
Modern applications significantly enhance user experience by adapting to each user’s
individual condition and/or preferences. While this adaptation can greatly improve a user’s
experience or be essential for the application to work, the exposure of user data to the
application presents a significant privacy threat to the users—even when the traces are
anonymized (since the statistical matching of an anonymized trace to prior user behavior
can identify a user and their habits). Because of the current and growing algorithmic and
computational capabilities of adversaries, provable privacy guarantees as a function of the
degree of anonymization and obfuscation of the traces are necessary. This dissertation fo-
cuses on deriving the theoretical bounds on the privacy of users in such a scenario. Here we
derive the fundamental limits of user privacy when both anonymization and obfuscation-
based protection mechanisms are applied to users’ time series of data. We investigate the
impact of such mechanisms on the trade-off between privacy protection and user utility. In
vii
the first part, the requirements on anonymization and obfuscation in the case that data traces
are independent between users are obtained. However, the data traces of different users will
be dependent in many applications, and an adversary can potentially exploit such. So in the
next part, we consider the impact of dependency between user traces on their privacy. In or-
der to do that, we demonstrate that the adversary can readily identify the association graph
of the obfuscated and anonymized version of the data, revealing which user data traces are
dependent, and then, we demonstrate that the adversary can use this association graph to
break user privacy with significantly shorter traces than in the case of independent users.
As a result, we show inter-user dependency degrades user privacy. We show that obfus-
cating data traces independently across users is often insufficient to remedy such leakage.
Therefore, we discuss how users can improve privacy by employing joint obfuscation that
removes the data dependency. Finally, we discuss how the remapping technique came to
our help to improve user utility and how much remapping is leaking to the adversary when
the adversary does not have the full prior information.
viii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
A number of emerging systems and applications work by analyzing the data submitted
by their users in order to serve them; we call such systems User-Data Driven (UDD) ser-
vices. Examples of UDD services include smart cities, connected vehicles, smart homes,
and connected healthcare devices, which have the promise of greatly improving users’
lives. Unfortunately, the sheer volume of user data collected by these systems can compro-
mise users’ privacy [85]. Even the use of standard Privacy-Protection Mechanisms (PPMs),
specifically anonymization of user identities and obfuscation of submitted data, does not
guarantee users’ privacy, as adversaries are able to use powerful statistical inference tech-
niques to learn sensitive private information of the users [74]. Such privacy threats are a
major obstacle to the wide adoption of IoT applications, as demonstrated by prior stud-
ies [3, 5, 27, 44, 47, 66, 84, 85, 87, 101, 115, 116, 118, 120, 122].
To illustrate the threat of privacy leakage, consider three popular UDD services: (1)
Health care: Wearable monitors that constantly track user health variables can be invalu-
able in assessing individual health trends and responding to emergencies. However, such
monitors produce long time-series of user data uniquely matched to the health character-
istics of each user; (2) Smart homes: Emerging smart-home technologies such as fine-
grained power measurement systems can help users and utility providers to address one of
the key challenges of the twenty-first century: energy conservation. But the measurements
of power by such devices can be mapped to users and reveal their lifestyle habits; and, (3)
Connected vehicles: The location data provided by connected vehicles promises to greatly
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improve everyday life by reducing congestion and traffic accidents. However, the matching
of such location traces to prior behavior not only allows for user tracking, but also reveals
a user’s habits. In summary, despite their potential impact on society and their emerging
popularity, these UDD services have one thing in common: their utility critically depends
on their collection of user data, which puts users’ privacy at significant risk.
1.2 Related Works
There are two main approaches to augment privacy in UDD services: identity pertur-
bation (anonymization) [18, 33, 45, 71, 74, 96, 102, 103], and data perturbation (obfusca-
tion) [10,39,99]. In anonymization techniques, privacy is obtained by concealing the map-
ping between users and data, and the mapping is changed periodically to thwart statistical
inference attacks that try to de-anonymize the anonymized data traces by matching user
data to known user profiles. Some approaches employ k-anonymity to keep each user’s
identity indistinguishable within a group of k − 1 other users [28,36,50,69,105,133,134].
Other approaches employ users’ pseudonyms within areas called mix-zones [8, 34, 81].
Obfuscation mechanisms aim at protecting privacy by perturbing user data, e.g., by adding
noise to users’ samples of data. For instance, cloaking replaces each user’s sample of
data with a larger region [15, 46, 98, 117, 124, 136], while an alternative approach is to use
dummy data in the set of possible data of the users [16,54,55,70,91]. In [123], a mechanism
of obfuscation was introduced where the answer was changed randomly with some small
probability. Here we consider the fundamental limits of a similar obfuscation technique for
providing privacy in the long time series of emerging applications.
The anonymization and obfuscation mechanisms improve user privacy at the cost of
user utility. The anonymization mechanism works by frequently changing the pseudonym
mappings of users to reduce the length of time series that can be exploited by statistical
analysis. However, this frequent change may also decrease the usability by concealing the
temporal relation between a user’s sample of data, which may be critical in the utility of
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some systems, e.g., a dining recommendation system that makes suggestions based on the
dining history of its users. On the other hand, obfuscation mechanisms work by adding
noise to users’ collected data, e.g., location information. The added noise may degrade
the utility of UDD applications. Thus, choosing the right level of the privacy-protection
mechanism is an important question, and understanding what levels of anonymization and
obfuscation can provide theoretical guarantees of privacy is of interest.
Numerous researchers have put forward ideas for quantifying privacy-protection. Shokri
et al. [96, 97] define the expected estimation error of the adversary as a metric to evaluate
PPMs. Ma et al. [71] use uncertainty about users’ information to quantify user privacy in
vehicular networks. To defeat localization attacks and achieve privacy at the same time,
Shokri et al. [99] proposed a method which finds optimal PPM for a Location Based Ser-
vice (LBS) given service quality constraints. In [60] and [76], privacy leakage of data
sharing and interdependent privacy risks are quantified, respectively. A similar idea is
proposed in [132] where the quantification model is based on the Bayes conditional risk.
Previously, mutual information has been used as a privacy metric in a number of set-
tings, [11, 19, 64, 65, 88, 89, 127]. However, the framework and problem formulation for
our setting (Internet of Things (IoT) privacy) are quite different from those encountered in
previous works. More specifically, the IoT privacy problem we consider here is based on
a large set of time-series data that belongs to different users with different statistical pat-
terns that has gone through a privacy-preserving mechanism, and the adversary is aiming
at de-anonymizing and de-obfuscating the data.
The discussed studies demonstrate the growing importance of privacy. What is miss-
ing from the current literature is a solid theoretical framework for privacy that is general
enough to encompass various privacy-preserving methods in the literature. Such a frame-
work will allow us to achieve provable privacy guarantees, obtain fundamental trade-offs
between privacy and performance, and provide analytical tools to optimally achieve prov-
able privacy.
3
1.3 Contributions
• Privacy of Independent Users Against Statistical Matching (Chapter 2):
In this chapter, we derive the fundamental limits of user privacy when both anonymiza-
tion and obfuscation-based protection mechanisms are applied to users’ time series
of data. We investigate the impact of such mechanisms on the trade-off between pri-
vacy protection and user utility in the case that data traces are independent between
users. We first study achievability results for the case where the time-series of users
are governed by an i.i.d. process. The converse results are proved both for the i.i.d.
case as well as the more general Markov chain model. We demonstrate that as the
number of users in the network grows, the obfuscation-anonymization plane can be
divided into two regions: in the first region, all users have perfect privacy; and, in the
second region, no user has privacy.
• Privacy of Independent Users Against Statistical Matching: Non-Asymptotic
Results (Chapter 3)
In this chapter, we turn attention to exact performance analysis for a finite number
of users and observations. We consider the case where a user is distributed over a
discrete set of states according to a probability distribution drawn at random, which
we assume is known to the adversary based on his/her analysis of past user behavior.
The finite-length traces are then anonymized and obfuscated at a cost in user utility.
We analyze the ability of the adversary to correctly identify user data samples as a
function of the rate of anonymization and degree of obfuscation, and we arrive at
complicated yet readily numerically evaluated expressions. These results allow us to
investigate interesting questions left open by the asymptotic nature of previous work.
• Privacy of Dependent Users Against Statistical Matching(Chapter 4):
Chapter 2 has considered the requirements on anonymization and obfuscation for
“perfect” user privacy when traces are independent between users. However, in prac-
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tice users have correlated data traces, as relationships between users establish de-
pendence in their behavior. In this chapter, we demonstrate that such dependency
degrades the privacy of PPMs, as the anonymization employed must be significantly
increased to preserve perfect privacy, and often no degree of independent obfusca-
tion of the traces can be effective. We also present preliminary results on dependent
obfuscation to improve users’ privacy.
• Leveraging Prior Knowledge asymmetries in the Design of IoT Privacy-Preserving
Mechanisms (Chapter 5):
The Internet of Things (IoT) promises to improve user utility by tuning applications
to user behavior, but the revealing of the characteristics of a user’s behavior presents
a significant privacy risk. Recently, the technique of remapping has been introduced
in the privacy literature. Remapping exploits asymmetries in knowledge and/or so-
phistication between the intended application and the adversary; in particular, the
user publishes a more accurate version of their data than they might have otherwise
because a sophisticated adversary could obtain that accurate version anyway. We
present an information-theoretic analysis of the remapping technique. After intro-
ducing a system model, we first demonstrate the mechanism behind the remapping
technique. Next, we characterize the loss in privacy when the user lacks knowledge
of the accuracy of the adversary’s statistical model; this loss in privacy occurs both
because the adversary obtains a more accurate view of the user data than expected and
because the adversary can exploit the remapping to improve their statistical model
more than would have been possible when remapping is not employed. Finally, we
introduce a random remapping approach as a countermeasure; in particular, for a
given utility, the random remapping approach makes it difficult for the adversary to
improve their statistical model.
Finally, in Chapter 6, we present our conclusions and future work.
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CHAPTER 2
PRIVACY OF INDEPENDENT USERS AGAINST STATISTICAL
MATCHING
2.1 Introduction
Many popular applications use traces of user data to offer various services to their
users. However, even if user data is anonymized and obfuscated, a user’s privacy can be
compromised through the use of statistical matching techniques that match a user trace to
prior user behavior. In this chapter, we derive the theoretical bounds on the privacy of users
in such a scenario.
Here, we will consider the ability of an adversary to perform statistical analyses on
time series and match the series to descriptions of user behavior. In related work, Unnikr-
ishnan [118] provides a comprehensive analysis of the asymptotic (in the length of the time
series) optimal matching of time series to source distributions. However, there are several
key differences between that analysis and the work here. First, Unnikrishnan [118] looks
at the optimal matching tests, but does not consider any privacy metrics as considered in
this dissertation, and a significant component of our study is demonstrating that mutual
information converges to zero so that we can conclude there is no privacy leakage (hence,
“perfect privacy”). Second, the setting of [118] is different, as it does not consider: (a)
obfuscation, which is one of the two major protection mechanisms; and (b) sources that
are not independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). Third, the setting of Unnikrish-
nan [118] assumes a fixed distribution on sources (i.e., classical inference), whereas we
assume the existence of general (but possibly unknown) prior distributions for the sources
The work presented in this chapter was published in [106, 107, 109, 111].
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(i.e., a Bayesian setting). Finally, we study the fundamental limits in terms of both the
number of users and the number of observations, while Unnikrishnan [118] focuses on the
case where the number of users is a fixed, finite value.
We derive the fundamental limits of user privacy when both anonymization and obfuscation-
based protection mechanisms are applied to users’ time series of data. We investigate the
impact of such mechanisms on the trade-off between privacy protection and user utility in
the case that data traces are independent between users.
In this chapter, we consider two models for users’ data: i.i.d. and Markov chains. After
introducing the general framework in Section 2.2, we consider an i.i.d. model extensively
in Section 2.3 and the first half of Section 2.4. We obtain achievability and converse results
for the i.i.d. model. The i.i.d. model would apply directly to data that is sampled at a
low rate. In addition, understanding the i.i.d. case can also be considered the first step
toward understanding the more complicated case where there is dependency, as was done
for anonymization-only Location Privacy-Preserving Mechanisms (LPPMs) in [73], and
will be done in Section 2.4.3. In particular, in Section 2.4.3, a general Markov chain model
is used to model users’ data pattern to capture the dependency of the user’ data pattern
over time. There, we obtain converse results for privacy for this model. In Section 2.5, we
provide some discussion about the achievability for the Markov chain case.
2.2 System Model, Definitions, and Metrics
In this chapter, we adopt a similar framework to that employed in [73,106]. The general
set up is provided here, and the refinement to the precise models for this chapter will be
presented in the following sections. We assume a system with n users with Xu(k) denoting
a sample of the data of user u at time k, which we would like to protect from an interested
adversary. We consider a strong adversary that has complete statistical knowledge of the
users’ data patterns based on the previous observations or other resources. In order to
secure data privacy of users, both obfuscation and anonymization techniques are used as
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shown in Figure 2.1. In Figure 2.1, Zu(k) shows the (reported) sample of the data of user
u at time k after applying obfuscation, and Yu(k) shows the (reported) sample of the data
of user u at time k after applying anonymization. The adversary observes only Yu(k), k =
1,2, · · · ,m(n), where m(n) is the number of observations of each user before the identities
are permuted. The adversary then tries to estimate Xu(k) by using those observations.
Figure 2.1: Applying obfuscation and anonymization techniques to users’ data samples.
Let Xu be the m(n) × 1 vector containing the samples of the data of user u, and X be the
m(n) × n matrix with uth column equal to Xu;
Xu =

Xu(1)
Xu(2)
...
Xu(m)

, X = [X1,X2, · · · ,Xn] .
Data Samples Model: We assume there are r ≥ 2 possible values (0,1, · · · ,r − 1) for
each sample of the users’ data. In the first part of this chapter (perfect privacy analysis),
we assume an i.i.d. model as motivated in Section 2.1. In the second part of this chapter
(converse results: no privacy region), the users’ datasets are governed by irreducible and
aperiodic Markov chains. At any time, Xu(k) is equal to a value in {0,1, · · · ,r − 1} accord-
ing to a user-specific probability distribution. The collection of user distributions, which
satisfy some mild regularity conditions discussed below, is known to the adversary, and
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they employ such to distinguish different users based on statistical matching of those user
distributions to traces of user activity of length m(n).
Obfuscation Model: The first step in obtaining privacy is to apply the obfuscation opera-
tion in order to perturb the users’ data samples. In this chapter, we assume that each user
has only limited knowledge of the characteristics of the overall population and thus we em-
ploy a simple distributed method in which the samples of the data of each user are reported
with error with a certain probability, where that probability itself is generated randomly
for each user. In other words, the obfuscated data is obtained by passing the users’ data
through an r-ary symmetric channel with a random error probability. More precisely, let
Zu be the vector which contains the obfuscated versions of user u’s data samples, and Z is
the collection of Zu for all users,
Zu =

Zu(1)
Zu(2)
...
Zu(m)

, Z = [Z1,Z2, · · · ,Zn] .
To create a noisy version of data samples, for each user u, we independently generate a
random variable Ru that is uniformly distributed between 0 and an, where an ∈ (0,1]. The
value of Ru gives the probability that a user’s data sample is changed to a different data
sample by obfuscation, and an is termed the “noise level” of the system. For the case of
r = 2 where there are two states for users’ data (state 0 and state 1), the obfuscated data is
obtained by passing users’ data through a Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC) with a small
error probability [123]. Thus, we can write
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Zu(k) =

Xu(k), with probability 1 − Ru.
1 − Xu(k), with probability Ru.
When r > 2, for l ∈ {0,1, · · · ,r − 1}:
P(Zu(k) = l |Xu(k) = i) =

1 − Ru, for l = i.
Ru
r−1, for l , i.
Note that the effect of the obfuscation is to alter the probability distribution function of
each user across the r possibilities in a way that is unknown to the adversary, since it is
independent of all past activity of the user, and hence the obfuscation inhibits user iden-
tification. For each user, Ru is generated once and is kept constant for the collection of
samples of length m(n), thus, providing a very low-weight obfuscation algorithm. We will
discuss the extension to the case where Ru is regenerated independently over time in Sec-
tion 2.5. There, we will also provide a discussion about obfuscation using continuous noise
distributions (e.g., Gaussian noise).
Anonymization Model: Anonymization is modeled by a random permutation Π on the
set of n users. The user u is assigned the pseudonym Π(u). Y is the anonymized version of
Z; thus,
Y = Perm (Z1,Z2, · · · ,Zn;Π)
=
[
ZΠ−1(1),ZΠ−1(2), · · · ,ZΠ−1(n)
]
= [Y1,Y2, · · · ,Yn] ,
where Perm( . ,Π) is permutation operation with permutation function Π. As a result,
Yu = ZΠ−1(u) and YΠ(u) = Zu.
Here we provide a simple example to further elaborate the problem setting. Let us
assume there are three users in the setting, n = 3, and there exists five possible values for
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each data point of user u, r = 5. Also, let us assume the number of adversary’s observations
per user is equal to 6, m = 6. Now, each user has a data sequence as below:
Users Data sequences
User 1 0→ 1→ 2→ 3→ 4→ 0
User 2 1→ 2→ 3→ 4→ 0→ 1
User 3 2→ 3→ 4→ 0→ 2→ 4
X =

0 1 2
1 2 3
2 3 4
3 4 0
4 0 2
0 1 4

.
In order to anonymized data, we change the pseudonyms of users. These pseudonyms
are determined by the function defined by a random permutation on the user set:
Π : {1,2,3} 7→ {1,2,3}.
Now, assume Π(1) = 2, Π(2) = 3, and Π(3) = 1. Thus, the adversary observes the
anonymized version of data Y, so they observe
11
Pseudonyms Observed data by the adversary
user 1 2→ 3→ 4→ 0→ 2→ 4
user 2 0→ 1→ 2→ 3→ 4→ 0
user 3 1→ 2→ 3→ 4→ 0→ 1
Y =

2 0 1
3 1 2
4 2 3
3 1 2
0 3 4
4 0 1

.
The adversary tries to de-anonymized data based on their observations and the statistical
knowledge of the user’s behaviour.
Adversary Model: We protect against the strongest reasonable adversary. Through past
observations or some other sources, the adversary is assumed to have complete statistical
knowledge of the users’ patterns; in other words, they know the probability distribution
for each user on the set of data samples {0,1, . . . ,r − 1}. As discussed in the model for the
data samples, the parameters pu, u = 1,2, · · · ,n are drawn independently from a continuous
density function, fP(pu), which has support on a subset of a defined hypercube. The density
fP(pu) might be unknown to the adversary, as all that is assumed here is that such a density
exists, and it will be evident from our results that knowing or not knowing fP(pu) does not
change the results asymptotically. Specifically, from the results we will show in Section 2.3,
we conclude that user u has perfect privacy even if the adversary knows fP(pu). In addition,
in Section 2.4, it is shown that the adversary can recover the true data of user u at time k
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without using the specific density function of fP(pu), and as result, users have no privacy
even if the adversary does not know fP(pu).
The adversary also knows the value of noise level an as it is a design parameter. How-
ever, the adversary does not know the realization of the random permutation Π or the
realizations of the random variables Ru, as these are independent of the past behavior of
the users. It is critical to note that we assume the adversary does not have any auxiliary
information or side information about users’ data.
In [73], perfect privacy is defined as follows:
Definition 1. User u has perfect privacy at time k, if and only if
lim
n→∞ I (Xu(k); Y) = 0,
where I(X;Y ) denotes the mutual information between random variables (vectors) X and
Y .
In this chapter, we also consider the situation in which there is no privacy.
Definition 2. For an algorithm for the adversary that tries to estimate the actual data point
of user u at time k, define the error probability as
Pe(u, k) = P
( Xu(k) , Xu(k)) ,
where Xu(k) is the actual data point of user u at time k, Xu(k) is the adversary’s estimated
data point of user u at time k. Now, define E as the set of all possible adversary’s estimators.
Then, user u has no privacy at time k, if and only if,
P∗e(u, k) = limn→∞ infE P
( Xu(k) , Xu(k)) → 0.
Hence, a user no privacy at time k if there exists an algorithm for the adversary to estimate
Xu(k) with diminishing error probability as n goes to infinity.
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Discussion 1: Both of the privacy definitions given above (perfect privacy and no privacy)
are asymptotic in the number of users (n → ∞), which allows us to find clean analytical
results for the fundamental limits. Moreover, in many IoT applications, such as ride sharing
and dining recommendation applications, the number of users is large.
Notation: Note that the sample of data of user u at time k after applying obfuscation (Zu(k))
and the sample of data of user u at time k after applying anonymization (Yu(k)) depend on
the number of users in the network (n), while the actual sample of data of user u at time
k is independent of the number of users (n). Despite the dependency in the former cases,
we omit this subscript (n) on
(
Z (n)u (k),Y (n)u (k)
)
to avoid confusion and make the notation
consistent.
Notation: Throughout the chapter, Xn
d−→ X denotes convergence in distribution. Also, We
use P
(
X = x
Y = y) for the conditional probability of X = x given Y = y. When we write
P
(
X = x
Y ) , we are referring to a random variable that is defined as a function of Y .
2.3 Perfect Privacy Analysis: I.I.D. Case
2.3.1 Two-State i.i.d. Model
We first consider the two-state case (r = 2) which captures the salient aspects of the
problem. For the two-state case, the sample of the data of user u at any time is a Bernoulli
random variable with parameter pu, which is the probability of user u having data sample
1. Thus,
Xu(k) ∼ Bernoulli (pu) .
Per Section 2.2, the parameters pu, u = 1,2, · · · ,n are drawn independently from a contin-
uous density function, fP(pu), on the (0,1) interval. We assume there are δ1, δ2 > 0 such
that:1
1The condition δ1 < fP(pu) < δ2 is not actually necessary for the results and can be relaxed; however,
we keep it here to avoid unnecessary technicalities.
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
δ1 < fP(pu) < δ2, pu ∈ (0,1).
fP(pu) = 0, pu < (0,1).
The adversary knows the values of pu, u = 1,2, · · · ,n and uses this knowledge to iden-
tify users. We will use capital letters (i.e., Pu) when we are referring to the random variable,
and use lower case (i.e., pu) to refer to the realization of Pu.
In addition, since the user data (Xu(k)) are i.i.d. and have a Bernoulli distribution, the
obfuscated data (Zu(k)) are also i.i.d. with a Bernoulli distribution. Specifically,
Zu(k) ∼ Bernoulli (Qu) ,
where
Qu = Pu(1 − Ru) + (1 − Pu)Ru
= Pu + (1 − 2Pu) Ru,
and recall that Ru is the probability that user u’s data sample is altered at any time. For
convenience, define a vector where element Qu is the probability that an obfuscated data
sample of user u is equal to one, and
Q = [Q1,Q2, · · · ,Qn] .
Thus, a vector containing the permutation of those probabilities after anonymization is
given by:
W = Perm (Q1,Q2, · · · ,Qn;Π)
=
[
QΠ−1(1),QΠ−1(2), · · · ,QΠ−1(n)
]
= [W1,W2, · · · ,Wn] ,
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where Wu = QΠ−1(u) and WΠ(u) = Qu. As a result, for u = 1,2, ...,n, the distribution of the
data symbols for the user with pseudonym u is given by:
Yu(k) ∼ Bernoulli (Wu) ∼ Bernoulli
(
QΠ−1(u)
)
.
The following theorem states that if the amount of noise level (an) is significantly larger
than 1n in this two-state model, then all users have perfect privacy independent of the value
of m(n).
Theorem 1. For the above two-state model, if Z is the obfuscated version of X, and Y is
the anonymized version of Z as defined above, and
• m = m(n) is arbitrary;
• Ru ∼ Uniform[0,an], where an , Ω
(
c′n−(1−β)
)
for any c′ > 0 and 0 < β < 1;
then, user 1 has perfect privacy.
The proof of Theorem 1 will be provided for the case 0 ≤ p1 < 12 , as the proof for the
case 12 ≤ p1 ≤ 1 is analogous and is thus omitted.
Intuition behind the Proof of Theorem 1:
Since m(n) is arbitrary, the adversary is able to estimate very accurately (in the limit,
perfectly) the distribution from which each data sequence Yu, u = 1,2, · · · ,n is drawn; that
is, the adversary is able to accurately estimate the probability Wu, u = 1,2, · · · ,n. Clearly,
if there were no obfuscation for each user u, the adversary would then simply look for the
l such that pl is very close to Wu and set Xl(k) = Yu(k), resulting in no privacy for any user.
We want to make certain that the adversary obtains no information about X1(k), the
sample of data of user 1 at time k. To do such, we will establish that there are a large
number of users whom have a probability pu that when obfuscated could have resulted
in a probability consistent with p1. Consider asking whether another probability p2 is
16
sufficiently close enough to be confused with p1 after obfuscation; in particular, we will
look for p2 such that, even if the adversary is given the obfuscated probabilities WΠ(1)
and WΠ(2), they cannot associate these probabilities with p1 and p2. This requires that the
distributions Q1 and Q2 of the obfuscated data of user 1 and user 2 have significant overlap;
we explore this next.
Recall that Qu = Pu+(1−2Pu)Ru, and Ru ∼ Uniform[0,an]. Thus, we know Qu |Pu = pu
has a uniform distribution with length (1 − 2pu)an. Specifically,
Qu
Pu = pu ∼ Uniform [pu, pu + (1 − 2pu)an] .
Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of Qu given Pu = pu.
Figure 2.2: Distribution of Qu given Pu = pu.
Consider two cases: In the first case, the support of the distributions Q1
P1 = p1 and
Q2
P2 = p2 are small relative to the difference between p1 and p2 (Figure 2.3); in this case,
given the probabilities WΠ(1) and WΠ(2) of the anonymized data sequences, the adversary
can associate those with p1 and p2 without error. In the second case, the support of the
distributions Q1
P1 = p1 and Q2P2 = p2 is large relative to the difference between p1
and p2 (Figure 2.4), so it is difficult for the adversary to associate the probabilities WΠ(1)
and WΠ(2) of the anonymized data sequences with p1 and p2. In particular, if WΠ(1) and
WΠ(2) fall into the overlap of the support of Q1 and Q2, we will show the adversary can
only guess randomly how to de-anonymize the data. Thus, if the ratio of the support of
the distributions to
p1 − p2 goes to infinity, the adversary’s posterior probability for each
user converges to 12 , thus, implying no information leakage on the user identities. More
generally, if we can guarantee that there will be a large set of users with pu’s very close
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to p1 compared to the support of Q1
P1 = p1, we will be able to obtain perfect privacy as
demonstrated rigorously below.
Figure 2.3: Case 1: The support of the distributions is small relative to the difference
between p1 and p2.
Figure 2.4: Case 2: The support of the distributions is large relative to the difference be-
tween p1 and p2.
Given this intuition, the formal proof proceeds as follows. Given p1, we define a set J(n)
of users whose parameter pu of their data distributions is sufficiently close to p1 (Figure 2.4;
case 2), so that it is likely that Q1 and Qu cannot be readily associated with p1 and pu.
The purpose of Lemmas 1, 2, and 3 is to show that, from the adversary’s perspective,
the users in set J(n) are indistinguishable. More specifically, the goal is to show that the
obfuscated data corresponding to each of these users could have been generated by any
other users in J(n) in an equally likely manner. To show this, Lemma 1 employs the fact
that, if the observed values of N uniformly distributed random variables (N is size of set
J(n)) are within the intersection of their ranges, it is impossible to infer any information
about the matching between the observed values and the distributions. That is, all possible
N! matchings are equally likely. Lemmas 2 and 3 leverage Lemma 1 to show that even
if the adversary is given a set that includes all of the pseudonyms of the users in set J(n)
(i.e., Π(J(n)) ∆= {Π−1(u) ∈ J(n)}) they still will not be able to infer any information about
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the matching of each specific user in set J(n) and his pseudonym. Then Lemma 5 uses the
above fact to show that the mutual information between the data set of user 1 at time k and
the observed data sets of the adversary converges to zero as n→∞.
Proof of Theorem 1:
Proof. Note, per Lemma 6 of Appendix 2.8.1, it is sufficient to establish the results on
a sequence of sets with high probability. That is, we can condition on high-probability
events.
Now, as shown in Figure 2.5, define the critical set J(n) with size N (n) =
J(n) for
0 ≤ p1 < 12 as follows:
J(n) =
{
u ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n} : p1 ≤ Pu ≤ p1 + n; p1 + n ≤ Qu ≤ p1 + (1 − 2p1)an
}
,
where n , 1
n1−
β
2
, an = c′n−(1−β), and β is defined in the statement of Theorem 1.
Note for large enough n, if 0 ≤ p1 < 12 , we have 0 ≤ pu < 12 . As a result,
Qu
Pu = pu ∼ Uniform (pu, pu + (1 − 2pu)an) .
We can prove that with high probability, 1 ∈ J(n) for large enough n, as follows. First, Note
that
Q1
P1 = p1 ∼ Uniform (p1, p1 + (1 − 2p1)an) .
Now, according to Figure 2.6,
P
(
1 ∈ J(n)
)
= 1 − n(1 − 2p1) an
= 1 − 1
(1 − 2p1) c′n β2
,
thus, for any c′ > 0 and large enough n,
P
(
1 ∈ J(n)
)
→ 1.
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Figure 2.5: Range of Pu and Qu for elements of set J(n) and probability density function of
Qu
Pu = pu.
Figure 2.6: Range of Pu and Qu for elements of set J(n) and probability density function of
Q1
P1 = p1.
Now in the second step, we define the probability J (n)l for any l ∈ Π(J(n)) = {Π(u) :
u ∈ J(n)} as
J (n)l = P
(
Π(1) = l
W,Π(J(n))) .
J (n)l is the conditional probability that Π(1) = l after perfectly observing the values of the
permuted version of obfuscated probabilities (W) and set including all of the pseudonyms
of the users in set J(n)
(
Π(J(n))
)
. Since W and Π(J(n)) are random, J (n)l is a random
variable. However, we will prove shortly that in fact J (n)l = 1N (n) , for all l ∈ Π(J(n)).
Note: Since we are looking from the adversary’s point of view, the assumption is that
all the values of pu, u ∈ {1,2, · · · ,n} are known, so all of the probabilities are conditioned
on the values of P1 = p1,P2 = p2, · · · ,Pn = pn. Thus, to be accurate, we should write
J (n)l = P
(
Π(1) = l
W,Π(J(n)),P1,P2, · · · ,Pn) .
Nevertheless, for simplicity of notation, we often omit the conditioning on P1,P2, · · · ,Pn.
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First, we need a lemma from elementary probability.
Lemma 1. Let N be a positive integer, and let a1,a2, · · · ,aN and b1, b2, · · · , bN be real
numbers such that au ≤ bu for all u. Assume that X1,X2, · · · ,XN are independent random
variables such that
Xu ∼ Uniform[au, bu].
Let also γ1, γ2, · · · , γN be distinct real numbers such that
γl ∈
N⋂
u=1
[au, bu] for all l ∈ {1,2, ..,N}.
Suppose that we know the event E has occurred, meaning that the observed values of Xu’s
are equal to the set of γl’s (but with unknown ordering), i.e.,
E ≡ {X1,X2, · · · ,XN } = {γ1, γ2, · · · , γN },
then
P (X1 = γl |E) = 1N .
Proof. Lemma 1 is proved in Appendix 2.8.2. 
Using the above lemma, we can state our desired result for J (n)l .
Lemma 2. For all l ∈ Π(J(n)), J (n)l = 1N (n) .
Proof. We argue that the setting of this lemma is essentially equivalent to the assumptions
in Lemma 1. First, remember that
J (n)l = P
(
Π(1) = l
W,Π(J(n))) .
Note that Qu = Pu + (1− 2Pu)Ru, and since Ru is uniformly distributed, Qu conditioned
on Pu is also uniformly distributed in the appropriate intervals. Moreover, since Wu =
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QΠ−1(u), we conclude Wu is also uniformly distributed. So, looking at the definition of J (n)l ,
we can say the following: given the values of the uniformly distributed random variables
Qu, we would like to know which one of the values in W is the actual value of Ql = WΠ(1),
i.e., is Π(1) = l? This is equivalent to the setting of Lemma 1 as described further below.
Note that since 1 ∈ J(n), Π(1) ∈ Π(J(n)). Therefore, when searching for the value of
Π(1), it is sufficient to look inside set Π(J(n)). Therefore, instead of looking among all the
values of Wl , it is sufficient to look at Wl for l ∈ Π(J(n)). Let us show these values by
WΠ = {w1,w2, · · · ,wN (n)}, so,
J (n)l = P
(
Π(1) = l
WΠ,Π(J(n))) .
Thus, we have the following scenario: Qu,u ∈ J(n) are independent random variables,
and
Qu
Pu = pu ∼ Uniform[pu, pu + (1 − 2pu)an].
Also, w1,w2, · · · ,wN (n) are the observed values of Qu with unknown ordering (unknown
mapping Π). We also know from the definition of set J(n) that
Pu ≤ p1 + n ≤ Qu,
Qu ≤ p1(1 − 2an) + an ≤ Pu(1 − 2an) + an,
so, we can conclude
wl ∈
N (n)⋂
u=1
[pu, pu + (1 − 2pu)an] for all l ∈ {1,2, ..,N (n)}.
We know the event E has occurred, meaning that the observed values of Qu’s are equal to
set of wl’s (but with unknown ordering), i.e.,
E ≡ {Qu,u ∈ J(n)} = {w1,w2, · · · ,wN (n)}.
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Then, according to Lemma 1,
P (Q1 = wl |E,P1,P2, · · · ,Pn) = 1N (n) .
Note that there is a subtle difference between this lemma and Lemma 1. Here N (n) is a
random variable while N is a fixed number in Lemma 1. Nevertheless, since the assertion
holds for every fixed N , it also holds for the case where N is a random variable. Now, note
that
P (Q1 = wl |E,P1,P2, · · · ,Pn) = P
(
Π(1) = l
E,P1,P2, · · · ,Pn)
= P
(
Π(1) = l
WΠ,Π(J(n)),P1,P2, · · · ,Pn)
= J (n)l .
Thus, we can conclude
J (n)l =
1
N (n)
.

In the third step, we define J˜ (n)l for any l ∈ Π(J(n)) as
J˜ (n)l = P
(
Π(1) = l
Y,Π(J(n))) .
J˜ (n)l is the conditional probability that Π(1) = l after observing the values of the
anonymized version of the obfuscated samples of the users’ data (Y) and the aggregate
set including all the pseudonyms of the users in set J(n) (i.e., Π(J(n)) ∆= {Π−1(l) ∈ J(n)}).
Since Y and Π(J(n)) are random, J˜ (n)l is a random variable. Now, in the following lemma,
we will prove J˜ (n)l = 1N (n) , for all l ∈ Π(J(n)) by using Lemma 3.
Note in the following lemma, we want to show that even if the adversary is given a set
including all of the pseudonyms of the users in set J(n), they cannot match each specific
user in set J(n) and his pseudonym.
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Lemma 3. For all l ∈ Π(J(n)), J˜ (n)l = 1N (n) .
Proof. First, note that
J˜ (n)l =
∑
for all w
P
(
Π(1) = l
Y,Π (J(n)) ,W = w) P (W = wY,Π (J(n))) .
Also, we note that given V, Π(J(n)), and Y are independent. Intuitively, this is because
when observing Y, any information regarding Π(J(n)) is leaked through estimating V. This
can be rigorously proved similar to the proof of [73, Lemma 1]. We can state this fact as
P
(
Yu(k)
 Wu = wu,Π(J(n))) = P (Yu(k)  Wu = wu) = wu.
The right and left hand sides of the above equation are given by Bernoulli(wu) distributions.
As a result,
J˜ (n)l =
∑
for all w
P
(
Π(1) = l
Π(J(n)),W = w) P (W = wY,Π (J(n))) .
Note J (n)l = P
(
Π(1) = l
Π(J(n)),W) , so
J˜ (n)l =
∑
for all w
J (n)l P
(
W = w
Y,Π (J(n)))
=
1
N (n)
∑
for all w
P
(
W = w
Y,Π (J(n)))
=
1
N (n)
.

To show that no information is leaked, we need to show that the size of set J(n) goes to
infinity.
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Lemma 4. If N (n) , |J(n) |, then N (n) → ∞ with high probability as n → ∞. More
specifically, there exists λ > 0 such that
P
(
N (n) >
λ
2
n
β
2
)
→ 1.
Proof. Lemma 4 is proved in Appendix 2.8.3. 
In the final step, we define Ĵ (n)l for any l ∈ Π(J(n)) as
Ĵ (n)l = P
(
X1(k) = 1
Y,Π(J(n))) .
Ĵ (n)l is the conditional probability that X1(k) = 1 after observing the values of the anonymized
version of the obfuscated samples of the users’ data (Y) and the aggregate set including all
of the pseudonyms of the users in set J(n) (Π(J(n))). Ĵ (n)l is a random variable because Y
and Π(J(n)) are random. Now, in the following lemma, we will prove Ĵ (n)l converges in
distribution to p1.
Note that this is the probability from the adversary’s point of view. That is, given that
the adversary has observed Y as well as the extra information Π(J(n)), what can they infer
about X1(k)?
Lemma 5. For all l ∈ Π(J(n)), Ĵ (n)l
d−→ p1.
Proof. We know
Ĵ (n)l =
∑
l∈Π(J(n))
P
(
X1(k) = 1
Π(1) = l,Y,Π(J(n))) P (Π(1) = lY,Π(J(n))) ,
and according to the definition J˜ (n)l = P
(
Π(1) = l
Y,Π(J(n))) , we have
Ĵ (n)l =
∑
l∈Π(J(n))
P
(
X1(k) = 1
Π(1) = l,Y,Π(J(n))) J˜ (n)l
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=
1
N (n)
∑
l∈Π(J(n))
P
(
X1(k) = 1
Π(1) = l,Y,Π(J(n))) .
We now claim that
P
(
X1(k) = 1
Π(1) = l,Y,Π(J(n))) = p1 + o(1).
The reasoning goes as follows. Given Π(1) = l and knowing Y, we know that
YΠ(1)(k) = Z1(k) =

X1(k), with probability 1 − R1.
1 − X1(k), with probability R1.
Thus, given Yl(k) = 1, Bayes’ rule yields:
P
(
X1(k) = 1
Π(1) = l,Y,Π(J(n))) = (1 − R1) P(X1(k) = 1)
P(YΠ(1)(k) = 1)
= (1 − R1) p1p1(1 − R1) + (1 − p1)R1
= 1 − o(1),
and similarly, given Yl(k) = 0,
P
(
X1(k) = 1
Π(1) = l,Y,Π(J(n))) = R1 P(X1(k) = 1)
P(YΠ(1)(k) = 0)
= R1
p1
p1R1 + (1 − p1)(R1 − 1)
= o(1).
Note that by the independence assumption, the above probabilities do not depend on the
other values of Yu(k) (as we are conditioning on Π(1) = l ). Thus, we can write
Ĵ (n)l =
1
N (n)
∑
l∈Π(J(n))
P
(
X1(k) = 1
Π(1) = l,Y,Π(J(n)))
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=
1
N (n)
∑
l∈Π(J(n)),Yl(k)=1
(1 − o(1)) + 1
N (n)
∑
l∈Π(J(n)),Yl(k)=0
o(1).
First, note that since
{l ∈ Π(J(n)),Yl(k) = 0} ≤ N (n), the second term above converges to
zero, thus,
Ĵ (n)l →
{l ∈ Π(J(n)),YΠ(1)(k) = 1}
N (n)
.
Since for all l ∈ Π(J(n)), Yl(k) ∼ Bernoulli (p1 + o(1)), by a simple application of Cheby-
shev’s inequality, we can conclude Ĵ (n)l → p1. Appendix 2.8.4 provides the detail. 
As a result,
X1(k)|Y,Π(J(n)) → Bernoulli(p1),
thus,
H
(
X1(k)
Y,Π(J(n))) → H (X1(k)) .
Since conditioning reduces entropy,
H
(
X1(k)
Y,Π(J(n))) ≤ H (X1(k)Y) ,
and as a result,
lim
n→∞H (X1(k)) − H
(
X1(k)
Y) ≤ 0,
and
lim
n→∞ I (X1(k); Y) ≤ 0.
By knowing that I (X1(k); Y) cannot take any negative value, we can conclude that
I (X1(k); Y) → 0.

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2.3.2 r-State i.i.d. Model
Now, assume users’ data samples can have r possibilities (0,1, · · · ,r − 1), and pu(i)
shows the probability of user u having data sample i. We define the vector pu and the
matrix p as
pu =

pu(1)
pu(2)
...
pu(r − 1)

, p =
[
p1,p2, · · · ,pn
]
.
We assume pu(i)’s are drawn independently from some continuous density function, fP(pu),
which has support on a subset of the (0,1)r−1 hypercube (Note that the pu(i)’s sum to one,
so one of them can be considered as the dependent value and the dimension is r − 1). In
particular, define the range of the distribution as
Rp = {(x1, x2, · · · , xr−1) ∈ (0,1)r−1 : xi > 0, x1 + x2 + · · · + xr−1 < 1, i = 1,2, · · · ,r − 1}.
Figure 2.7 shows the range Rp for the case where r = 3.
Then, we assume there are δ1, δ2 > 0 such that:

δ1 < fP(pu) < δ2, pu ∈ Rp.
fP(pu) = 0, pu < Rp.
The obfuscation is similar to the two-state case. Specifically, for l ∈ {0,1, · · · ,r − 1},
we can write
P(Zu(k) = l |Xu(k) = i) =

1 − Ru, for l = i.
Ru
r−1, for l , i.
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Figure 2.7: Rp for case r = 3.
Theorem 2. For the above r-state model, if Z is the obfuscated version of X, and Y is the
anonymized version of Z as defined previously, and
• m = m(n) is arbitrary;
• Ru ∼ Uniform[0,an], where an , Ω
(
c′n−( 1r−1−β)
)
for any c′ > 0 and 0 < β < 1r−1 ;
then, user 1 has perfect privacy.
The proof of Theorem 2 is similar to the proof of Theorem 1. The major difference
is that instead of the random variables Pu,Qu,Wu, we need to consider the random vectors
Pu,Qu,Wu. Similarly, for user u, we define the vector Qu as
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Qu =

Qu(1)
Qu(2)
...
Qu(r − 1)

.
In the r-state case,
Qu(i) = Pu(i)
(
1 − Ru
)
+
(
1 − Pu(i)
)
Ru
r − 1
= Pu(i) +
(
1 − rPu(i)
)
Ru
r − 1 .
We also need to define the critical set J(n). First, for i = 0,1, · · · ,r − 1, define set J(n)i as
follows. If 0 ≤ p1(i) < 1r , then,
J(n)i =
{
u ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n} :
p1(i) ≤ Pu(i) ≤ p1(i) + n; p1(i) + n ≤ Qu(i) ≤ p1(i) + (1 − rp1(i)) anr − 1
}
,
where n , 1
n
1
r−1−
β
2
, an = c′n−( 1r−1−β), and β is defined in the statement of Theorem 2.
We then define the critical set J(n) as:
J(n) =
r−1⋂
l=0
J(n)i .
We can then repeat the same arguments in the proof of Theorem 1 to complete the proof.
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2.4 Converse Results: No Privacy Region
In this section, we prove that if the number of observations by the adversary is larger
than its critical value and the noise level is less than its critical value, then the adversary can
find an algorithm to successfully estimate users’ data samples with arbitrarily small error
probability. Combined with the results of the previous section, this implies that asymptoti-
cally (as n→ ∞), privacy can be achieved if and only if at least one of the two techniques
(obfuscation or anonymization) are used above their thresholds. This statement needs a
clarification as follows: Looking at the results of [73], we notice that anonymization alone
can provide perfect privacy if m(n) is below its threshold. On the other hand, the threshold
for obfuscation requires some anonymization: In particular, the identities of the users must
be permuted once to prevent the adversary from readily identifying the users.
2.4.1 Two-State i.i.d. Model
Again, we start with the i.i.d. two-state model. The data sample of user u at any time is
a Bernoulli random variable with parameter pu.
As before, we assume that pu’s are drawn independently from some continuous density
function, fP(pu), on the (0,1) interval. Specifically, there are δ1, δ2 > 0 such that:

δ1 < fP(pu) < δ2, pu ∈ (0,1).
fP(pu) = 0, pu < (0,1).
Theorem 3. For the above two-state mode, if Z is the obfuscated version of X, and Y is
the anonymized version of Z as defined, and
• m , Ω (cn2+α) for any c > 0 and α > 0;
• Ru ∼ Uniform[0,an], where an , O
(
c′n−(1+β)
)
for any c′ > 0 and β > α4 ;
then, user 1 no privacy at time k.
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Figure 2.8: p1, sets B(n) and C(n) for case r = 2.
Since this is a converse result, we give an explicit detector at the adversary and show
that it can be used by the adversary to recover the true data of user 1.
Proof. The adversary first inverts the anonymization mapping Π to obtain Z1(k), and then
estimates the value of X1(k) from that. To invert the anonymization, the adversary calcu-
lates the empirical probability that each string is in state 1 and then assigns the string with
the empirical probability closest to p1 to user 1.
Formally, for u = 1,2, · · · ,n, the adversary computes Yu, the empirical probability of
user u being in state 1, as follows:
Yu =
Yu(1) + Yu(2) + · · · + Yu(m)
m
,
thus,
YΠ(u) =
Zu(1) + Zu(2) + · · · + Zu(m)
m
.
As shown in Figure 2.8, define
B(n) , {x ∈ (0,1); p1 − ∆n ≤ x ≤ p1 + ∆n} ,
where ∆n = 1
n1+
α
4
and α is defined in the statement of Theorem 3. We claim that for
m , cn2+α, an , c′n−(1+β), and as n→ in f ty,
1. P
(
YΠ(1) ∈ B(n)
)
→ 1.
2. P
(
n⋃
u=2
(
YΠ(u) ∈ B(n)
))
→ 0.
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As a result, the adversary can identify Π(1) by examining Yu’s and assigning the one in B(n)
to user 1. Note that YΠ(u) ∈ B(n) is a set (event) in the underlying probability space and can
be written as
{
ω ∈ Ω : YΠ(u)(ω) ∈ B(n)
}
.
First, we show that as n goes to infinity,
P
(
YΠ(1) ∈ B(n)
)
→ 1.
We can write
P
(
YΠ(1) ∈ B(n)
)
= P
©­­­«
m∑
k=1
Z1(k)
m
∈ B(n)
ª®®®¬
= P
©­­­«p1 − ∆n ≤
m∑
k=1
Z1(k)
m
≤ p1 + ∆n
ª®®®¬
= P
(
mp1 − m∆n − mQ1 ≤
m∑
k=1
Z1(k) − mQ1 ≤ mp1 + m∆n − mQ1
)
.
Note that for any u ∈ {1,2, · · · ,n}, we have
Qu
Pu = pu ∼ Uniform (pu, pu + (1 − 2pu)an) ,
and as a result,
|pu −Qu | ≤ |1 − 2pu |Ru
≤ Ru ≤ an,
so, we can conclude
P
(
YΠ(1) ∈ B(n)
)
= P
(
mp1 − m∆n − mQ1 ≤
m∑
k=1
Z1(k) − mQ1 ≤ mp1 + m∆n − mQ1
)
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≥ P
(
−m∆n + man ≤
m∑
k=1
Z1(k) − mQ1 ≤ −man + m∆n
)
= P
( m∑
k=1
Z1(k) − mQ1
 ≤ m(∆n − an)
)
.
From the Chernoff bound, for any c, c′, α > 0 and β > α4 ,
P
( m∑
k=1
Z1(k) − mQ1
 ≤ m(∆n − an)
)
≥ 1 − 2e−
m(∆n−an)2
3Q1
≥ 1 − 2e−
(
1
3Q1
)(cn2+α)( 1
n
1+α4
− c′
n1+β
)2
≥ 1 − 2e−
1
3 (cn2+α)
(
1
n
1+α4
− c′
n1+β
)2
→ 1.
As a result, as n becomes large,
P
(
YΠ(1) ∈ B(n)
)
→ 1.
Now, we need to show that as n goes to infinity,
P
(
n⋃
u=2
(
YΠ(u) ∈ B(n)
))
→ 0.
First, we define
C(n) = {x ∈ (0,1); p1 − 2∆n ≤ x ≤ p1 + 2∆n} ,
and claim as n goes to infinity,
P
(
n⋃
u=2
(
Pu ∈ C(n)
))
→ 0.
Note
4∆nδ1 < P
(
Pu ∈ C(n)
)
< 4∆nδ2,
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and according to the union bound, as n→∞,
P
(
n⋃
u=2
(
Pu ∈ C(n)
))
≤
n∑
u=2
P
(
Pu ∈ C(n)
)
≤ 4n∆nδ2
= 4n
1
n1+
α
4
δ2
= 4n−
α
4 δ2 → 0.
As a result, we can conclude that all pu’s are outside of C(n) for u ∈ {2,3, · · · ,n} with high
probability.
Now, we claim that given all pu’s are outside of C(n), P
(
YΠ(u) ∈ B(n)
)
is small. Remem-
ber that for any u ∈ {1,2, · · · ,n}, we have
|pu −Qu | ≤ an.
Now, noting the definitions of sets B(n) and C(n), we can write for u ∈ {2,3, · · · ,n},
P
(
YΠ(u) ∈ B(n)
)
≤ P
(YΠ(u) −Qu ≥ (∆n − an))
= P
( m∑
k=1
Zu(k) − mQu
 > m(∆n − an)
)
.
According to the Chernoff bound, for any c, c′, α > 0 and β > α4 ,
P
( m∑
k=1
Zu(k) − mQu
 > m(∆n − an)
)
≤ 2e−
m(∆n−an)2
3Q1
≤ 2e−
(
1
3Q1
)(cn2+α)( 1
n
1+α4
− c′
n1+β
)2
≤ 2e−
1
3 (cn2+α)
(
1
n
1+α4
− c′
n1+β
)2
.
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Now, by using a union bound, for any β > α4 , we have
P
(
n⋃
u=2
(
YΠ(u) ∈ B(n)
))
≤
n∑
u=2
P
(
YΠ(u) ∈ B(n)
)
≤ n ©­«2e
− 13 (cn2+α)
(
1
n
1+α4
− c′
n1+β
)2ª®¬ ,
and thus, as n goes to infinity,
P
(
n⋃
u=2
(
YΠ(u) ∈ B(n)
))
→ 0.
So, the adversary can successfully recover Z1(k). Since Z1(k) = X1(k) with probability
1 − R1 = 1 − o(1), the adversary can recover X1(k) with vanishing error probability as
n→∞. 
2.4.2 r-State i.i.d. Model
Now, assume users’ data samples can have r possibilities (0,1, · · · ,r − 1), and pu(i)
shows the probability of user u having data sample i. We define the vector pu and the
matrix p as
pu =

pu(1)
pu(2)
...
pu(r − 1)

, p =
[
p1,p2, · · · ,pn
]
.
We also assume pu’s are drawn independently from some continuous density function,
fP(pu), which has support on a subset of the (0,1)r−1 hypercube. In particular, define the
range of distribution as
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Rp =
{(x1, x2, · · · , xr−1) ∈ (0,1)r−1 : xi > 0, x1 + x2 + · · · + xr−1 < 1, i = 1,2, · · · ,r − 1}
Then, we assume there are δ1, δ2 > 0 such that:

δ1 < fP(pu) < δ2, pu ∈ Rp.
fP(pu) = 0, pu < Rp.
Theorem 4. For the above r-state mode, if Z is the obfuscated version of X, and Y is the
anonymized version of Z as defined, and
• m , Ω
(
cn
2
r−1+α
)
for any c > 0 and 0 < α < 1;
• Ru ∼ Uniform[0,an], where an , O
(
c′n−( 1r−1+β)
)
for any c′ > 0 and β > α4 ;
then, user 1 no privacy at time k.
The proof of Theorem 4 is similar to the proof of Theorem 3, so we just provide the
general idea. We similarly define the empirical probability that the user with pseudonym u
has data sample i
(
Yu(i)
)
as follows:
Yu(i) = |{k ∈ {1,2, · · · ,m} : Yu(k) = i}|m ,
thus,
YΠ(u)(i) = |{k ∈ {1,2, · · · ,m} : Yu(k) = i}|m .
The difference is that now for each u ∈ {1,2, · · · ,n}, Yu is a vector of size r − 1. In
other words,
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Figure 2.9: p1, sets B′(n) and C′(n) in Rp for case r = 3.
Yu =

Yu(1)
Yu(2)
...
Yu(r − 1)

.
Define sets B′(n) and C′(n) as
B′(n) , {(x1, x2, · · · , xr−1) ∈ Rp : p1(i) − ∆′n ≤ xi ≤ p1(i) + ∆′n, i = 1,2, · · · ,r − 1} ,
C′(n) , {(x1, x2, · · · , xr−1) ∈ Rp : p1(i) − 2∆′n ≤ xi ≤ p1(i) + 2∆′n, i = 1,2, · · · ,r − 1} ,
where ∆′n = 1
n
1
r−1+
α
4
. Figure 2.9 shows p1 and sets B′(n) and C′(n) for the case r = 3.
We claim for m , cn
2
r−1+α, an , c′n−( 1r−1+β), as n→∞,
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1. P
(
YΠ(1) ∈ B′(n)
)
→ 1.
2. P
(
n⋃
u=2
(
YΠ(u) ∈ B′(n)
))
→ 0.
The proof follows that for the two-state case. Thus, the adversary can de-anonymize the
data and then recover X1(k) with vanishing error probability in the r-state model.
2.4.3 r-State Markov Chain Model
So far, we have assumed users’ data samples can have r possibilities (0,1, · · · ,r − 1)
and users’ pattern are i.i.d. . Here we model users’ pattern using Markov chains to capture
the dependency of the users’ pattern over time. Again, we assume there are r possibilities
(the number of states in the Markov chains). Let E be the set of edges. More specifically,
(i, j) ∈ E if there exists an edge from i to j with probability p(i, j) > 0. What distinguishes
different users is their transition probabilities pu(i, j) (the probability that user u jumps from
state i to state j). The adversary knows the transition probabilities of all users. The model
for obfuscation and anonymization is exactly the same as before.
We show that the adversary will be able to estimate the data samples of the users with
low error probability if m(n) and an are in the appropriate range. The key idea is that the ad-
versary can focus on a subset of the transition probabilities that are sufficient for recovering
the entire transition probability matrix. By estimating those transition probabilities from
the observed data and matching with the known transition probabilities of the users, the
adversary will be able to first de-anonymize the data, and then estimate the actual samples
of users’ data. In particular, note that for each state i, we must have
r∑
j=1
pu(i, j) = 1, for each u ∈ {1,2, · · · ,n},
so, the Markov chain of user u is completely determined by a subset of size d = |E | − r of
transition probabilities. We define the vector pu and the matrix p as
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pu =

pu(1)
pu(2)
...
pu(|E | − r)

, p =
[
p1,p2, · · · ,pn
]
.
We also consider pu’s are drawn independently from some continuous density function,
fP(pu), which has support on a subset of the (0,1)|E |−r hypercube. Let Rp ⊂ Rd be the
range of acceptable values for pu, so we have
RP =
{(x1, x2 · · · , xd) ∈ (0,1)d : xi > 0, x1 + x2 + · · · + xd < 1, i = 1,2, · · · , d} .
As before, we assume there are δ1, δ2 > 0, such that:

δ1 < fP(pu) < δ2, pu ∈ Rp.
fP(pu) = 0, pu < Rp.
Using the above observations, we can establish the following theorem.
Theorem 5. For an irreducible, aperiodic Markov chain with r states and |E | edges as
defined above, if Z is the obfuscated version of X, and Y is the anonymized version of Z,
and
• m , Ω
(
cn
2
|E |−r +α
)
for any c > 0 and α > 0;
• Ru ∼ Uniform[0,an], where an , O
(
c′n−
(
1
|E |−r +β
) )
for any c′ > 0 and β > α4 ;
then, user 1 no privacy at time k.
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The proof has a lot of similarity to the i.i.d. case, so we provide a sketch, mainly fo-
cusing on the differences. We argue as follows. If the total number of observations per
user is m = m(n), then define Mi(u) to be the total number of visits by user u to state i, for
i = 0,1, · · · ,r − 1. Since the Markov chain is irreducible and aperiodic, and m(n) → ∞,
all Mi(u)m(n) converge to their stationary values. Now conditioned on Mi(u) = mi(u), the tran-
sitions from state i to state l for user u follow a multinomial distribution with probabilities
pu(i, l).
Given the above, the setting is now very similar to the i.i.d. case. Each user is uniquely
characterized by a vector pu of size |E | − r . We define sets B ′′(n) and C ′′(n) as
B ′′(n) , {(x1, x2, · · · , xd) ∈ Rp : p1(i) − ∆′′n ≤ xi ≤ p1(i) + ∆′′n, i = 1,2, · · · , d},
C ′′(n) , {(x1, x2, · · · , xd) ∈ Rp : p1(i) − 2∆′′n < xi < p1(i) + 2∆′′n, i = 1,2, · · · , d},
where ∆′′n = 1
n
1
|E |−r +
α
4
, and d = |E | − r . Then, we can show that for the stated values of m(n)
and an, as n becomes large:
1. P
(
YΠ(1) ∈ B ′′(n)
)
→ 1,
2. P
(
n⋃
u=2
(
YΠ(u) ∈ B′′(n)
))
→ 0,
which means that the adversary can estimate the data of user 1 with vanishing error prob-
ability. The proof is very similar to the proof of the i.i.d. case; however, there are two
differences that need to be addressed:
First, the probability of observing an erroneous observation is not exactly given by Ru.
In fact, a transition is distorted if at least one of its nodes is distorted. So, if the actual
transition is from state i to state l, then the probability of an erroneous observation is equal
to
R′u = Ru + Ru − RuRu = Ru(2 − Ru).
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Nevertheless, here the order only matters, and the above expression is still in the order
of an = O
(
n−
(
1
|E |−r +β
) )
.
The second difference is more subtle. As opposed to the i.i.d. case, the error probabil-
ities are not completely independent. In particular, if Xu(k) is reported in error, then both
the transition to that state and from that state are reported in error. This means that there is a
dependency between errors of adjacent transitions. We can address this issue in the follow-
ing way: The adversary makes their decision only based on a subset of the observations.
More specifically, the adversary looks at only odd-numbered transitions: First, third, fifth,
etc., and ignores the even-numbered transitions. In this way, the number of observations is
effectively reduced from m to m2 which again does not impact the order of the result (recall
that the Markov chain is aperiodic). However, the adversary now has access to observations
with independent errors.
2.5 Perfect Privacy Analysis: r− State Markov Chain Model
So far, we have provided both achievability and converse results for the i.i.d. case.
However, we have only provided the converse results for the Markov chain case. Here,
we investigate achievability for Markov chain models. It turns out that for this case, the
assumed obfuscation technique is not sufficient to achieve a reasonable level of privacy.
Loosely speaking, we can state that if the adversary can make enough observations, then he
can break the anonymity. The culprit is the fact that the sequence observed by the adversary
is no longer modeled by a Markov chain; rather, it can be modeled by a hidden Markov
chain. This allows the adversary to successfully estimate the obfuscation random variable
Ru as well as the pu(i, l) values for each sequence, and hence successfully de-anonymize
the sequences.
More specifically, as we will see below, there is a fundamental difference between
the i.i.d. case and the Markov chain case. In the i.i.d. case, if the noise level is beyond
a relatively small threshold, the adversary will be unable to de-anonymize the data and
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unable to recover the actual values of the data sets for users, regardless of the (large) size of
m = m(n). On the other hand, in the Markov chain case, if m = m(n) is large enough, then
the adversary can easily de-anonymize the data. To better illustrate this, let us consider a
simple example.
Example 1. Consider the scenario where there are only two states and the users’ data sam-
ples change between the two states according to the Markov chain shown in Figure 2.10.
What distinguishes the users is their different values of pu. Now, suppose we use the same
obfuscation method as before. That is, to create a noisy version of the sequences of data
samples, for each user u, we generate the random variable Ru that is the probability that the
data sample of the user is changed to a different data sample by obfuscation. Specifically,
Zu(k) =

Xu(k), with probability 1 − Ru.
1 − Xu(k), with probability Ru.
0
1
((
1 1−pu
uu
pu
hh
Figure 2.10: A state transition diagram.
To analyze this problem, we can construct the underlying Markov chain as follows.
Each state in this Markov chain is identified by two values: the real state of the user, and
the observed value by the adversary. In particular, we can write
(Real value,Observed value) ∈ {( 0,0), (0,1), (1,0), (1,1)}.
Figure 2.11 shows the state transition diagram of this new Markov chain.
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Figure 2.11: The state transition diagram of the new Markov chain.
We know
pi00 = pi0(1 − Ru) = pu
1 + pu
(1 − Ru).
pi01 = pi0Ru =
pu
1 + pu
Ru.
pi10 = pi1Ru =
1
1 + pu
Ru.
pi11 = pi1(1 − Ru) = 1
1 + pu
(1 − Ru).
The observed process by the adversary is not a Markov chain; nevertheless, we can
define limiting probabilities. In particular, let θ0 be the limiting probability of observing a
zero. That is, we have
M0
m
d−→ θ0, as n→∞,
where m is the total number of observations by the adversary, and M0 is the number of 0’s
observed. Then,
θ0 = pi00 + pi10 =
(1 − Ru)pu + Ru
1 + pu
.
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Also, let θ1 be the limiting probability of observing a one, so
θ1 = pi01 + pi11 =
puRu + (1 − Ru)
1 + pu
= 1 − θ0.
Now the adversary’s estimate of θ0 is given by:
θ˜0 =
(1 − Ru)pu + Ru
1 + pu
. (2.1)
Note that if the number of observations by the adversary can be arbitrarily large, the ad-
versary can obtain an arbitrarily accurate estimate of θ0. The adversary can obtain another
equation easily, as follows. Let θ01 be the limiting value of the portion of transitions from
state 0 to 1 in the chain observed by the adversary. We can write
θ01 = P {(00→ 01), (00→ 11), (10→ 01), (10→ 11)}
= pi00(1 − Ru) + pi10puRu + pi10(1 − pu)(1 − Ru).
As a result,
θ˜01 =
pu(1 − Ru)2 + Ru (puRu(1 − Ru)(1 − pu))
1 + pu
. (2.2)
Again, if the number of observations can be arbitrarily large, the adversary can obtain an ar-
bitrarily accurate estimate of θ01. By solving (2.1) and (2.2), the adversary can successfully
recover R and p; thus, they can successfully determine the users’ data values.
2.6 Discussion
2.6.1 Markov Chain Model
As opposed to the i.i.d. case, we see from Section 2.5 that if we do not limit m = m(n),
the assumed obfuscation method will not be sufficient to achieve perfect privacy. There are
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a few natural questions here. First, for a given noise level, what would be the maximum
m(n) that could guarantee perfect privacy in this model? The more interesting question
is, how can we possibly modify the obfuscation technique to make it more suitable for
the Markov chain model? A natural solution seems to be re-generating the obfuscation
random variables Ru periodically. This will keep the adversary from easily estimating them
by observing a long sequence of data at a small increase in complexity. In fact, this will
make the obfuscation much more robust to modeling uncertainties and errors. It is worth
noting, however, that this change would not affect the other results in this chapter. That
is, even if the obfuscation random variables are re-generated frequently, it is relatively
easy to check that all the previous theorems in this chapter remain valid. However, the
increase in robustness to modeling errors will definitely be a significant advantage. Thus,
the question is how often should the random variable Ru be re-generated to strike a good
balance between complexity and privacy? These are all interesting questions for future
research.
2.6.2 Obfuscating the Samples of Users’ Data Using Continuous Noise
Here we argue that for the setting of this chapter, continuous noise such as that drawn
from a Gaussian distribution is not a good option to obfuscate the sample of users’ data
drawn from a finite alphabet when we want to achieve perfect privacy. For a better under-
standing, let us consider a simple example.
Example 2. Consider the scenario where the users’ datasets are governed by an i.i.d. model
and the number of possible values for each sample of the users’ data (r) is equal to 2 (two-
state model). Note that the data sequence for user u is a Bernoulli random variable with
parameter pu.
Assume that the actual sample of the data of user u at time k (Xu(k)) is obfuscated using
noise drawn from a Gaussian distribution (Su(k)), and Zu(k) is the obfuscated version of
Xu(k). That is, we can write
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Zu(k) = Xu(k) + Su(k);
where Su(k) ∼ N
(
µ(Ru), σ2(Ru)
)
, is independent of Xu(k), and Ru is the noise parameter
which is chosen from some distribution. Here, µ(Ru) and σ2(Ru) are some known functions
of Ru. We also apply anonymization to Zu(k), and, as before, Yu(k) is the reported sample of
the data of user u at time k after applying anonymization. Per Section 2.2, anonymization
is modeled by a random permutation Π(u) on the set of n users.
Now, the question is as follows: Is it possible to achieve perfect privacy independent
of the number of adversary’s observation (m) while using this continuous noise (Su(k)) to
obfuscate the sample of users’ data?
Note that
E[Zu(k)] = pu + µ(Ru), (2.3)
and
Var (Zu(k)) = pu(1 − pu) + σ2(Ru). (2.4)
In this case, when the adversary’s number of observations is arbitrarily large, the adversary
can obtain good estimates of E[Zu(k)] and Var (Zu(k)) for each user with an arbitrarily
small error probability. Then, by using (2.3) and (2.4), the adversary can recover pu and
Ru. As a result, the adversary can de-anonymize the data and then recover Xu(k). The con-
clusion here is that a continuous noise distribution can potentially give information to the
adversary when used for obfuscation of finite alphabet data. A method to mitigate this issue
is to regenerate the random variables Ru frequently (similar to our previous discussion for
Markov chains). Understanding the optimal frequency of such a regeneration and detailed
analysis in this case is an interesting future research direction.
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2.7 Summary of the Results
Given n, the total number of the users in a network, their degree of privacy depends on
two parameters: (1) The number of observations m = m(n) by the adversary per user for a
fixed anonymization mapping (i.e., the number of observations before the pseudonyms are
changed); and (2) the value of the noise added by the obfuscation technique. Intuitively,
smaller m(n) and larger an result in stronger privacy, at the expense of lower utility for
the users. When the users’ datasets are governed by an i.i.d. process, we showed that the
m(n)−an plane can be divided into two areas. In the first area, all users have perfect privacy
(as defined in Section 2.2), and, in the second area, users have no privacy. Figure 2.12
shows the limits of privacy in the entire m(n) − an plane. As the figure shows, number
of adversary’s observations per user (m) is significantly smaller than n
2
r−1 or the amount of
noise level (an) is significantly larger than n−
1
r−1 , users have perfect privacy and if the levels
of both anonymization adn obfuscation them are significantly low, users have no privacy.
Figure 2.12: Limits of privacy in the entire m(n) − an plane. Note that m(n) is the number
of the adversary’s observations per user (degree of anonymization), and an is the amount
of noise level (degree of obfuscation).
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For the case where the users’ datasets are governed by irreducible and aperiodic Markov
chains with r states and |E | edges, we show that users will have no privacy if m = cn 2|E |−r +α
and an = c′n
−
(
1
|E |−r +β
)
, for any constants c > 0, c′ > 0, α > 0, and β > α4 . We also provide
some insights for the opposite direction (under which conditions users have perfect privacy)
for the case of Markov chains.
2.8 Appendix
2.8.1 Lemma 6 and its Proof
Here we state that we can condition on high-probability events.
Lemma 6. Let p ∈ (0,1), and X ∼ Bernoulli(p) be defined on a probability space
(Ω,F ,P). Consider B1,B2, · · · be a sequence of events defined on the same probability
space such that P(Bn) → 1 as n goes to infinity. Also, let Y be a random vector (matrix) in
the same probability space, then:
I(X; Y) → 0 iff I(X; Y|Bn) → 0.
Proof. First, we prove that as n becomes large,
H(X |Bn) − H(X) → 0. (2.5)
Note that as n goes to infinity,
P (X = 1) = P
(
X = 1
Bn) P (Bn) + P (X = 1Bn) P (Bn)
= P
(
X = 1
Bn) ,
thus,
(
X
Bn) d−→ X , and as n goes to infinity,
H (X |Bn) − H(X) → 0.
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Similarly, as n becomes large,
P
(
X = 1
Y = y) → P (X = 1Y = y,Bn) ,
and
H (X |Y = y,Bn) − H (X |Y = y) → 0. (2.6)
Remembering that
I (X; Y) = H(X) − H(X |Y), (2.7)
and using (2.5), (2.6), and (2.7), we can conclude that as n goes to infinity,
I (X; Y|Bn) − I (X,Y) → 0.
As a result, as n→∞,
I (X; Y) → 0⇐⇒ I (X; Y|Bn) → 0.

2.8.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Here we provide a formal proof for Lemma 1 which we restate as follows. Let N be a
positive integer, and let a1,a2, · · · ,aN and b1, b2, · · · , bN be real numbers such that au ≤ bu
for all u. Assume that X1,X2, · · · ,XN are N independent random variables such that
Xu ∼ Uni f orm[au, bu].
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Let also γ1, γ2, · · · , γN be real numbers such that
γ j ∈
N⋂
u=1
[au, bu] for all j ∈ {1,2, · · · ,N}.
Suppose that we know the event E has occurred, meaning that the observed values of Xu’s
is equal to the set of γ j’s (but with unknown ordering), i.e.,
E ≡ {X1,X2, · · · ,XN } = {γ1, γ2, · · · , γN },
then
P
(
X1 = γ j |E
)
=
1
N
.
Proof. Define sets P and Pj as follows:
P = The set of all permutations Π on {1,2, · · · ,N}.
Pj = The set of all permutations Π on {1,2, · · · ,N} such that Π(1) = j .
We have |P| = N! and |P| = (N − 1)!. Then
P(X1 = α j |E) =
∑
pi∈Pj fX1,X2,··· ,XN (γpi(1), γpi(2), · · · , γpi(N))∑
pi∈P fX1,X2,··· ,XN (γpi(1), γpi(2), · · · , γpi(N))
=
(N − 1)!
N∏
u=1
1
bu−au
N!
N∏
u=1
1
bu−au
=
1
N
.

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2.8.3 Proof of Lemma 4
Here, we provide a formal proof for Lemma 4 which we restate as follows. The fol-
lowing lemma confirms that the number of elements in J(n) goes to infinity as n becomes
large.
If N (n) , |J(n) |, then N (n) → ∞ with high probability as n → ∞. More specifically,
there exists λ > 0 such that
P
(
N (n) >
λ
2
n
β
2
)
→ 1.
Proof. Define the events A, B as
A ≡ p1 ≤ Pu ≤ p1 + n
B ≡ p1 + n ≤ Qu ≤ p1 + (1 − 2p1)an.
Then, for u ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n} and 0 ≤ p1 < 12 :
P
(
u ∈ J(n)
)
= P (A ∩ B)
= P (A)P (BA) .
So, given p1 ∈ (0,1) and the assumption 0 < δ1 < fp < δ2, for n large enough, we have
P(A) =
∫ p1+n
p1
fP(p)dp,
so, we can conclude that
nδ1 < P(A) < nδ2.
We can find a δ such that δ1 < δ < δ2 and
P(A) = nδ. (2.8)
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We know
Qu
Pu = pu ∼ Uni f orm [pu, pu + (1 − 2pu)an] ,
so, according to Figure 2.5, for p1 ≤ pu ≤ p1 + n,
P (B |Pu = pu) = p1 + (1 − 2p1)an − p1 − npu + (1 − 2pu)an − pu
=
(1 − 2p1)an − n
(1 − 2pu)an
≥ (1 − 2p1)an − n(1 − 2p1)an
= 1 − n(1 − 2p1)an ,
which implies
P (B |A) ≥ 1 − n(1 − 2p1)an . (2.9)
Using (2.8) and (2.9), we can conclude
P
(
u ∈ J(n)
)
≥ nδ
(
1 − n(1 − 2p1)an
)
.
Then, we can say that N (n) has a binomial distribution with expected value of N (n) greater
than nnδ
(
1 − n(1−2p1)an
)
, and by substituting n and an, for any c′ > 0, we get
E
[
N (n)
]
≥ δ
(
n
β
2 − 1
c′(1 − 2p1)
)
≥ λn β2 .
Now by using Chernoff bound, we have
P
(
N (n) ≤ (1 − θ)E
[
N (n)
] )
≤ e− θ
2
2 E[N (n)],
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so, if we assume θ = 12 , we can conclude as n→∞,
P
(
N (n) ≤ λ
2
n
β
2
)
≤ P
(
N (n) ≤ E
[
N (n)
]
2
)
≤ e−E[N
(n)]
8
≤ e− λn
β
2
8 → 0.
As a result, N (n) →∞ with high probability as n→∞. 
2.8.4 Completion of Proof of Lemma 5
Let p1 ∈ (0,1), and let N (n) be a random variable as above, i.e., N (n) → ∞ as n →
∞. Consider the sequence of independent random variables Yu ∼ Bernoulli(pu) for u =
1,2, · · · ,N (n) such that
1. For all n and all u ∈ {1,2, · · · ,N (n)}, |pu − p1 | ≤ ζn.
2. lim
n→∞ ζn = 0.
Define
Y ,
1
N (n)
N (n)∑
u=1
Yu,
then Y
d−→ p1.
Proof. Note
E[Y ] = 1
N (n)
N (n)∑
u=1
pu
≤ 1
N (n)
N (n)∑
u=1
(p1 + ζn)
=
1
N (n)
· N (n)(p1 + ζn)
= p1 + ζn.
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Similarly we can prove E
[
Y
]
≥ p1 − ζn. Since as n becomes large, ζn → 0 and p1 ∈ (0,1),
we can conclude
lim
n→∞E
[
Y
]
= p1. (2.10)
Also,
Var
(
Y
)
=
1(
N (n)
)2 N (n)∑
u=1
pu (1 − pu)
≤ 1(N (n))2
N (n)∑
u=1
(p1 + ζn) (1 − p1 + ζn)
=
1
(N (n))2 · N
(n) (p1 + ζn) (1 − p1 + ζn)
=
1
N (n)
(p1 + ζn) (1 − p1 + ζn) .
Thus,
lim
n→∞Var
(
Y
)
= 0. (2.11)
By using (2.10), (2.11), and Chebyshev’s inequality, we can conclude
Y
d−→ p1.

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CHAPTER 3
PRIVACY OF INDEPENDENT USERS AGAINST STATISTICAL
MATCHING: NON-ASYMPTOTIC RESULTS
3.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2, the concept of perfect privacy is defined and the limits of privacy are
characterized. However, Chapter 2 limits their consideration to the asymptotic case. Here,
we obtain the exact expressions for the discrete and finite case where user data samples are
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) and independent of other users’ data sets,
while employing both anonymization and obfuscation techniques. Our results, while ex-
act, are unwieldy. Similar to [62], the expression for the error probability could be used
in asymptotic analyses to approach the problem from a different perspective from the in-
formation theoretic approach used in Chapter 2. In addition to its potential in asymptotic
analyses, we demonstrate here how the results can be used to answer meaningful questions
in the application. In particular, Chapter 2 indicates that, given enough obfuscation, the
length m of the observed traces does not matter. Likewise, given a large enough m, ob-
fuscation is not needed. And, conversely, if both are beneath their thresholds, a user does
not have privacy. This gives the idea that the two methods work independently, and never
need be employed in unison. Here, our expression for the finite case allow us to investigate
whether this is true for smaller (practical) values of the number of users n and sequence
length m.
The work presented in this chapter was published in [112].
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Notation: In this chapter, P
(
X = x
Y = y) is used for the conditional probability of X = x
given Y = y. When we write P
(
X
Y ) , we are referring to a random variable that is defined
as a function of Y .
3.2 System Model, Definitions, and Metrics
Consider a system with n users and denote Xu(k) as a sample of the data of user u
at time k, which we desire to protect from the adversary. In the discrete case, there is a
countable number of possible states for each sample of each user’s data. However, here
we consider the binary case, where the data is restricted to {0,1}. User u is distinguished
by Pu the probability that Xu(k) = 1 for any k. Per Section 3.1, we assume the adversary
knows Pu, u = 1,2, · · · ,n, based on prior observations of the users, and it is this statistical
knowledge that they will employ to identity users by the characteristics of their data traces.
Finally, Pu, u = 1,2, · · · ,n, are drawn independently from a distribution fP.
As shown in Figure 3.1, we employ both anonymization and obfuscation techniques
to protect the users’ identities. In Figure 3.1, Zu(k) is the reported sample of the data of
user u at time k, where Zu(k) has a Bernoulli distribution with the obfuscated probability
of being in state 1 denoted as Qu. Yu(k) is the data of user u at time k after applying
both obfuscation and anonymization; Yu(k) has a Bernoulli distribution with the estimated
probability of being in state 1 denoted as Wu.
Figure 3.1: Applying obfuscation and anonymization techniques to users’ data samples.
Obfuscation Model: The obfuscation is characterized by random variables, Ru, u =
1,2, . . . ,n, which are drawn independently from a distribution fR. The value of Ru is the
probability that a sample of the data of user u is intentionally reported with error. Hence,
the effect of the obfuscation is to alter the probability Pu, u = 1,2, . . . ,n of each user in
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a way that is unknown to the adversary, since the obfuscation is independent of all past
activity of the user. For the binary case, where there are two states (state 0 and state 1) for
a user’s data pattern, we can write
Zu(k) =

Xu(k), with probability of 1 − Ru.
1 − Xu(k), with probability of Ru.
Anonymization Model: Anonymization is modeled by a random permutation Π such that
for user u, the pseudonym of Π(u) is assigned. The users’ identities are permuted after each
m samples, i.e., the observation sequences which the adversary uses to perform statistically
matching are of length m. We can write
Yu(k) = ZΠ−1(u) and Zu(k) = YΠ(u).
The adversary attempts to identify the users based on the observations. Per above, we
assume a powerful adversary who has complete statistical knowledge of the users’ behavior,
which means that they know Pu and their distribution fP, for u = 1,2, . . . ,n. The adversary
does not know the instantiation of Ru, u = 1,2, . . . ,n, or the permutation Π for each time
period of length m.
The goal of the adversary is to correctly identify the users (i.e., figure out the in-
stantiation of the permutation Π) based on their observation of YΠ(u)(k), k = 1,2, . . . ,m,
u = 1,2, . . . ,n. We illustrate this in Figure 3.2, where the adversary tries to statisti-
cally match each Pu, u = 1,2, . . . ,n, to their corresponding observation sequences YΠ(u),
u = 1,2, . . . ,n in order to identify them.
Our metric is the adversary’s probability of being correct, which is the probability that
the adversary identifies the data of user u successfully.
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Figure 3.2: The goal of the adversary: match each Pu of user u for u = 1,2, . . . ,n to each
observed sequences YΠ(u)(1),YΠ(u)(2), . . . ,YΠ(u)(m) for u = 1,2, . . . ,n.
Here we assume the distribution fP and the distribution fR to be uniform. Note that
the problem is still Bayesian because the adversary knows Pu and their distribution fP, for
u = 1,2, · · · ,n.
3.3 Analytical and Numerical Results
3.3.1 Privacy with Anonymization
In this section, we consider the case where only anonymization is employed to provide
user privacy. The identification problem can be formulated as a hypothesis testing problem,
with the optimal test a straightforward adaptation of the work in [61]. This chapter provides
an optimal hypothesis test in the case where the adversary has training sequences from the
same group of users. Here, the optimal test can be obtained by replacing the empirical
number of ones in [61] with the true (ensemble) values of Pu,u = 1,2, · · · ,n. Thus, the
optimal test is given by:
Theorem 6. The optimal hypothesis test in the case with binary observations and n users
is given by: 1) Order (either descending or ascending) the data sequences by the number
of ones they contain, and order {Pu,u = 1,2, · · · ,n}; 2) match each data sequence to the Pu
(and hence, the user) at the same position in these orders.
Let As, s = 0,1, . . . , dn2e − 1 be the event that: 1) exactly s of the users have Pu ≤ P1
but sum of observation sequence
∑m
k=1 YΠ(u)(k) ≥
∑m
k=1 YΠ(1)(k) (we term this as "user
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moves from left to right"), and 2) exactly s users have Pu ≥ P1 but sum of observation
sequence
∑m
k=1 YΠ(u)(k) ≤
∑m
k=1 YΠ(1)(k), (we term this as "user moves from right to left")
for u = 1,2, . . . ,n. Given that A0, A1, · · · , Ad n2 e−1 are disjoint, the probability Ps that the
adversary detects user 1 correctly is given by
Ps = P
©­«
d n2 e−1⋃
s=0
As
ª®¬ =
d n2 e−1∑
s=0
P(As).
We denote Wu =
m∑
k=1
YΠ(u)(k)
m , u = 1,2, · · · ,n, as the estimation of Pu based on the ob-
served sequence. Thus, in order to obtain P(As |P1,W1), we first consider the probability that
a user moves from left to right, which we denote as PL→R(P1 = p1,W1 = w1), and the prob-
ability that a user moves from right to left, which we denote as PR→L(P1 = p1,W1 = w1).
So we have,
PL→R (P1 = p1,W1 = w1) = EPu
[
P
({
User u moves to right
}{User u starts on left})
· P
({
User u starts on left
}Pu,P1 = p1,W1 = w1) ]
= EPu
[ m∑
l=dw1·me
(
m
l
)
Plu (1 − Pu)m−1 I{Pu≤p1}
]
=
∫ p1
0
m∑
l=dw1·me
(
m
l
)
plu (1 − pu)m−1 dpu.
Likewise,
PR→L (P1 = p1,W1 = w1) = EPu
[
P
({
User u moves to left
}{User u starts on right})
· P
({
User u starts on right
}Pu,P1 = p1,W1 = w1) ]
= EPu
[ bw1·mc∑
l=0
(
m
l
)
Plu (1 − Pu)m−1 I{Pu≥p1}
]
=
∫ 1
p1
bw1·mc∑
l=0
(
m
l
)
plu (1 − pu)m−1 dpu.
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Because a user’s movement left-to-right or right-to-left is independent of other users
when conditioned on P1 and W1, we obtain P (As |P1,W1) by employing a multinomial
distribution with three categories. We denote N1 as the number of users that move from left
to right, N2 as the number of users that move from right to left, and N3 as the number of
remaining users. Then,
P (As |P1,W1) = P (N1 = s,N2 = s,N3 = n − 2s − 1)
=
(n − 1)!
s!s!(n − 2s − 1)!P
s
I P
s
I I P
n−2s−1
I I I ,
where PI = PL→R(P1 = p1,W1 = w1), PI I = PR→L(P1 = p1,W1 = w1), and PI I I =
1 − PL→R(P1 = p1,W1 = w1) − PR→L(P1 = p1,W1 = w1).
Thus, the probability that the adversary successfully identifies user 1 is given by:
Ps =EP1,W1
[ d n2 e−1∑
s=0
P (As |P1,W1)
]
=
∫ 1
0
m∑
h=0
d n2 e−1∑
s=0
P (As |P1,W1) fP1W1(p1, h)dp1. (3.1)
where, noting p1 is uniformly distributed on [0,1],
fP1W1 (p1, h) = fW1 |P1 (h|p1) · fP1 (p1)
=
(
m
h
)
ph1 (1 − p1)m−h .
To get some insight into the effect of anonymization on privacy, we show the probability
of correct (Ps) in Figure 3.3, and compare the theoretical results in (3.1) with simulation
results. As expected, the theoretical results match the simulation results. We can also
notice that if we decrease the number m of observations per user, or increase the number n
of users, the probability of correct decreases. This shows more users and a higher level of
anonymization achieve more privacy, as expected.
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Figure 3.3: Comparison of simulation and theoretical results for correct probability (Ps) in
identifying a given user when there are 2 users, 5 users, and 8 users in the case that only
the anonymization technique is employed.
3.3.2 Privacy with Anonymization and Obfuscation
In this section, we employ both obfuscation and anonymization techniques to achieve
privacy, and consider how these two techniques combine with each other to affect user
privacy.
Recall that the obfuscation is characterized by a random variable Ru, u = 1,2, · · · ,n,
which given the probability that any data sample of user u is changed to a different data
sample by obfuscation. We assume Ru is distributed uniformly over [0,a], where a is noise
level.
Let us define Qu as the probability of Xu(k) = 1 after obfuscation; then we have
Qu = Pu + Ru(1 − 2Pu)
Similar to the previous part, the probability that the adversary correctly identifies the
data trace of user 1 is given by:
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Ps = P
©­«
d n2 e−1⋃
s=0
As
ª®¬ =
d n2 e−1∑
s=0
P(As).
Figure 3.4: Comparison of simulation and theoretical results of the correct probability (Ps)
in identifying a given user when there are 2 users, 5 users, and 8 users in the case that
both obfuscation and anonymization techniques are employed. The noise level is fixed as
a = 0.5.
To obtain P(As |P1,R1,W1), consider the probability a user moves from left to right,
which we denote as PL→R (P1 = p1,R1 = r1,W1 = w1) and the probability a user moves
from right to left, which we denote as PR→L (P1 = p1,R1 = r1,W1 = w1). Now,
PL→R (P1 = p1,R1 = r1,W1 = w1) =
EPu,Ru
[
P
({
User u moves to right
}{User u starts on left})
· P
({
User u starts on left
}Pu,Ru,P1,R1,W1) ]
= EPu,Ru
[ m∑
l=dw1·me
(
m
l
)
Qlu (1 −Qu)m−1 I{Pu≤p1}
]
=
∫ p1
0
∫ a
0
m∑
l=dw1·me
(
m
l
)
qlu (1 − qu)m−1 ·
(
1
a
)
drudpu.
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Likewise,
PR→L (P1 = p1,R1 = r1,W1 = w1) =
EPu,Ru
[
P
({
User u moves to left
}{User u starts on right})
· P
({
User u starts on right
}Pu,Ru,P1,R1,W1) ]
= EPu,Ru
[ bw1·mc∑
l=0
(
m
l
)
Qlu (1 −Qu)m−1 I{Pu≥p1}
]
=
∫ 1
p1
∫ a
0
bw1·mc∑
l=0
(
m
l
)
qlu (1 − qu)m−1 ·
(
1
a
)
drudpu,
As a result, for obtaining P (As |P1,R1,W1), we write the multinomial distribution as
P (As |P1,R1,W1) = P (N1 = s,N2 = s,N3 = n − 2s − 1)
=
(n − 1)!
s!s!(n − 2s − 1)!P
s
I P
s
I I · Pn−2s−1I I I ,
where PI = PL→R, PI I = PR→L , and PI I I = 1 − PL→R − PR→L .
Thus, the probability that the adversary successfully detects user 1 is given by
Ps =EP1,R1,W1
[ d n2 e−1∑
s=0
P(As |P1,R1,W1)
]
.
Now we can conclude
Ps =
∫ 1
0
∫ a
0
m∑
h=0
d n2 e−1∑
s=0
P (As |P1,W1) fP1R1W1(p1,r1, h)dr1dp1, (3.2)
where fP1R1W1(p1,r1, h) is given by
fP1R1W1(p1,r1, h) = fW1 |R1P1(h|r1, p1) fR1 |P1(r1 |p1) fP1(p1)
=
(
m
h
)
ph1(1 − p1)m−h ·
(
1
a
)
.
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Again, to get some insight of how anonymization and obfuscation combine to affect
privacy, we provide numerical and simulation results in Figures 3.4 and 3.5. We compare
the theoretical results in (3.2) with the simulation results, and, as expected, we see that the
theoretical results match the simulation results.
In Figure 3.4, we show the correct probability (Ps) for different numbers of users (n)
and length (m) of observation sequences, with a fixed noise level of a = 0.5. The figure
implies that, similar to the case with only anonymization, if m decreases or n increases, the
correct probability (Ps) decreases. In general, if we compare Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4, we
see that anonymization among with obfuscation leads to better results in preserving privacy,
as expected from our intuition but in contrast to what is suggested by the asymptotic results
of Chapter 2. We investigate this further in Figure 3.6 below.
In Figure 3.5, we fix m = 5 and show Ps for different n and a. We see that a higher level
of noise results in a lower correct probability. It shows the degree to which a high level of
obfuscation preserves privacy.
Figure 3.5: Comparison of simulation and theoretical results of the correct probability (Ps)
in identifying a given user when there are 2 users, 5 users, and 8 users in the case that both
obfuscation and anonymization techniques are employed. The length of the observation
sequences is fixed as m = 5.
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Finally, Figure 3.6 shows for small n and m, anonymization and obfuscation work to-
gether for preserving users’ privacy. We see that when the anonymization level is not high
enough (i.e. m is large) obfuscation helps in protecting user privacy (i.e. Ps decreases when
a is large), and when the obfuscation level is not high enough (i.e. a is small), anonymiza-
tion helps in protecting user privacy (i.e. Ps decreases when m is small). In fact, the
sharp corner observed in the asymptotic case, which would suggest the center of the plot
in Figure 3.6, would contain the corner of a box, is not evident. Instead, we see a smooth
transition where the techniques can be used in conjunction when neither is sufficient by
itself.
Figure 3.6: Simulation results for the correct probability (Ps) in identifying a given user
vs. the number of observations per user (m) and noise level (a) for 10 users in the case that
both obfuscation and anonymization techniques are employed.
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CHAPTER 4
PRIVACY OF DEPENDENT USERS AGAINST STATISTICAL
MATCHING
4.1 Introduction
Many modern applications provide an enhanced user experience by exploiting users’
characteristics, including their past choices and present states. In particular, emerging In-
ternet of Things (IoT) applications include smart homes, healthcare, and connected ve-
hicles that intelligently tailor their performances to their users. For such applications
to be able to provide their enhanced, user-tailored performances, they need to request
their clients for potentially sensitive user information such as mobility behaviors and so-
cial preferences. Therefore, such applications trade off user privacy for enhanced utility.
hence, questions arise about the degree to which user privacy is compromised in seek-
ing an enhanced experience. Previous work [74] shows that even if users’ data traces are
anonymized before being provided to such applications, standard statistical matching tech-
niques can be used to leak users’ private information. Thus, privacy and security threats
are a major obstacle to the wide adoption of IoT applications, as demonstrated by prior
studies [3, 5, 27, 44, 47, 66, 84, 85, 87, 101, 115, 116, 118, 120, 122].
The bulk of previous work assumes independence between the traces of different users. [4,
22, 25, 68, 95, 126, 131] have mostly considered temporal and spatial dependency within
data traces, but not cross-user dependency. In [4], an obfuscation technique is employed to
achieve privacy; however, for continuous Location-Based Services (LBS) queries, there is
often strong temporal dependency in the locations. Hence, [4] considers how dependency
The work presented in this chapter was published in [110, 114] and submitted to [108].
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of the users’ obfuscated data can impact privacy, and then employs an adaptive noise level
to achieve more privacy while still maintaining an acceptable level of utility. Liu et al. [68]
show that the spatiotemporal dependency between neighboring location sets can ruin the
privacy achieved using a dummy-based location-privacy preserving mechanism (LPPM);
to solve this problem, they propose a spatiotemporal dependency-aware privacy protec-
tion that perturbs the spatiotemporal dependency between neighboring locations. Zhang
et al. [131] employ Protecting Location Privacy (PLP) against dependency-analysis attack
in crowd sensing: the potential dependency between users’ data is modeled, and the data
is filtered to remove the samples that disclose the user’s private data. In [126], locations
of a single user are temporally dependent, and δ-location set based differential privacy is
proposed to achieve location privacy at every timestamp. Finally, Song et al. [104] provide
privacy when there is dependency within the data of a single user. In summary, previ-
ous studies do not consider dependency between users, which is the focus of this work.
We argue that for many applications, there is dependency between the traces of different
users. For example, friends tend to travel together or might meet at given places, hence
introducing dependency between the traces of their location information. Several previ-
ous works [56, 57, 67, 78, 128, 130, 135] have considered cross-user dependency; however,
this only has been for protecting queries on aggregated data, which is different than our
application scenario.
We use the notion of “perfect privacy” and “no privacy”, as introduced in Chapter 2, to
evaluate the privacy of user traces. The “perfect privacy” notion provides an information-
theoretic guarantee on privacy in the presence of a strong adversary who has complete
knowledge on users’ prior data traces. On the opposite extreme is the notion of ‘no pri-
vacy”. It means there exists an algorithm for the adversary to estimate the actual data points
of users with diminishing error probability. In Chapter 2, we have derived the degree of
user anonymization and data obfuscation required to obtain perfect privacy—assuming that
the data traces of different users are independent across users. Particularly, we evaluated
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the case of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) samples from a given user and
the case when there is temporal dependency within the trace of a given user (but indepen-
dent across users). In this work, we expand our study to the case where there is dependency
between the data traces of users. That is, we investigate how privacy is affected by the pres-
ence of dependency between the data traces of users when anonymization and obfuscation
techniques are used. We show that dependency significantly reduces the privacy of users.
Specifically, we show that the same anonymization and obfuscation levels that could pro-
duce perfect privacy for independent users result in no privacy for dependent users. Thus,
in the presence of inter-user dependency, we need to employ much stronger anonymization
and obfuscation compare to the case data traces of different users are independent.
We model dependency between user traces with an association graph, where the pres-
ence of an edge between the vertices corresponding to a pair of users indicates a non-zero
dependency between their data traces. We employ standard concentration inequalities to
demonstrate that the adversary can readily determine this association graph. Using this
association graph and statistical data about the users, the adversary can attempt to identify
users, and we demonstrate that this provides the adversary with a significant advantage ver-
sus the case when the data traces of different users are independent of one another. This
suggests that, unless additional countermeasures are employed, the results of Chapter 2 for
independent traces are optimistic when user traces are dependent. We next consider the
effectiveness of countermeasures. First, we argue that adding independent obfuscation to
user data points is often ineffective in improving the privacy of (dependent) users. Next,
we demonstrate that, if users with dependent traces can jointly design their obfuscation,
user privacy can be significantly improved.
A related but parallel approach to our study is graph alignment in which the edge set
is sampled at random. Graph alignment is the problem of finding a matching between
the vertices of the two graphs that matches, or aligns, many edges of the first graph with
edges of the second graph. Shirani et. al. [92, 94] and Cullina et. al. [20] have done
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significant work on graph alignment. Although the graph alignment problem looks similar
to our problem on the surface, there exist notable differences between the two. First, in
Shirani et. al.’s work [92–94], graphs are generated using a model which is sampled at
random from a probability distribution, while here the association graph is deterministic,
as it is based on the dependency between data traces of users. Consequently, Shirani et.
al. [92–94] used a completely different approach and solution to de-anonymize users. In
other words, they have not used the probability distribution of the data traces of each user to
break anonymization, while here the probability distribution of the data trace of each user
is a key characteristic which helps the adversary to break users’ privacy. Finally, Shirani et.
al. [92, 94] considered discrete values for the correlation between users and used them to
de-anonymize the graph, while here the correlation between users have continuous values
and the adversary does not have access to the exact value of them.
[20,21,26] considered the graph alignment for two correlated graphs, while here we as-
sume the adversary has the association graph and tries to reconstruct it from the anonymized
and obfuscated data traces. Thus, in our work, the adversary has two identical graphs and
their goal is to identify all of the users based on the observed data and their statistical
knowledge of users. Also, Cullina et. al. [20] considered fractional matching, while here
the adversary can identify not only all of the users but also the data points of each user at
all time with small error probability. [48, 52, 83, 129] studied matching of non-identical
pairs of correlated Erdös-Rényi graphs.
Also, graph isomorphism studied in [7,9,17,24] is an instance of the matching problem
where the two graphs are identical copies of one another. [9] studied different algorithms
such as maximum degree algorithms to match two identical graphs for the case where
each edge of the graph has a fixed probability of being present or absent which is in the
range of
[
ω
(
log n/n 15
)
,1 − ω
(
log n/n 15
)]
, where n is the number of vertices in the graph.
Here, the approach of our work is completely different, as the adversary uses probability
distributions of users’ data traces to reconstruct the association graph. After reconstruction
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of the association graph, the adversary uses the size of each disjoint group to identify all of
the members.
In summary, although matching (alignment) between graphs can be considered as a part
of our analysis, the analysis based on the users’ data traces and the statistical knowledge
of the adversary is a key part of this chapter which distinguishes it from previous works on
graph alignment.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we present the model
and metrics considered in this work. In Sections 4.3 and 4.4, we show dependency between
users’ traces degrades privacy. In Section 4.5, we discuss how our methodology can be
applied to a more general setting for the association graph. In Section 4.6, we propose a
method to improve privacy in the case when there exists inter-user dependency.
4.2 System Model, Definitions, and Metrics
Here, we employ a similar framework to Chapter 2. The system has n users, and Xu(k)
is the data point of user u at time k. Our main goal is protecting Xu(k) from a strong
adversary who has full knowledge of the (unique) marginal probability distribution function
of the data points of each user based on previous observations or other sources. In order
to achieve data privacy for users, both anonymization and obfuscation techniques can be
used as shown in Figure 4.1. In Figure 4.1, Zu(k) shows the (reported) data point of user
u at time k after applying obfuscation, and Yu(k) shows the (reported) data point of user
u at time k after applying anonymization to Zu(k). Let m = m(n) be the number of data
points after which the pseudonyms of users are changed using anonymization. To break
obfuscation and anonymization, the adversary tries to estimate Xu(k), k = 1,2, · · · ,m, from
m observations per user by matching the sequence of observations to the known statistical
characteristics of the users. Let Xu be the m × 1 vector containing the data points of user u,
and X be the m × n matrix with the uth column equal to Xu:
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Figure 4.1: Applying obfuscation and anonymization techniques to the users’ data points.
Xu =

Xu(1)
Xu(2)
...
Xu(m)

, X = [X1 X2 · · · Xn] .
Data Points Model: Here, we assume two different models for users’ data points: in the
first case, we assume the sequence of data for any individual user is modeled by i.i.d. which
could apply directly to data that is sampled at a low rate. In addition, understanding the
i.i.d. case can also be considered the first step toward understanding the more complicated
case where there is temporal dependency. In the second case, we assume the data trace of
any individual users is governed by Markov chain in which each sample of users’ data is
dependent over time.
We also assume users’ data points can have one of r possible values (0,1, · · · ,r − 1).
Thus, according to a user-specific probability distribution (pu), Xu(k) is equal to a value in
{0,1, · · · ,r − 1} at any time. Note pu(i) is the probability of user u having the data value i,
so
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pu =

pu(1)
pu(2)
...
pu(r − 1)

, for each u ∈ {1,2, · · · ,n}.
We also assume pu’s are drawn independently from some continuous density function,
fP(pu), which has support on a subset of the (0,1)r−1 hypercube. Note these user-specific
probability distributions, i.e., pu’s, are known to the adversary and form the basis upon
which they perform (statistical) matching.
Association Graph: An association graph or dependency graph is an undirected graph
representing dependency of the data of users with each other. Let G(V,F) denote the
association graph with set of nodesV, (|V| = n), and set of edges F. Two vertices (users)
are connected if their data sets are dependent. More specifically,
• (u,u′) < F iff I(Xu(k); Xu′(k)) = 0,
• (u,u′) ∈ F iff I(Xu(k); Xu′(k)) > 0,
where I (Xu(k); Xu′(k)) is the mutual information between the k th data point of user u and
user u′1.
Obfuscation Model: Obfuscation perturbs the users’ data points [10, 39, 99]; in other
words, the obfuscation can be viewed as passing data through a noisy channel. Normally,
in such settings, each user has only limited knowledge of the characteristics of the overall
population. Thus, usually, a simple distributed method in which the data points of each
1It is worth noting that the mechanism that determines the joint distribution of Xu(k) and Xu′(k) does not
affect the results of this chapter as long as the marginal densities of Xu(k)’s (i.e., pu’s) are drawn indepen-
dently from fP(pu).
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user are reported with error with a certain probability is employed [123]. Note that this
probability itself is generated randomly for each user. Let Zu be the vector that contains
the obfuscated version of user u’s data points, and Z be the collection of Zu for all users,
Zu =

Zu(1)
Zu(2)
...
Zu(m)

, Z = [Z1 Z2 · · · Zn] .
Here, we define the asymptotic noise level for an obfuscation technique. Loosely speak-
ing, the asymptotic noise level of obfuscation is the highest probable percentage of data
points that are corrupted. More precisely, for a subset of users U, let Xu(k) be the actual
data point of user u at time k, u ∈ U, k ∈ {1,2, · · · ,m}, and let Zu(k) be the obfuscated
(noisy) version of Xu(k). Define
Am(u) = |{k : Zu(k) , Xu(k)}|m .
Then, the asymptotic noise level for user u is defined as follows:
a(u) = inf
{
τ ≥ 0 : P (Am(u) > τ) → 0 as m→∞
}
.
Also, define
Am =
∑
u∈U
|{k : Zu(k) , Xu(k)}|
m|U | ,
then, the asymptotic noise level for the entire dataset is
a = inf
{
τ ≥ 0 : P (Am > τ) → 0 as m→∞
}
.
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Note that while the above definition is given for a general case required in Section 4.6,
in practice we often use simple obfuscation techniques that employ i.i.d. noise sequences.
Then, by the Strong Law of Large Number (SLLN),
|{k : Zu(k) , Xu(k)}|
m
a.s.−−→ P (Zu(k) , Xu(k)) ,
and for any k,
a(u) = P (Zu(k) , Xu(k)) .
Anonymization Model: In the anonymization technique, the identity of the users is per-
turbed [18, 33, 45, 71, 74, 96, 102]. Anonymization is modeled by a random permutation Π
on the set of n users. Let Yu be the vector which contains the anonymized version of Zu,
and Y is the collection of Yu for all users, thus
Y = Perm (Z1,Z2, · · · ,Zn;Π)
=
[
ZΠ−1(1) ZΠ−1(2) · · · ZΠ−1(n)
]
= [Y1 Y2 · · · Yn] ,
where Perm( . ,Π) is the permutation operation with permutation function Π. As a result,
Yu = ZΠ−1(u) and YΠ(u) = Zu.
Adversary Model: We assume the adversary has full knowledge of the marginal proba-
bility distribution function of each of the users on {0,1, . . . ,r − 1}. As discussed in the
data points models in succeeding sections, the parameters pu, u = 1,2, · · · ,n are drawn
independently from a continuous density function, fP(pu), which has support on a subset
of a given hypercube. The density fP(pu) might be unknown to the adversary, so all that is
assumed here is that such a density exists. From the results, it will be evident that knowing
or not knowing fP(pu) does not change the results asymptotically.
The adversary knows the anonymization mechanism but does not know the realization
of the random permutation. The adversary also knows the obfuscation mechanism but does
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not know the realization of the noise parameters. And finally, the adversary knows the as-
sociation graph G(V,F), but does not necessarily know the exact nature of the dependency.
That is, while the adversary knows the marginal distributions Xu(k) as well as which pairs
of users have strictly positive mutual information, they might not know the joint distribu-
tions or even the values of the mutual information I(Xu(k); Xu′(k)).
It is critical to note that the adversary does not have any other auxiliary information or
side information about users’ data.
We adopt the definitions of perfect privacy and no privacy from Chapter 2:
Definition 3. User u has perfect privacy at time k if and only if
lim
n→∞ I (Xu(k); Y) = 0,
where I (Xu(k); Y) denotes the mutual information between the data point of user u at time
k and the collection of the adversary’s observations for all the users.
Definition 4. For an algorithm for the adversary that tries to estimate the actual data point
of user u at time k, define the error probability as
Pe(u, k) = P
( Xu(k) , Xu(k)) ,
where Xu(k) is the actual data point of user u at time k, Xu(k) is the adversary’s estimated
data point of user u at time k. Now, define E as the set of all possible adversary’s estimators.
Then, user u has no privacy at time k, if and only if,
P∗e(u, k) = limn→∞ infE P
( Xu(k) , Xu(k)) → 0.
Hence, a user has no privacy if there exists an algorithm for the adversary to estimate Xu(k)
with diminishing error probability as n goes to infinity.
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Discussion 1: The studied anonymization and obfuscation mechanisms improve user pri-
vacy at the cost of user utility. An anonymization mechanism works by frequently changing
the pseudonym mappings of users to reduce the length of time series that can be exploited
by statistical analysis. However, such frequent changes may also degrade the usability of
the underlying application by concealing the temporal relation between a user’s data points,
e.g., for a dining recommendation system that makes suggestions based on the dining his-
tory of its users. On the other hand, obfuscation mechanisms work by adding noise to users’
collected data, e.g., location information. The added noise may also degrade the utility of
the system. In this work, our goal is studying the level of anonymization and obfuscation
one should employ to ensure privacy with the minimum loss in utility. In other words, we
derive the optimal frequency of changing user pseudonyms during anonymization, and the
optimal extent of noise added by an obfuscation mechanism while guaranteeing privacy.
However, like similar works in privacy [18,33,45,71,74,118], we consider the quantifi-
cation of utility orthogonal to our privacy evaluations for two reasons: (1) the implications
of our PPMs on utility do not impact our privacy analysis, and (2) unlike privacy, the de-
sired level of utility is application specific.
Discussion 2: Note that there are two kinds of dependency:
• Intra-user dependency: In this case, there is temporal and spatial dependency within
data traces of one user. For example, when the data trace of a user is governed by
a Markov chain model, the Markov chain characterizes temporal intra-user depen-
dency. Thus, the adversary can benefit from this dependency and break the users’
privacy. According to the results obtained in [111], when there are a large number
of users in the setting (n → ∞), and data traces of the users are governed by i.i.d.
statistics with r possible values for each data point, users have no privacy if and
only if the number of adversary’s observations per user (m) is significantly larger
than n
2
r−1 and the amount of noise level (an) is significantly smaller than n− 1r−1 ; how-
ever, if the data trace of users is governed by an irreducible and aperiodic Markov
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chains with r states and |E | edges, users have no privacy if and only if the number
of adversary’s observations per user (m) is significantly larger than n 2|E |−r and the
amount of noise level (an) is significantly smaller than n−
1
|E |−r . Most of the previous
work [4, 22, 25, 68, 95, 126, 131] that considers intra-user dependency assumes inde-
pendence between the traces of different users, which is different from our work as
described below.
• Inter-user dependency: Here, there exists dependency between the traces of different
users. This is the main focus of our work. First, we demonstrate that the adversary
can readily identify the association graph of the obfuscated and anonymized version
of the data, revealing which user data traces are dependent. Next, we demonstrate that
the adversary can use this association graph along with their statistical knowledge
and the observed obfuscated and anonymized sequences to break user privacy with
significantly shorter traces than in the case of independent users, and that obfuscating
data traces independently across users is often insufficient to remedy such leakage.
Discussion 3: The general models of multi-user in classical information theory assume a
fixed number of users and the fundamental limits of communication systems are charac-
terized by studying the asymptotic limits of infinite coding blocklength [41, 43, 63, 119].
However, the emerging Internet of Things enables an ever-increasing number of users to
share and access information on a large scale, i.e., applications, such as ride sharing and
dining recommendation applications, the number of users is large. Thus, the number of
users is allowed to grow with the blocklength [13,14,42], and our goal is for the asymptotic
results to provide a good insight to the performance of the privacy-preserving mechanisms
for these applications. Moreover, both of the privacy definitions given above (perfect pri-
vacy and no privacy) are asymptotic in the number of users (n → ∞), which allows us to
find clean analytical results for the fundamental limits.
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4.3 Impact of Dependency on Privacy Using Anonymization
In this section, we consider only anonymization and thus the obfuscation block in Fig-
ure 4.1 is not present. In this case, the adversary’s observation Y is the anonymized version
of X; thus
Y = Perm (X1,X2, · · · ,Xn;Π)
=
[
XΠ−1(1) XΠ−1(2) · · · XΠ−1(n)
]
= [Y1 Y2 · · · Yn] .
4.3.1 r-State i.i.d. Model
There is potentially dependency between the data of different users, but we assume here
that the sequence of data for any individual user is i.i.d.. We also assume users’ data points
can have r possibilities (0,1, · · · ,r − 1), and pu(i) is the probability of user u having the
data value i, i.e., pu(i) = P (Xu(k) = i), for k = 1,2, · · · ,m. We define the vectors pu and p
as
pu =

pu(1)
pu(2)
...
pu(r − 1)

, p =
[
p1 p2 · · · pn
]
.
We also assume pu’s are drawn independently from some continuous density function,
fP(pu), which has support on a subset of the (0,1)r−1 hypercube. In particular, define the
range of the distribution as
RP =
{(x1, x2, · · · , xr−1) ∈ (0,1)r−1 : xi > 0, x1 + x2 + · · · + xr−1 < 1} ,
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then, we assume there are δ1, δ2 > 0 such that:

δ1 ≤ fP(pu) ≤ δ2, pu ∈ RP.
fP(pu) = 0, pu < RP.
The adversary knows the values of pu, u = 1,2, · · · ,n, and uses this knowledge to match
the observed traces to the users. We will use capital letters (i.e., Pu) when we are referring
to the random variable, and use lower case (i.e., pu) to refer to the realization of Pu.
A vector containing the permutation of those probabilities after anonymization is
W = Perm (P1,P2, · · · ,Pn;Π)
=
[
PΠ−1(1) PΠ−1(2) · · · PΠ−1(n)
]
= [W1 W2 · · · Wn] ,
where Wu = PΠ−1(u) and WΠ(u) = Pu.
In this case, we can say:
• (u,u′) < F iff for all i, j ∈ {0,1, · · · ,r − 1}, puu′(i, j) = pu(i)pu′( j),
• (u,u′) ∈ F iff for at least one pair of i, j ∈ {0,1, · · · ,r − 1}, puu′(i, j) , pu(i)pu′( j),
where puu′(i, j) = P (Xu(k) = i,Xu′(k) = j), pu(i) = P (Xu(k) = i), and pu′( j) = P (Xu′(k) = j).
Note that the adversary knows the association graph G(V,F), but does not necessarily
know the joint probability distribution for each specific (u,u′) ∈ F. The adversary observes
the anonymized version of users’ data traces and combines them with their full knowledge
of the marginal probability distribution of each of the users and the structure of the whole
association graph to break users’ privacy with arbitrarily small error probability.
In the first step, we show that the adversary can reliably reconstruct the entire asso-
ciation graph for the anonymized version of the data (i.e., the observed data traces) with
relatively few observations.
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Lemma 7. Consider a general association graph G(V,F). If the adversary obtains m =
(log n)3 anonymized observations per user, they can construct G˜ = G˜(V˜, F˜), where V˜ =
{Π(u) : u ∈ V} = V, such that with high probability, for all u,u′ ∈ V; (u,u′) ∈ F iff
(Π(u),Π(u′)) ∈ F˜. We write this statement as P(G˜ ' G) → 1, i.e., Graph G and Graph G˜
are isomorphic with high probability.
Proof. For u,u′ ∈ {1,2, · · · ,n}, we normally write v = Π(u) and v′ = Π(u′). We provide
an algorithm for the adversary that with high probability obtains all edges of F correctly.
First, for all v, v′ ∈ {1,2, · · · ,n}, and all i, j ∈ {0,1, · · · ,r − 1} the adversary computespvv′(i, j), pv(i), and pv′( j) as follow:
pvv′(i, j) = |{k : Yv(k) = i,Yv′(k) = j}|m = M̂vv′(i, j)m , (4.1)
pv(i) = |{k : Yv(k) = i}|m = M̂v(i)m , (4.2)
pv′( j) = |{k : Yv′(k) = j}|m = M̂v′( j)m , (4.3)
where
M̂vv′(i, j) = |{k : Yv(k) = i,Yv′(k) = j}|.
M̂v(i) = |{k : Yv(k) = i}|.
M̂v′( j) = |{k : Yv′(k) = j}|.
After observing m = (log n)3 data points per user and computing the above expressions,
the adversary constructs G˜ in the following way:
• If
 M̂vv′(i,j)m − M̂v(i)m M̂v′( j)m  ≤ m− 15 for all i, j ∈ {0,1, · · · ,r − 1}, then (v, v′) < F˜ .
81
• If
 M̂vv′(i,j)m − M̂v(i)m M̂v′( j)m  ≥ m− 15 for at least one pair of i, j ∈ {0,1, · · · ,r − 1}, then
(v, v′) ∈ F˜ .
We show the above method yields P(G˜ ' G) → 1 as n→∞, as follows. Note
M̂vv′(i, j) ∼ Binomial(m,wvv′(i, j)),
M̂v(i) ∼ Binomial(m,wv(i)),
M̂v′( j) ∼ Binomial(m,wv′( j)),
where wvv′(i, j) = P (Yv(k) = i,Yv′(k) = j) = pΠ−1(v)Π−1(v′)(i, j), wv(i) = P (Yv(k) = i) =
pΠ−1(v)(i), and wv′( j) = P (Yv′(k) = j) = pΠ−1(v′)( j). Now, for all v, v′ ∈ {1,2, · · · ,n} and all
i, j ∈ {0,1, · · · ,r − 1}, define
Jvv′(i, j) =
{Mvv′(i, j)m − wvv′(i, j) ≥ m− 14 } ,
then, for all v, v′ ∈ {1,2, · · · ,n} and all i, j ∈ {0,1, · · · ,r − 1}, the Chernoff bound yields
P (Jvv′(i, j)) ≤ 2e−
√
m
3wvv′ (i, j) ≤ 2e−
√
m
3 .
Similarly, for all v, v′ ∈ {1,2, · · · ,n} and all i, j ∈ {0,1, · · · ,r − 1}, define
Jv(i) =
{Mv(i)m − wv(i) ≥ m− 14 } ,
Jv′( j) =
{Mv′( j)m − wv′( j) ≥ m− 14 } ,
then, the Chernoff bound yields,
P (Jv(i)) ≤ 2e−
√
m
3 ,
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P (Jv′( j)) ≤ 2e−
√
m
3 ,
Now, by employing a union bound, for all v, v′ ∈ {1,2, · · · ,n} and all i, j ∈ {0,1, · · · ,r−1},
we have
P (Jvv′(i, j) ∪ Jv(i) ∪ Jv′( j)) ≤ 2
(
e−
√
m
3 + e−
√
m
3 + e−
√
m
3
)
= 6e−
√
m
3 .
Then, by employing a union bound again,
P
(
n⋃
v=1
n⋃
v′=1
r−1⋃
i=0
r−1⋃
j=0
{Jvv′(i, j) ∪ Jv(i) ∪ Jv′( j)}
)
≤
n∑
v=1
n∑
v′=1
r−1∑
i=0
r−1∑
j=0
6e−
√
m
3
= 6n2r2e−
√
m
3
= 6r2 exp
{
2 log n − (log n)
3
2
3
}
→ 0,
(4.4)
as n → ∞. Thus, (4.4) yields that with high probability, for all v, v′ ∈ {1,2, · · · ,n} and all
i, j ∈ {0,1, · · · ,r − 1}, we have
0 ≤ mwvv′(i, j) − m 34 ≤ M̂vv′(i, j) ≤ mwvv′(i, j) + m 34 . (4.5)
0 ≤ mwv(i) − m 34 ≤ M̂v(i) ≤ mwv(i) + m 34 . (4.6)
0 ≤ mwv′( j) − m 34 ≤ M̂v′( j) ≤ mwv( j) + m 34 . (4.7)
Let us define event Avv′(i, j) as the event that (4.5), (4.6), and (4.7) are all valid, thus, as
shown in (4.4), we have
P
(
n⋂
v=1
n⋂
v′=1
r−1⋂
i=0
r−1⋂
j=0
{Avv′(i, j)}
)
→ 1, (4.8)
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as n → ∞. Now, if Avv′(i, j) is true for some v, v′ ∈ {1,2, · · · ,n} and some i, j ∈
{0,1, · · · ,r − 1}, we have
M̂vv′(i, j)
m
− M̂v(i)
m
M̂v′( j)
m
≤ mwvv′(i, j) + m
3
4
m
− mwv(i) − m
3
4
m
mwv′(i) − m 34
m
= wvv′(i, j) − wv(i)wv′( j) + m− 14 + (wv(i) + wv′( j))m− 14 − m− 12
≤ wvv′(i, j) − wv(i)wv′( j) + m− 14 + (wv(i) + wv′( j))m− 14 + m− 12 .
(4.9)
Similarly,
M̂vv′(i, j)
m
− M̂v(i)
m
M̂v′( j)
m
≥ mwvv′(i, j) − m
3
4
m
− mwv(i) + m
3
4
m
mwv′(i) + m 34
m
= wvv′(i, j) − wv(i)wv′( j) − m− 14 − (wv(i) + wv′( j))m− 14 − m− 12 .
(4.10)
Thus, by using (4.9) and (4.10), we have
(
M̂vv′(i, j)
m
− M̂v(i)
m
M̂v′( j)
m
)
− (wvv′(i, j) − wv(i)wv′( j))
 ≤ (1 + wv(i) + wv′( j))m− 14 + m− 12 .
(4.11)
Let us define event Bvv′(i, j) as the event that (4.11) is valid for v, v′, i, and j. We have
shown, for all v, v′ ∈ {1,2, · · · ,n} and all i, j ∈ {0,1, · · · ,r − 1}, Avv′(i, j) ⊆ Bvv′(i, j), thus{
n⋂
v=1
n⋂
v′=1
r−1⋂
i=0
r−1⋂
j=0
{Avv′(i, j)}
}
⊆
{
n⋂
v=1
n⋂
v′=1
r−1⋂
i=0
r−1⋂
j=0
{Bvv′(i, j)}
}
,
and as a result,
P
(
n⋂
v=1
n⋂
v′=1
r−1⋂
i=0
r−1⋂
j=0
{Bvv′(i, j)}
)
≥ P
(
n⋂
v=1
n⋂
v′=1
r−1⋂
i=0
r−1⋂
j=0
{Avv′(i, j)}
)
.
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Thus, by using (4.8), we have
P
(
n⋂
v=1
n⋂
v′=1
r−1⋂
i=0
r−1⋂
j=0
{Bvv′(i, j)}
)
→ 1,
as n → ∞. Hence, with high probability, for all v, v′ ∈ {1,2, · · · ,n} and all i, j ∈
{0,1, · · · ,r − 1}, we have
(
M̂vv′(i, j)
m
− M̂v(i)
m
M̂v′( j)
m
)
− (wvv′(i, j) − wv(i)wv′( j))
 ≤ (1 + wv(i) + wv′( j))m− 14 + m− 12 .
(4.12)
Now, if (u,u′) < F, then for all i, j ∈ {0,1, · · · ,r−1}, we have puu′(i, j)−pu(i)pu′( j) = 0,
and as a result, wvv′(i, j) − wv(i)wv′( j) = 0. Thus, by using (4.12), we have M̂vv′(i, j)m − M̂v(i)m M̂v′( j)m
 ≤ (1 + wv(i) + wv′( j))m− 14 + m− 12 ,
and as a result, as m→∞,  M̂vv′(i, j)m − M̂v(i)m M̂v′( j)m
 ≤ m− 15 .
Thus, we can conclude, (v, v′) < F˜, and in other words, (Π(u),Π(u′)) < F˜. This is true with
high probability, for all u,u′ ∈ {1,2, · · · ,n} where (u,u′) < F .
Similarly, if (u,u′) ∈ F, there exists at least one pair of i, j ∈ {0,1, · · · ,r − 1} with
puu′(i, j) − pu(i)pu′( j) ≥  − m− 14 for a fixed value of  . Thus, there exists at least one pair
of i, j ∈ {0,1, · · · ,r − 1} with wvv′(i, j) − wv(i)wv′( j) ≥  − m− 14 . As a result, by using
(4.12), for large enough m, we have M̂vv′(i, j)m − M̂v(i)m M̂v′( j)m
 ≥ m− 15 .
Thus, we can conclude, (v, v′) ∈ F˜, and in other words, (Π(u),Π(u′)) ∈ F˜. Again, this is
true with high probability, for all u,u′ ∈ {1,2, · · · ,n} where (u,u′) ∈ F .
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Figure 4.2: The structure of the association graph (G): Group l with sl vertices is disjoint
from the reminder of the association graph (G′).
Now, we can conclude, for large enough n, we have P
(
G˜ ' G
)
→ 1, so the adversary
can reconstruct the association graph of the anonymized version of the data with an arbi-
trarily small error probability. Note that reconstruction of the association graph does not
require the adversary’s knowledge about user statistics (i.e., the values of pu’s). 
The structure of the association graph (G) can leak a lot of information. For the rest
of this section, we consider a graph structure shown in Figure 4.2. In this structure, Gl ,
the subgraph consisting of the users the adversary wants to de-anonymize, has sl vertices
and is disjoint from the reminder of the association graph. So, we can write Gl(Vl,Fl),
where |Vl | = sl . Note that we assume sl is finite. In particular, the subgraph Gl can be
thought of as a group of “friends” or “associates” such that their data sets are dependent.
In Section 4.5, we discuss how our methodology can be applied to the settings where the
subgraph Gl is not disjoint from the reminder of the graph (G′) [23, 32, 35, 37, 38, 53, 75,
77, 100, 125].
The following theorem states that if the number of observations per user (m) is signif-
icantly larger than n
2
s(r−1)+α in the r-state model, where s is the size of a group, then the
adversary can successfully de-anonymize the users in that group.
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Theorem 7. For the above r-state model, if Y is the anonymized version of X as defined
above, the size of the group including user 1 is s, and
• m = Ω
(
n
2
s(r−1)+α
)
, for any α > 0;
then, user 1 has no privacy at time k.
Discussion 4: It is insightful to compare this result to [73, Theorem 2], where it is stated
that if the users are not dependent, then all users have perfect privacy as long as the number
of adversary’s observations per user (m) is smaller than O(n 2r−1−α). Here, Theorem 7 states
that with much smaller m, the adversary can de-anonymize the users. Therefore, we see
that dependency can significantly reduce the privacy of users.
Proof of Theorem 7:
Proof. As shown in Figure 4.3, the proof of Theorem 7 consists of three parts:
• First Step: Showing the adversary can reconstruct the association graph of the
anonymized version of the data with an arbitrarily small error probability (as shown
in Figure 4.3a).
• Second Step: Showing the adversary can uniquely identify Group 1 with an arbitrar-
ily small error probability (as shown in Figure 4.3b).
• Third Step: Showing the adversary can individually identify all the members within
Group 1 with an arbitrarily small error probability (as shown in Figure 4.3c).
The first part of the proof exploits the fact that the adversary can readily reconstruct
the association graph of the anonymized data in m = (log n)3. It is the second and third
parts that give rise to the condition m = Ω
(
n
2
s(r−1)+α
)
, and it is in the second part where
we see the mechanism for the speed-up of the adversary’s algorithm relative to the case
where user traces are independent. In particular, due to the dependence between users
breaking them into groups, the key search for the adversary now involves finding a set of
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(a) First step: Reconstruction of the association graph from the observed data.
(b) Second step: Identifying Group 1 among all of the groups after association graph is
reconstructed.
(c) Third step: Identifying user 1 among all of the members of Group 1 after Group 1 is
uniquely identified.
Figure 4.3: The algorithm of the adversary to estimate data points of user 1 with vanishing
error probability.
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users corresponding to a length-s vector of probabilities rather than searching for a single
user associated with a given probability.
First step: Reconstruction of the association graph: In this step, we use Lemma 7.
More specifically, since n
2
s(r−1) > (log n)3 for large enough n, we can use Lemma 7 to
conclude that the adversary can reconstruct the association graph with arbitrarily small
error probability.
Second step: Identifying Group 1 among all of the groups: Now, assume the size of
Group 1 is s. Without loss of generality, suppose the members of Group 1 are users
{1,2, · · · , s}. Note that there are at most ns isolated groups of size s in the association
graph. We call these Groups 1,2, · · · , ns . The adversary needs to first identify Group 1
among all of these groups.
First, for all u ∈ {1,2, · · · ,n} and all i ∈ {1,2, · · · ,r − 1}, the adversary computes pu(i)
as:
pu(i) = |{k : Yu(k) = i}|m = M̂u(i)m , (4.13)
and as a result,
pΠ(u)(i) = |{k : Xu(k) = i}|m = Mu(i)m , (4.14)
where M̂u(i) = |{k : Yu(k) = i}| and Mu(i) = |{k : Xu(k) = i}|. Let pu be the collection of
pu(i) and pΠ(u) be the collection of pΠ(u)(i) for all i ∈ {1,2, · · · ,r − 1}:
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p˜u =

pu(1)
pu(2)
...
pu(r − 1)

, pΠ(u) =

pΠ(u)(1)
pΠ(u)(2)
...
pΠ(u)(r − 1)

.
Now, define Σs as the set of all permutations on s elements; forσ ∈ Σs, σ : {1,2, · · · , s} →
{1,2, · · · , s} is a one-to-one mapping.
First, we provide the definition of a distance measure D (Φ,Ψ) for vectors
Φ = [Φ1 Φ2 · · · Φs] ,
Ψ = [Ψ1 Ψ2 · · · Ψs] ,
where Φu ∈ Rr−1 and Ψu ∈ Rr−1. Define
D (Φ,Ψ) = min
σ∈Σs
{
max
{ | |Φ1 −Ψσ(1) | |∞, | |Φ2 −Ψσ(2) | |∞, · · · , | |Φs −Ψσ(s) | |∞}} ,
where for all u ∈ {1,2, · · · , s},
| |Φu −Ψσ(u) | |∞ = max
{ |Φu(i) − Ψσ(u)(i)| : i = 1,2, · · · ,r − 1} .
90
Here, let P(l) be a vector which contains probability distributions of users belonging
to Group l, and P˜(l)
Π
be a vector which contains the estimate of the adversary about the
probability distribution of users belong to Group l. For example, for Group 1, we have
P(1) =
[
p1 p2 · · · ps
]
,
and
P˜(1)
Π
=
[pΠ(1) pΠ(2) · · · pΠ(s)] .
Now, we claim for m = cn
2
s(r−1)+α and large enough n,
• P
(
D
(
P(1), P˜(1)
Π
)
≤ ∆n
)
→ 1,
• P
(
n
s⋃
l=2
{
D
(
P(1), P˜(l)
Π
)
≤ ∆n
})
→ 0 ,
where ∆n = n
− 1s(r−1)−α4 .
Define the hypercubes of F (n) andH (n) as
F (n) =
{
(x1,x2, · · · ,xs) ∈
(
R(r−1)
) s
: max
u
{|xu − pu |} ≤ ∆n,u = 1,2, · · · , s
}
,
H (n) =
{
(x1,x2, · · · ,xs) ∈
(
R(r−1)
) s
: max
u
{|xu − pu |} ≤ 2∆n,u = 1,2, · · · , s
}
,
Figure 4.4 shows sets F (n) andH (n) in the case r = s = 2.
First, we prove P˜(1)
Π
is in set F (n), thus, D
(
P(1), P˜(1)
Π
)
≤ ∆n. Note that for all u ∈
{1,2, · · · ,n} and all i ∈ {1,2, · · · ,r − 1}, a Chernoff bound yields
P
(Mu(i)m − pu(i) ≥ ∆n) ≤ 2e−m∆2n3pu
= 2e
−
(
cn
2
s(r−1)+α
) (
1
n
1
s(r−1)+
α
4
)2 (
1
3pu
)
≤ 2e− c3n
α
2
. (4.15)
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Figure 4.4: P(1), sets F (n) andH (n) for the case r = s = 2.
Thus, for all u ∈ Group 1 and all i ∈ {1,2, · · · ,r − 1}, (4.15) and the union bound yield
P
(
D
(
P(1), P˜(1)
Π
)
≥ ∆n
)
≤
s∑
u=1
r−1∑
i=1
P
(Mu(i)m − pu(i) ≥ ∆n)
≤ 2s(r − 1)e− c3n
α
2 → 0,
as n→∞. As a result, D
(
P(1), P˜(1)
Π
)
≤ ∆n with high probability.
In the next step, we prove P
(
n
s⋃
l=2
{
D
(
P(1), P˜(l)
Π
)
≤ ∆n
})
→ 0. Note that for all groups
other than Group 1, we have
(4∆n)s(r−1)δ1 ≤ P
(
P(l) ∈ H (n)
)
≤ (4∆n)s(r−1)δ2,
and as a result,
P
(
P(l) ∈ H (n)
)
≤ δ2(4∆n)s(r−1)
= δ24
s(r−1) 1
n1+
α
4 s(r−1)
.
Similarly, for any σ ∈ Σs,
P
(
P(l)σ ∈ H (n)
)
≤ δ2(4∆n)s(r−1)
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= δ24
s(r−1) 1
n1+
α
4 s(r−1)
,
and since |Σs | = s!, by a union bound,
P
©­«
n
s⋃
l=2
{ ⋃
σ∈Σs
{
P(l)σ ∈ H (n)
}}ª®¬ ≤
n
s∑
l=2
∑
σ∈Σs
P
(
P(l)σ ∈ H (n)
)
≤ n
s
s!δ24s(r−1)
1
n1+
α
4 s(r−1)
= (s − 1)!4s(r−1)δ2n−α4 s(r−1) → 0,
as n→∞. Thus, all P(l)’s are outside ofH (n) with high probability.
Now, given the fact that all P(l)’s are outside ofH (n), we prove P
(
n
s⋃
l=2
{
D
(
P(1), P˜(l)
Π
)
≤ ∆n
})
→
0. We show that P˜(l)
Π
’s are close to P(l)’s, and as a result, they will be outside of F (n). For
all u ∈ Group l and all i ∈ {1,2, · · · ,r − 1}, (4.15) and the union bound yield,
P
(
D
(
P(1), P˜(l)
Π
)
≤ ∆n
)
= P
(
D
(
P(l), P˜(l)
Π
)
≥ ∆n
)
≤
s∑
u=1
r−1∑
i=1
P
(Mu(i)m − pu(i) ≥ ∆n)
≤ 2s(r − 1)e− c3n
α
2
.
Now by using a union bound, again, we have
P
©­«
n
s⋃
l=2
{
D
(
P(l), P˜(l)
Π
)
≥ ∆n
}ª®¬ ≤
n
s∑
l=2
P
(
D
(
P(l), P˜(l)
Π
)
≥ ∆n
)
≤ n
s
2s(r − 1)e− c3n
α
2
= 2n(r − 1)e− c3n
α
2 → 0,
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as n→∞. Thus, for all l ∈ {2,3, · · · , ns }, P˜(l)Π ’s are close to P(l)’s, thus, they will be outside
of F (n) with high probability. Now, we can conclude as n→∞,
P
©­«
n
s⋃
l=2
{
D
(
P(1), P˜(l)
Π
)
≤ ∆n
}ª®¬→ 0.
This means that with high probability all P˜(l)
Π
’s are outside of F (n), so the adversary can
successfully identify Group 1.
Third step: Identifying user 1 among all of the members of Group 1: In this step, we
prove that, after identifying Group 1, the adversary can correctly identify each member.
This step can be done using a similar approach to the one above. We define two sets B(n)
and C(n) around p1. We will show that with high probability, the true estimated value of p1
(shown as p˜1) is inside of B(n). Also, all pu’s of other members of Group 1 are outside of
C(n), and since their estimated values are close to pu’s, the estimated values will be outside
of B(n). Therefore, the adversary can successfully invert the permutation Π within Group
1 and identify all of the members. Below are the details.
From (4.13) and (4.14), for all u ∈ {1,2, · · · , s} and all i ∈ {1,2, · · · ,r − 1}, we have
pu(i) = |{k : Yu(k) = i}|m ,
and as a result,
pΠ(u)(i) = |{k : Xu(k) = i}|m = Mu(i)m ,
where Mu(i) = |{k : Xu(k) = i}|. Let us define sets B(n) and C(n) as
B(n) =
{
(x1, x2, · · · , xr−1) ∈ RP : |xi − p1(i)| ≤ ∆n, i = 1,2, · · · ,r − 1
}
,
94
Figure 4.5: p1, sets B(n) and C(n) in RP for case r = 3.
C(n) =
{
(x1, x2, · · · , xr−1) ∈ RP : |xi − p1(i)| ≤ 2∆n, i = 1,2, · · · ,r − 1
}
,
where ∆n = n
− 1s(r−1)−α4 . Figure 4.5 shows p1, sets B(n) and C(n) in range of RP for case
r = 3. Now, we claim for m = cn
2
s(r−1)+α,
1. P
(pΠ(1) ∈ B(n)) → 1,
2. P
(
s⋃
u=2
{pΠ(u) ∈ B(n)}) → 0,
as n→∞. Thus, the adversary can identify Π(1) by examining p˜u’s and choosing the only
one that belongs to B(n).
First, we want to show that as n goes to infinity,
P
(pΠ(1) ∈ B(n)) → 1.
For all i ∈ {1,2, · · · ,r − 1}, By using (4.15) and the union bound, we have
P
(pΠ(1) < B(n)) ≤ r−1∑
i=1
P
(M1(i)m − p1(i) ≥ ∆n)
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≤ (r − 1)
(
2e−
c
3n
α
2
)
,
thus,
P
(pΠ(1) ∈ B(n)) ≥ 1 − 2(r − 1)e− c3nα2 → 1,
as n→∞.
Now, we need to show that as n goes to infinity,
P
(
s⋃
u=2
{pΠ(u) ∈ B(n)}) → 0.
First, we show as n goes to infinity,
P
(
s⋃
u=2
{
pu ∈ C(n)
})
→ 0.
Note
4 (∆n)r−1 δ1 < P
(
pu ∈ C(n)
)
< 4 (∆n)r−1 δ2,
and according to the union bound, for large enough n, we have
P
(
s⋃
u=2
{
pu ∈ C(n)
})
≤
s∑
u=2
P
(
pu ∈ C(n)
)
≤ 4s (∆n)r−1 δ2
≤ 4s 1
n
1
s +
α(r−1)
4
δ2 → 0;
thus, all pu’s are outside of C(n) with high probability.
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Now, we claim that given all pu’s are outside of C(n), P
(pΠ(u) ∈ B(n)) is small. Note,
for all i ∈ {1,2, · · · ,r − 1}, by using (4.15) and the union bounds, we have
P
(pΠ(u) ∈ B(n)) ≤ P (pΠ(u) − pu ≥ ∆n)
≤
r−1∑
i=1
P
(Mu(i)m − pu(i) ≥ ∆n)
≤ 2(r − 1)e− c3n
α
2
.
As a result, by using another union bound, as n becomes large,
P
(
s⋃
u=2
{pΠ(u) − pu ≥ ∆n}) ≤ s (2(r − 1)e− c3nα2 ) → 0.
Thus, for all u ∈ {2,3, · · · , s}, pΠ(u)’s are close to pu’s, thus they will be outside of B(n).
Now, we can conclude as n→∞ that:
P
(
s⋃
u=2
{pΠ(u) ∈ B(n)}) → 0.
Thus, we have proved that if m = cn
2
s(r−1)+α, there exists an algorithm for the adversary
to successfully recover user 1. Remember, the adversary identifies the members of Group
1 independent of the structure of the subgraph. 
4.3.2 r-State Markov Chain Model
In Sections 4.3.1, we assumed each user’s data patterns was i.i.d.; however, in this
section, users’ data patterns are modeled using Markov chains in which each user’s data
points are dependent over time. In this model, we again assume there are r possibilities for
each users’ data point, i.e., Xu(k) ∈ {0,1, · · · ,r − 1}. More specifically, each user’s data
set is modeled by a Markov chain with r states. It is assumed that the Markov chains of all
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users have the same structure but have different transition probabilities. Let E be the set of
edges in the assumed transition graph, so, (i, j) ∈ E if there exists an edge from state i to
state j, meaning that pu(i, j) = P (Xu(k + 1) = j |Xu(k) = i) > 0. The transition matrix is a
square matrix used to describe the transitions of a Markov chain; thus, different users can
have different transition probability matrices. Note for each state i, we have
r−1∑
j=1
pu(i, j) = 1,
so, the adversary can focus on a subset of size d = |E | − r of the transition probabilities for
recovering the entire transition matrix. Let pu be the vector that contains these transition
probabilities for user u. We write
pu =

pu(1)
pu(2)
...
pu(|E | − r)

, p =
[
p1 p2 · · · pn
]
.
We also consider all pu(i)’s are drawn independently from some continuous density
function, fP(pu), on the (0,1)|E |−r hypercube. Define the range of distribution as
RP =
{
(x1, x2, · · · , x|E |−r) ∈ (0,1)|E |−r : xi > 0, x1 + x2 + · · · + x|E |−r < 1
}
,
and as before, we assume there are δ1, δ2 > 0, such that

δ1 ≤ fP(pu) ≤ δ2, pu ∈ Rp.
fP(pu) = 0, pu < Rp.
Now, we can repeat the similar steps as the previous sections to prove the following theo-
rem.
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Theorem 8. For an irreducible, aperiodic Markov chain model, if Y is the anonymized
version of X as defined above, the size of the group including user 1 is s, and
• m = Ω
(
n
2
s( |E |−r)+α
)
, for any α > 0;
then, user 1 has no privacy at time k.
Proof. The basic ideas behind the proof of Theorem 8 are similar to the ones for Theo-
rems 7; thus, in this part we just focus on the differences and key ideas.
Define the random variable Mu(i) as the total number of visits by user u to state i, for
all u ∈ {1,2, · · · ,n} and i ∈ {0,1, · · · ,r − 1}. Since the Markov chain is irreducible and
aperiodic, and m → ∞, all Mi(u)m converge to their stationary values [59]. Given Mu(i) =
mu(i), the transitions from state i to state j for user u has a multinomial distribution with
probabilities pu(i, j). Now, considering the fact that the vector pu uniquely determines the
user u, the adversary can invert the anonymization permutation function in a similar way to
the i.i.d. case by focusing on pu’s. Let
Φ = [Φ1 Φ2 · · · Φs] ,
Ψ = [Ψ1 Ψ2 · · · Ψs] ,
where Φu ∈ R|E |−r and Ψu ∈ R|E |−r . Define
D (Φ,Ψ) = min
σ∈Σs
{
max
{ | |Φ1 −Ψσ(1) | |∞, | |Φ2 −Ψσ(2) | |∞, · · · , | |Φs −Ψσ(s) | |∞}} ,
where for u ∈ {1,2, · · · , s},
| |Φu −Ψσ(u) | |∞ = max
{ |Φu(i) − Ψσ(u)(i)| : i = 1,2, · · · , |E | − r} .
and we claim for m = cn
2
s( |E |−r)+α and large enough n,
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• P
(
D
(
P(1), P˜(1)
Π
)
≤ ∆′n
)
→ 1,
• P
(
n
s⋃
l=2
{
D
(
P(1), P˜(l)
Π
)
≤ ∆′n
})
→ 0 ,
where ∆′n = n
− 1s( |E |−r)−α4 . This can be shown similar to the proof of Theorem 7. First, define
F ′(n) andH ′(n) as
F ′(n) =
{
(x1,x2, · · · ,xs) ∈
(
R(|E |−r)
) s
: max
u
{|xu − pu |} ≤ ∆′n,u = 1,2, · · · , s
}
;
H ′(n) =
{
(x1,x2, · · · ,xs) ∈
(
R(|E |−r)
) s
: max
u
{|xu − pu |} ≤ 2∆′n,u = 1,2, · · · , s
}
;
then, prove that the adversary can identify Group 1 successfully.
In the next step, the adversary has to identify each member of Group 1 correctly. Define
sets B′(n) and C′(n) as
B′(n) =
{
(x1, x2, · · · , xd) ∈ RP : |xi − p1(i)| ≤ ∆′n, i = 1,2, · · · , d
}
,
C′(n) =
{
(x1, x2, · · · , xd) ∈ RP : |xi − p1(i)| ≤ 2∆′n, i = 1,2, · · · , d
}
,
where ∆′n = n
− 1s( |E |−r)−α4 . Now, we claim for m = cn
2
s( |E |−r)+α,
1. P
(pΠ(1) ∈ B′(n)) → 1,
2. P
(
s⋃
u=2
{pΠ(u) ∈ B′(n)}) → 0,
as n → ∞. This can be shown similar to the proof of Theorem 7, so the adversary can
successfully recover data traces of user 1. 
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Discussion 5: Note that the i.i.d. case can also be written as a Markov chain with a transi-
tion matrix with identical rows; then, |E | = r2. However, for the i.i.d. case, if the adversary
knows r − 1 elements of a row, they know that row and all of the others. In other words,
if we restrict the users’ data models to i.i.d., then we are using a different model where
pu(i)’s are restricted in a way to create an i.i.d. sequence. This is a different model and is
not compatible to our model for the Markov chain where pu(i)’s are drawn independently
from some continuous density function, fP(pu), on the (0,1)|E |−r hypercube. Thus, the
results of Theorem 2 cannot be applied to the i.i.d. case.
4.4 Impact of Dependency on Privacy using Anonymization and Ob-
fuscation
Here, we consider the case when both anonymization and obfuscation techniques are
employed, as shown in Figure 4.1. We assume similar obfuscation to Chapter 2. To obfus-
cate the users’ data points, for each user u, we independently generate a random variable Ru
that is uniformly distributed between 0 and an, where an ∈ (0,1]. The value of Ru shows the
probability that the user’s data point is changed to a different value by obfuscation, and an
is termed the “noise level’ of the system. Let Zu be the vector that contains the obfuscated
version of user u’s data points, and Z be the collection of Zu for all users,
Zu =

Zu(1)
Zu(2)
...
Zu(m)

, Z = [Z1 Z2 · · · Zn] .
Thus, the adversary’s observation Y is the anonymized version of Z;
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Y = Perm (Z1,Z2, · · · ,Zn;Π)
=
[
ZΠ−1(1) XΠ−1(2) · · · ZΠ−1(n)
]
= [Y1 Y2 · · · Yn] .
4.4.1 r-State i.i.d. Model
Now, assume users’ data points can have r possibilities (0,1, · · · ,r − 1). Similar to
Section 4.3.1, we assume pu’s are drawn independently from some continuous density
function, fP(pu), which has support on a subset of the (0,1)r−1 hypercube, and pu, fP(pu),
and RP are defined as in Section 4.3.1.
To create a noisy version of data samples, for each user u, we independently generate
a random variable Ru that is uniformly distributed between 0 and an, where an ∈ (0,1]2.
Then, the obfuscated data is obtained by passing the users’ data through an r-ary symmetric
channel with a random error probability Ru, so for j ∈ {0,1, · · · ,r − 1}:
P(Zu(k) = j |Xu(k) = i) =

1 − Ru, for j = i.
Ru
r−1, for j , i.
The effect of the obfuscation is to alter the probability distribution function of each
user’s data points in a way that is unknown to the adversary, since it is independent of all
past activity of the user, and hence, the obfuscation inhibits user identification. For each
user, Ru is generated once and is kept constant for the collection of data points of length m,
thus providing a very low-weight obfuscation algorithm.
2It is desirable that our results are true over the largest set of strategies that users can employ. In fact,
our results would apply to a general set of distributions and are true for any random noise with support that
extends out to the maximum amount of an. The reason that we have used a uniformly random noise is that
we want to have a similar mechanism as Chapter 2 to have a good comparison between the results of this
chapter and Chapter 2 to show that dependency is a significant detriment to the privacy of users.
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Now, define
Qu(i) = P (Zu(k) = i) ,
where
Qu(i) = Pu(i)(1 − Ru) + (1 − Pu(i))Ru
= Pu(i) + (1 − 2Pu(i))Ru. (4.16)
The vectors Qu and Q which contain the obfuscated probabilities are defined as below:
Qu =

Qu(1)
Qu(2)
...
Qu(r − 1)

, Q = [Q1 Q2 · · · Qn] ,
and the vector containing the permutation of those probabilities after anonymization is W.
Thus,
W = Perm (Q1,Q2, · · · ,Qn;Π)
=
[
QΠ−1(1) QΠ−1(2) · · · QΠ−1(n)
]
= [W1 W2 · · · Wn] .
Theorem 9. For the above r-state model, if Z is the obfuscated version of X, and Y is the
anonymized version of Z as defined above, the size of the group including user 1 is s, and
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• m = Ω
(
cn
2
s(r−1)+α
)
for any α > 0;
• Ru ∼ Uniform[0,an], where an = O
(
n−
1
s(r−1)−β
)
for any β > α4 ;
then, user 1 has no privacy at time k.
Discussion 6: It is insightful to compare this result to Theorem 2 of 2. We can see that
when users’ traces are dependent, the required level of obfuscation and anonymization to
achieve privacy is significantly higher. Therefore, we see that dependency can significantly
reduce the privacy of users. However, note that the asymptotic noise level is still zero in
this case. Specifically, if Am(u) = |{k:Zu(k),Xu(k)}|m , then
E[Am(u)] = E[Am] = O
(
n−
1
s(r−1)−β
)
→ 0,
implying that the asymptotic noise level is zero.
Proof of Theorem 9:
Proof. The proof of Theorem 9 is similar to the proof of Theorem 7 and consists of three
parts:
• First step: Showing the adversary can reconstruct the association graph of the ob-
fuscated and anonymized version of data with an arbitrarily small error probability.
• Second step: Showing the adversary can uniquely identify Group 1 with an arbitrar-
ily small error probability.
• Third step: Showing the adversary can successfully identify all of the members of
Group 1 with an arbitrarily small error probability.
First step: Reconstruction of the association graph: In Lemma 7, we show that for the
case of anonymization, the adversary can reconstruct the entire association graph of the
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anonymized data with an arbitrarily small error probability if the number of the adversary’s
observations per user (m) is bigger than (log n)3. Since obfuscation is done independently
(from other users’ obfuscation and from users’ data), it does not change the association
graph. Therefore, since n
2
s(r−1) > (log n)3, we can use Lemma 7 to show the adversary can
reconstruct the association graph of the obfuscated and anonymized data with an arbitrarily
small error probability.
Second step: Identifying Group 1 among all of the groups: Now, assume the size of
Group 1 is s. Without loss of generality, suppose the members of Group 1 are users
{1,2, · · · , s}, so there are at most ns groups of size s. We call these Groups 1,2, · · · , ns .
The adversary needs to first identify the Group 1 among all of these groups.
According to Section 4.3.1, Σs is defined as the set of all permutation on s elements,
and P(l) is a vector which contains probability distributions of users belong to Group l, and
P˜(l)
Π
is a vector which contains the estimate of adversary about the probability distribution
of users belong to Group l. For example, For Group 1, we have
P(1) =
[
p1 p2 · · · ps
]
,
and
P˜(1)
Π
=
[pΠ(1) pΠ(2) · · · pΠ(s)] .
We claim for m = cn
2
s(r−1)+α, an = c′n
−
(
1
s(r−1)+β
)
, and large enough n,
• P
(
D
(
P(1), P˜(1)
Π
)
≤ ∆n
)
→ 1,
• P
(
n
s⋃
l=2
{
D
(
P(1), P˜(l)
Π
)
≤ ∆n
})
→ 0 ,
where ∆n = n
− 1s(r−1)−α4 . As in Section 4.3.1,
F (n) =
{
(x1,x2, · · · ,xs) ∈
(
R(r−1)
) s
: max
u
{|xu − pu |} ≤ ∆n,u = 1,2, · · · , s
}
,
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H (n) =
{
(x1,x2, · · · ,xs) ∈
(
R(r−1)
) s
: max
u
{|xu − pu |} ≤ 2∆n,u = 1,2, · · · , s
}
.
First, we prove, as n→∞,
P
(
D
(
P(1), P˜(1)
Π
)
≤ ∆n
)
→ 1.
Note that for all u ∈ {1,2, · · · ,n} and all i ∈ {1,2, · · · ,r − 1}, the adversary computes pu(i)
as follow:
pu(i) = |{k : Yu(k) = i}|m , (4.17)
and as a result,
pΠ(u)(i) = |{k : Zu(k) = i}|m = (M u(i)m , (4.18)
where
(
M u(i) = |{k : Zu(k) = i}|. Now, for all u ∈ {1,2, · · · ,n} and all i ∈ {0,1, · · · ,r − 1},
we have
P
( (M u(i)m − pu(i) ≤ ∆n
)
= P
(
pu(i) − ∆n ≤
(
M u(i)
m
≤ pu(i) + ∆n
)
= P
(
pu(i) − ∆n − qu(i) ≤
(
M u(i)
m
− qu(i) ≤ pu(i) + ∆n − qu(i)
)
.
Note that for all u ∈ {1,2, · · · ,n} and all i ∈ {0,1, · · · ,r − 1}, we have
|pu(i) − qu(i)| = |1 − 2pu(i)|Ru
≤ Ru ≤ an,
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so, we can conclude for all u ∈ {1,2, · · · ,n} and all i ∈ {0,1, · · · ,r − 1},
P
( (M u(i)m − pu(i) ≤ ∆n
)
= P
(
pu(i) − ∆n − qu(i) ≤
(
M u(i)
m
− qu(i) ≤ pu(i) + ∆n − qu(i)
)
≥ P
(
−∆n + an ≤
(
M u(i)
m
− qu(i) ≤ −an + ∆n
)
= P
( (M u(i)m − qu(i)
 ≤ m(∆n − an)
)
. (4.19)
By employing a Chernoff bound, we have
P
( (M u(i)m − qu(i)
 ≤ m(∆n − an)
)
≥ 1 − 2e− (∆n−an)
2
3qu (i)
≥ 1 − 2e
−
(
1
3qu (i)
) (
cn
2
s(r−1)+α
) (
1
n
1
s(r−1)+
α
4
− c′
n
1
s(r−1)+β
)2
≥ 1 − 2e
− 13
(
cn
2
s(r−1)+α
) (
1
n
1
s(r−1)+
α
4
− c′
n
1
s(r−1)+β
)2
(4.20)
Now from (4.19) and (4.20), we can conclude for all u ∈ {1,2, · · · ,n} and all i ∈ {0,1, · · · ,r−
1},
P
( (M u(i)m − pu(i) ≤ ∆n
)
≥ 1 − 2e
− 13
(
cn
2
s(r−1)+α
) (
1
n
1
s(r−1)+
α
4
− c′
n
1
s(r−1)+β
)2
,
and
P
( (M u(i)m − pu(i) ≥ ∆n
)
≤ 2e
− 13
(
cn
2
s(r−1)+α
) (
1
n
1
s(r−1)+
α
4
− c′
n
1
s(r−1)+β
)2
. (4.21)
Now, for all u ∈ Group 1, all i ∈ {1,2, · · · ,r − 1} and any β > α4 , (4.21) and the union
bound yield
P
(
D
(
P(1), P˜(1)
Π
)
≥ ∆n
)
≤
s∑
u=1
r−1∑
i=1
P
( (M u(i)m − pu(i) ≥ ∆n
)
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≤ 2s(r − 1)e
− 13
(
cn
2
s(r−1)+α
) (
1
n
1
s(r−1)+
α
4
− c′
n
1
s(r−1)+β
)2
→ 0,
as n→∞. As a result,
P
(
D
(
P(1), P˜(1)
Π
)
≤ ∆n
)
→ 1,
as n→∞.
In the next step, we prove P
(
n
s⋃
l=2
{
D
(
P(1), P˜(l)
Π
)
≤ ∆n
})
→ 0. For all groups other than
Group 1, we have
(4∆n)s(r−1)δ1 ≤ P
(
P(l) ∈ H ′(n)
)
≤ (4∆n)s(r−1)δ2,
and as a result,
P
(
P(l) ∈ H (n)
)
≤ δ2(4∆n)s(r−1)
= δ24
s(r−1) 1
n1+
α
4 s(r−1)
.
Similarly, for any σ ∈ Σs,
P
(
P(l)σ ∈ H ′(n)
)
≤ δ2(4∆n)s(r−1)
= δ24
s(r−1) 1
n1+
α
4 s(r−1)
,
and since |Σs | = s!, by a union bound,
P
©­«
n
s⋃
l=2
{ ⋃
σ∈Σs
{
P(l)σ ∈ H (n)
}}ª®¬ ≤
n
s∑
l=2
∑
σ∈Σs
P
(
P(l)σ ∈ H (n)
)
≤ n
s
s!δ24s(r−1)
1
n1+
α
4 s(r−1)
= (s − 1)!4s(r−1)δ2n−α4 s(r−1) → 0,
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as n→∞. Thus, all P(l)’s are outside ofH (n) with high probability.
Now, we claim that given all P(l)’s are outside of H (n), P
(
n
s⋃
l=2
{
D
(
P(1), P˜(l)
Π
)
≤ ∆n
})
is
arbitrarily small. In other words, by using a Chernoff bound, it is shown P˜(l)’s are close to
P(l)’s, and they will be outside of F (n). Thus, for all u ∈ Group l and all i ∈ {1,2, · · · ,r−1},
(4.21) and the union bound yield
P
(
D
(
P(1), P˜(l)
Π
)
≤ ∆n
)
= P
(
D
(
P(l), P˜(l)
Π
)
≥ ∆n
)
≤
s∑
u=1
r−1∑
i=1
P
( (M u(i)m − pu(i)) ≤ ∆n
)
≤ 2s(r − 1)e
− 13
(
cn
2
s(r−1)+α
) (
1
n
1
s(r−1)+
α
4
− c′
n
1
s(r−1)+β
)2
.
Now, by using a union bound again, we can conclude, for any β > α4 ,
P
©­«
n
s⋃
l=2
{
D
(
P(l), P˜(l)
Π
)
≤ ∆n
}ª®¬ ≤
n
s∑
l=2
P
(
D
(
P(l), P˜(l)
Π
)
≤ ∆n
)
≤ 2n(r − 1)e
− 13
(
cn
2
s(r−1)+α
) (
1
n
1
s(r−1)+
α
4
− c′
n
1
s(r−1)+β
)2
→ 0,
as n→∞. Thus, we have shown that for all l ∈ {1,2, · · · , ns }, P˜(l)’s are close to P(l), which
are outside of set F (n). As a result, as n→∞,
P
©­«
n
s⋃
l=2
{
D
(
P(1), P˜(l)
Π
)
≤ ∆n
}ª®¬→ 0.
Third step: Identifying user 1 among all of the members of Group 1: In this step,
we need to prove that after identifying Group 1, the adversary can correctly identify each
member. In other words, the adversary should identify the permutation of Group 1.
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From (4.17) and (4.18), for all u ∈ {1,2, · · · , s} and all i ∈ {1,2, · · · ,r − 1}, we have
pu(i) = |{k : Yu(k) = i}|m ,
and as a result,
pΠ(u)(i) = |{k : Zu(k) = i}|m = (M u(i)m ,
where
(
M u(i) = |{k : Zu(k) = i}|.
As in Section 4.3.1, we define sets B(n) and C(n) as
B(n) =
{
(x1, x2, · · · , xr−1) ∈ RP : |xi − p1(i)| ≤ ∆′n, i = 1,2, · · · ,r − 1
}
,
C(n) =
{
(x1, x2, · · · , xr−1) ∈ RP : |xi − p1(i)| ≤ 2∆′n, i = 1,2, · · · ,r − 1
}
,
where ∆n = n
− 1s(r−1)−α4 . We claim that for m = cn
2
s(r−1)+α and an = c′n
−
(
1
s(r−1)+β
)
,
1. P
(pΠ(1) ∈ B(n)) → 1,
2. P
(
s⋃
u=2
{pΠ(u) ∈ B(n)}) → 0,
as n→∞. Thus, the adversary can identify Π(1) by examining p˜u’s and choosing the only
one that belongs to B(n).
First, we show that as n goes to infinity,
P
(pΠ(1) ∈ B(n)) → 1.
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According to (4.21) and the union bound, for all u ∈ Group 1 and all i ∈ {1,2, · · · ,r − 1},
we have
P
(pΠ(1) < B(n)) ≤ r−1∑
i=1
P
( (M 1(i)m − p1(i)
 ≥ ∆n
)
≤ (r − 1) ©­­«2e
− 13
(
cn
2
s(r−1)+α
) (
1
n
1
s(r−1)+
α
4
− c′
n
1
s(r−1)+β
)2ª®®¬ ,
thus,
P
(pΠ(1) ∈ B(n)) ≤ 1 − (r − 1) ©­­«2e
− 13
(
cn
2
s(r−1)+α
) (
1
n
1
s(r−1)+
α
4
− c′
n
1
s(r−1)+β
)2ª®®¬→ 1,
as n→∞.
Now, we need to show that as n goes to infinity,
P
(
s⋃
u=2
{pΠ(u) ∈ B(n)}) → 0.
First, we show as n goes to infinity,
P
(
s⋃
u=2
{
pu ∈ C′(n)
})
→ 0.
Note for all u ∈ {2,3, · · · , s},
4 (∆n)r−1 δ1 < P
(
pu ∈ C′(n)
)
< 4 (∆n)r−1 δ2,
and according to the union bound,
P
(
s⋃
u=2
{
pu ∈ C(n)
})
≤
s∑
u=2
P
(
pu ∈ C(n)
)
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≤ 4s (∆n)r−1 δ2
≤ 4s 1
n
1
s +
α(r−1)
4
δ2 → 0;
as n→∞. Thus, all pu’s are outside of C(n) with high probability.
Now, we claim that given all pu’s are outside of C(n), P
(pΠ(u) ∈ B(n)) is arbitrarily
small. Note that for all u ∈ {2,3, · · · , s} and all i ∈ {1,2, · · · ,r − 1}, (4.21) and the union
bounds yield
P
(pΠ(u) ∈ B(n)) ≤ P (pΠ(u) − pu ≥ ∆n)
≤
r−1∑
i=1
P
(pΠ(u)(i) − pu(i) ≥ ∆n)
≤ 2(r − 1)e
− 13
(
cn
2
s(r−1)+α
) (
1
n
1
s(r−1)+
α
4
− c′
n
1
s(r−1)+β
)2
.
As a result, by using a union bound again, as n becomes large,
P
(
s⋃
u=2
{pΠ(u) − pu ≥ ∆n}) ≤ s ©­­«2(r − 1)e
− 13
(
cn
2
s(r−1)+α
) (
1
n
1
s(r−1)+
α
4
− c′
n
1
s(r−1)+β
)2ª®®¬→ 0.
Thus, for all u ∈ {2,3, · · · , s}, pΠ(u)’s are close to pu’s, thus they will be outside of B(n).
Now, we can conclude as n→∞ that:
P
(
s⋃
u=2
{pΠ(u) ∈ B(n)}) → 0.
So the adversary can successfully recover Z1(k). Since Z1(k) = X1(k) with probability
1 − Ru = 1 − o(1), the adversary can recover X1(k) with vanishing error probability. 
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4.4.2 r-State Markov Chain Model
In this section, users’ data patterns are modeled using Markov chains and there are r
possibilities for users’ data patterns. Similar to Section 4.3.2, we assume pu(i)’s are drawn
independently from some continuous density function, fP(pu), on the (0,1)|E |−r hypercube,
and pu, fP(pu), and RP are defined in Section 4.3.2.
By using the general idea stated in Section 4.3.2, we can now repeat the similar reason-
ing as Theorem 9 to show the following theorem.
Theorem 10. For an irreducible, aperiodic Markov chain model, iff Z is the obfuscated
version of X, and Y is the anonymized version of Z as defined above, the size of the group
including user 1 is s, and
• m = Ω
(
n
2
s( |E |−r)+α
)
for any α > 0;
• Ru ∼ Uniform[0,an], where an = O
(
n−
1
s( |E |−r)−β
)
for any β > α4 ;
then, user 1 has no privacy at time k.
4.5 More General Setting for the Association Graph
The association graph structure that we have studied so far was somewhat general ex-
cept for one aspect: We assumed that people in a group can have dependency but they are
independent from members of other groups. It is natural to assume that there could be
dependency between members of each group and outside members. Here we discuss how
to apply the developed results to this more general setting.
Similar to [23, 32, 35, 37, 38, 53, 75, 77, 100, 125], we consider a community structure
with strong intra-community connections and weak inter-community connection. In the
community structure the nodes of the network can be grouped into sets of users such that
each set of users is densely connected internally as shown in Figure 4.6a. Here, we also
assume that the adversary has some knowledge about all of the covariances between users
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(a) A sketch of a small network displaying community
structure.
(b) The association graph consists of disjoint subgraphs.
Figure 4.6: The adversary uses their prior knowledge to break inter-community edges.
in addition to the marginal probability distributions: they know whether the value of each
covariance is less than or higher than a specific threshold. We show that the adversary can
reliably reconstruct the entire association graph for the anonymized version of the data (i.e.,
the observed data traces) with relatively few observations.
Let G(V,F) denote the association graph with set of nodes V, (|V| = n), and set of
edges F. In this case, we use an association graph based on a threshold as follows: we
assume two vertices (users) are connected if their data sets are strongly correlated, and are
not connected if their data sets are weakly correlated. More specifically,
• (u,u′) < F iff Cov (Xu(k); Xu′(k)) ≤ 1,
• (u,u′) ∈ F iff Cov (Xu(k); Xu′(k)) ≥ 2,
where Cov (Xu(k); Xu′(k)) is the covariance between the k th data point of user u and user
u′.
Lemma 8. Consider a general association graph, G(V,F), based on the threshold as de-
scribed above. If the adversary obtains m = (log n)3 anonymized observations per user,
they can construct G˜ = G˜(V˜, F˜), where V˜ = {Π(u) : u ∈ V} = V, such that with high
probability, for all u,u′ ∈ V; (u,u′) ∈ F iff (Π(u),Π(u′)) ∈ F˜. We write this statement as
P(G˜ ' G) → 1.
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Proof. Note for u,u′ ∈ {1,2, · · · ,n}, we write v = Π(u) and v′ = Π(u′). We provide an
algorithm for the adversary that with high probability obtains all edges of F correctly. For
each pair w and w′, the adversary computes Covvv′ as follows:
Covvv′ =
r−1∑
i=1
r−1∑
j=1
i j M̂vv′(i, j)
m
−
r−1∑
i=1
iM̂v(i)
m
r−1∑
i=1
iM̂v′(i)
m
(4.22)
where
M̂vv′(i, j) = |{k : Yv(k) = i,Yv′(k) = j}|.
M̂v(i) = |{k : Yv(k) = i}|.
M̂v′( j) = |{k : Yv′(k) = j}|.
After observing m = (log n)3 data points per user and computing the above expressions, the
adversary constructs G˜ in the following way:
• If |Covvv′ | ≤ 1, then (v, v′) < F˜ .
• If |Covvv′ | ≥ 2, then (v, v′) ∈ F˜ .
We show the above method yields P(G˜ ' G) → 1 as n→∞, as follows. Note
M̂vv′(i, j) ∼ Binomial(m,wvv′(i, j)),
M̂v(i) ∼ Binomial(m,wv(i)),
Mv′(i) ∼ Binomial(m,wv′(i)),
where wvv′(i, j) = P (Yv(k) = i,Yv′(k) = j), wv(i) = P (Yv(k) = i), and wv′(i) = P (Yv′(k) = i).
From proof of Lemma 7, by using (4.4), for all v, v′ ∈ {1,2, · · · ,n} and all i, j ∈ {0,1, · · · ,r−
1}, we have
0 ≤ mwvv′(i, j) − m 34 ≤ M̂vv′(i, j) ≤ mwvv′(i, j) + m 34 . (4.23)
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0 ≤ mwv(i) − m 34 ≤ M̂v(i) ≤ mwv(i) + m 34 . (4.24)
0 ≤ mwv′(i) − m 34 ≤ M̂v′(i) ≤ mwv(i) + m 34 . (4.25)
Avv′(i, j) is defined as the event that (4.23), (4.24), and (4.25) are all valid, thus, based on
proof of Lemma 7, we have
P
(
n⋂
v=1
n⋂
v′=1
r−1⋂
i=0
r−1⋂
j=0
{Avv′(i, j)}
)
→ 1, (4.26)
as n → ∞. Let us define Cvv′ =
r−1⋂
i=1
r−1⋂
j=1
{Avv′(i, j)}. Now, if Cvv′ is true for some v, v′ ∈
{1,2, · · · ,n}, according to (4.22), we have
Covvv′ =
r−1∑
i=1
r−1∑
j=1
i j M̂vv′(i, j)
m
−
r−1∑
i=1
iM̂v(i)
m
r−1∑
i=1
iM̂v′(i)
m
≤
r−1∑
i=1
r−1∑
j=1
i j
(
mwvv′(i, j) + m 34
)
m
−
r−1∑
i=1
i
(
mwv(i) − m 34
)
m
r−1∑
i=1
i
(
mwv′(i) − m 34
)
m
=
r−1∑
i=1
r−1∑
j=1
i jwvv′(i, j) −
r−1∑
i=1
iwv(i)
r−1∑
i=1
iwv′(i)
+
r2(r − 1)2
4
m−
1
4 +
r(r − 1)
2
r−1∑
i=1
i(wv(i) + wv′(i))m− 14 − r
2(r − 1)2
4
m−
1
2
≤ Covvv′ + r
2(r − 1)2
4
m−
1
4 +
r(r − 1)
2
r−1∑
i=1
i(wv(i) + wv′(i))m− 14 + r
2(r − 1)2
4
m−
1
2 ,
(4.27)
where Covvv′ =
r−1∑
i=1
r−1∑
j=1
i jwvv′(i, j) −
r−1∑
i=1
iwv(i)
r−1∑
i=1
iwv′(i). Similarly,
Covvv′ =
r−1∑
i=1
r−1∑
j=1
i j M̂vv′(i, j)
m
−
r−1∑
i=1
iM̂w(i)
m
r−1∑
i=1
iM̂v′(i)
m
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≥r−1∑
i=1
i
(
mwv(i) − m 34
)
m
−
r−1∑
i=1
i
(
mwv(i) + m 34
)
m
r−1∑
i=1
i
(
mwv′(i) + m 34
)
m
= Covvv′ − r
2(r − 1)2
4
m−
1
4 − r(r − 1)
2
r−1∑
i=1
i(wv(i) + wv′(i))m− 14 − r
2(r − 1)2
4
m−
1
2 .
(4.28)
Now, by using (4.27) and (4.28), we have
Covvv′ − Covvv′ ≤ r2(r − 1)2
4
m−
1
4 +
r(r − 1)
2
r−1∑
i=1
i(wv(i) + wv′(i))m− 14 + r
2(r − 1)2
4
m−
1
2 .
(4.29)
Let us define event Dvv′ as the event that (4.29) is valid, thus, we have shown, for all
v, v′ ∈ {1,2, · · · ,n}, Cvv′ ⊆ Dvv′, and consequently,{
n⋂
v=1
n⋂
v′=1
{Cvv′}
}
⊆
{
n⋂
v=1
n⋂
v′=1
{Dvv′}
}
.
As a result,
P
(
n⋂
v=1
n⋂
v′=1
{Dvv′}
)
≥ P
(
n⋂
v=1
n⋂
v′=1
{Cvv′}
)
.
Thus, by using (4.26), we have
P
(
n⋂
v=1
n⋂
v′=1
{Dvv′}
)
→ 1,
as n→∞. Hence, with high probability, for all v, v′ ∈ {1,2, · · · ,n} , we have
Covvv′ − Covvv′ ≤ r2(r − 1)2
4
m−
1
4 +
r(r − 1)
2
r−1∑
i=1
i(wv(i) + wv′(i))m− 14 + r
2(r − 1)2
4
m−
1
2 .
(4.30)
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Thus, we can conclude, with high probability, for all v, v′ ∈ {1,2, · · · ,n}, Covvv′’s are close
to Covvv′’s.
Now, if (u,u′) is an inter-community edge, the adversary knows Covuu′ ≤ 1, and
as a result, Covvv′ ≤ 1, thus, the adversary removes that edge. Now, we can conclude
(v, v′) < F˜, and in other words, (Π(u),Π(u′)) < F˜ . This is true with high probability,
simultaneously for all u,u′ ∈ {1,2, · · · ,n} where (u,u′) is an inter-community edge.
In addition, if (u,u′) is an intra-community edge, the adversary knows Covuu′ ≥ 2,
and as a result, Covvv′ ≥ 2. Now, we can conclude (v, v′) ∈ F˜, and in other words,
(Π(u),Π(u′)) ∈ F˜ . This is true with high probability, simultaneously for all u,u′ ∈ {1,2, · · · ,n}
where (u,u′) is an intra-community edge.
As a result, for large enough n, we have P
(
G˜ ' G
)
→ 1, so the adversary can re-
construct the association graph of the anonymized version of the data which is based on a
threshold with an arbitrarily small error probability. 
Now, the adversary has a graph structure shown in Figure 4.6b, where subgraph G1 is
a connected graph with s1 vertices which is disjoint from the reminder of the association
graph (G′ = G − G1). In other words,
G = G1 ∪ G′.
Now, we can repeat the same reasoning as that in the proof of Theorem 7, Theorem 8,
Theorem 9, and Theorem 10 to obtain the same results for this case.
Discussion 7: The stochastic block model is a generative model for random graphs [1, 2,
49, 58, 86, 90, 121]. Note that there are two key differences between the stochastic block
model and the work here. First, in the stochastic block model, the edge set is sampled
at random and the probability distributions of edges are the key part of the work, while
here the analysis is based on the users’ data traces, and the statistical knowledge of the
adversary is a key part. Second, in the stochastic block model, nodes within a community
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connect to nodes in other communities in an equivalent way. In other words, any two
vertices u ∈ Ci and v ∈ Cj are connected by an edge with probability pi j , where Ci and
Cj are different blocks, so all edges between two communities have the same weights or
strengths. While here, as shown in Figure 4.6a, there is no need that the inter-community
edges, corresponding to the covariance of nodes in separate communities, has the same
value as others; in other words, there is no need for the nodes in a community to connect
to the nodes in other communities in an equivalent way. In our work, for each of intra-
community edges, Covuu′ ≥ 2, and for each of inter-community edges, Covuu′ ≤ 1, thus,
edges have different weights.
4.6 Improving Privacy in the Presence of Dependency
In the previous parts of this chapter, we argued and demonstrated that inter-user depen-
dency degrades the privacy provided by standard privacy-preserving mechanisms (PPMs).
In this section, we discuss how to design PPMs considering inter-user dependency in order
to better preserve privacy. First, note that independent obfuscation alone cannot be suffi-
cient even at a high noise level, because it cannot change the association graph. Therefore,
the adversary can still reconstruct the association graph with a small number of observa-
tions if we add independent obfuscation noise. To mitigate this issue, we suggest that
associated users collaborate in applying the noise when deploying a PPM.
For clarity, we focus on the two-state i.i.d. case (r = 2). In the first part, we also focus
on the case the association graph consists of subgraphs with the size of each of them less
than or equal to 2 (sl ≤ 2). Thus, according to Figure 4.7, there are some connected users
and there are also some isolated users. First, we state the following lemma.
Lemma 9. Let Xu(k) ∼ Bernoulli(pu) and Xu′(k) ∼ Bernoulli(pu′); then, there exists an
obfuscation technique with a noise level equal to
aˇ(u,u′) = Cov(Xu(k),Xu′(k))
max{pu, pu′,1 − pu,1 − pu′} ,
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Figure 4.7: Graph G consists of some subgraphs (Gl) with sl ≤ 2.
for the dataset of user u and user u′ such that Zˇu(k) and Zˇu′(k) are independent from each
other. Note Zˇu(k) and Zˇu′(k) are the k th (reported) data point of user u and u′, respectively,
after applying obfuscation with the noise level equal to aˇ(u,u′).
Proof. Let Xu(k) ∼ Bernoulli (pu) and Xu′(k) ∼ Bernoulli (pu′). Then, to make these
two sequences independent, it suffices if Zˇu(k)| Zˇu′(k) = 0 has the same distributions as
Zˇu(k)| Zˇu′(k) = 1. We only prove for the case max{pu, pu′,1 − pu,1 − pu′} = 1 − pu′, and
the proofs of the other cases are similar to this one. Now, If Xu(k) = 1 and Xu′(k) = 1, we
pass Xu(k) through a BSC(Υ) in order to obtain Zˇu(k). Thus,
P (Xu(k) = 1,Xu′(k) = 0)
1 − pu′ =
P (Xu(k) = 1,Xu′(k) = 1) (1 − Υ)
pu′
,
and Υ can be calculated as
Υ = 1 − pu′
1 − pu′
P (Xu(k) = 1,Xu′(k) = 0)
P (Xu(k) = 1,Xu′(k) = 1) .
Now, we can conclude,
aˇ(u,u′) = ΥP (Xu(k) = 1,Xu′(k) = 1)
=
(
1 − pu′
1 − pu′
P (Xu(k) = 1,Xu′(k) = 0)
P (Xu(k) = 1,Xu′(k) = 1)
)
P (Xu(k) = 1,Xu′(k) = 1)
= P (Xu(k) = 1,Xu′(k) = 1) − pu′
1 − pu′ P (Xu(k) = 1,Xu
′(k) = 0)
=
P (Xu(k) = 1,Xu′(k) = 1) − pu′ (P (Xu(k) = 1,Xu′(k) = 1) + P (Xu(k) = 1,Xu′(k) = 0))
1 − pu′
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=
P (Xu(k) = 1,Xu′(k) = 1) − pupu′
1 − pu′
=
Cov(Xu(k),Xu′(k))
max{pu, pu′,1 − pu,1 − pu′} .
Now, we want to explain the idea behind this lemma by an example.
Example 3. Let Xu(k) ∼ Bernoulli
( 3
5
)
and Xu′(k) ∼ Bernoulli
( 1
5
)
, and let Table 4.1 show
the joint probability mass function of Xu(k) and Xu′(k).
Table 4.1: Joint probability mass function of Xu(k) and Xu′(k).
Xu(k)
Xu′(k)
0 1
0 720
1
20
1 920
3
20
As a result, if we observe 2000 bits of data, Table 4.2a shows the expected results
according to Table 4.1.
Then, to make Zˇu(k) and Zˇu′(k) independent, it is sufficient for Zˇu(k)| Zˇu′(k) = 0 to
have the same distribution as Zˇu(k)| Zˇu′(k) = 1. This means we should have
P
(
Zˇu(k) = 1, Zˇu′(k) = 1
)
P
(
Zˇu′(k) = 1
) = P (Zˇu(k) = 1, Zˇu′(k) = 0)
P
(
Zˇu′(k) = 0
) ;
thus, according to Table 4.2b,
300(1 − Υ)
100 + 300
=
900
700 + 900
→ Υ = 1
4
,
where Υ is the portion of data points Xu(k) that need to be flipped in the fourth region of
Table 4.2a (i.e., the region Xu(k) = 1,Xu′(k) = 1). Now, we need to change 14 · 300 = 75 of
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data bits. As a result, if Xu(k) = 1 and Xu′(k) = 1, then, we pass Xu(k) through a BSC(14 ),
and obtain Zˇu(k). Hence, asymptotic noise level is equal to
aˇ(u,u′) = 3
20
· 1
4
= 3.75%.
Table 4.2: (a) The expected results of Xu(k) and Xu′(k) according to Table 4.1 after observ-
ing 2000 bits of data, and (b) The desired results to make Zˇu(k) and Zˇu′(k) independent
from each other.
(a)
Xu(k)
Xu′(k)
0 1
0 700 100
1 900 300
(b)
Zˇu(k)
Zˇu′(k)
0 1
0 700 175
1 900 225
It is easy to check that the asymptotic noise level will be given by the equation in
Lemma 9. Specifically, for the above example,
Cov(Xu(k),Xu′(k)) = P(Xu(k) = 1,Xu′(k) = 1)−P(Xu(k) = 1)P(Xu′(k) = 1) = 3
20
−3
5
·1
5
=
3
100
,
and we have
aˇ(u,u′) = Cov(Xu(k),Xu′(k))
max{pu, pu′,1 − pu,1 − pu′} =
3
100
4
5
= 3.75%.

Lemma 9 provides a method to convert correlated data to independent traces. The
remaining task is to show that we can achieve perfect privacy after applying such a method.
As shown in Figure 4.8, two stages of obfuscation and one stage of anonymization are
employed to achieve perfect privacy for users. Note that the first stage of obfuscation is
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due to Lemma 9 and the second stage (as will be explained in Theorem 11) is the same
obfuscation technique given in Theorem 1 of Chapter 2. In Figure 4.8, Zˇu(k) shows the
(reported) data point of user u at time k after applying the first stage of obfuscation with
the noise level equal to
aˇ(u,u′) = Cov(Xu(k),Xu′(k))
max{pu, pu′,1 − pu,1 − pu′}
for the dataset of user u and user u′, Zu(k) shows the (reported) data point of user u at time
k after applying the second stage of obfuscation with the noise level equal to
an = c′n−( 1s −β),
and Yu(k) shows the (reported) data point of user u at time k after applying anonymization.
Figure 4.8: The sequence Zu(k), k = 1,2, . . . ,m, is the obfuscated version of Xu(k), k =
1,2, . . . ,m, and the sequence Yu(k), k = 1,2, . . . ,m, is observed by the adversary after Xu(k),
k = 1,2, . . . ,m, is obfuscated and anonymized.
Consider G(V,F), where sl ≤ 2. We have the same model for pu as in the previous
sections: pu is chosen from some density fP(pu) such that, for δ1, δ2 > 0:

δ1 < fP(pu) < δ2, pu ∈ (0,1).
fP(pu) = 0, pu < (0,1).
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Also, if (u,u′) ∈ F, ρuu′ is chosen according to some density fP(ρuu′ |pu, pu′) with
range of
[
0,min
{√
pu(1−pu′)
pu′(1−pu),
√
pu′(1−pu)
pu(1−pu′)
}]
. The following theorem states that we can in-
deed achieve perfect privacy if we allow collaboration between users.
Theorem 11. For the two-state model, if Z is the obfuscated version of X, Y is the
anonymized version of Z, and the size of all subgraphs are less than or equal to 2, there
exists an anonymization/obfuscation scheme such that for all (u,u′) ∈ F, the asymptotic
noise level for users u and u′ is at most
a(u,u′) = Cov(Xu(k),Xu′(k))
max{pu, pu′,1 − pu,1 − pu′} ,
to achieve perfect privacy for all users. The anonymization parameter m = m(n) can be
made arbitrarily large.
Proof. There are two main steps.
Step 1: De-correlate based on Lemma 9. In particular, note that for at least half of the
users, no noise is added in this step. More specifically, define
U = Set of unaffected users = {u : no noise is added to user u in this step}.
Then after step 1, we have Zˇu(k) ∼ Bernoulli(qˇu). As a result,
• For u ∈ U; Zˇu(k) = Xu(k) and qˇu = pu.
• For u ∈ {1,2, · · · ,n} − U; Zˇu(k) , Xu(k) and qˇu , pu.
Note |U| ≥ n2 , because the main graph consists of some subgraphs with sl ≤ 2.
Step 2: Assume qˇu’s are known to the adversary. The setup is now very similar to
Theorem 1 in Chapter 2, where perfect privacy is proved for the i.i.d. data. But there is
a difference here. Specifically, although the users’ data Zˇu(k) are now independent, the
distribution of qˇu’s are not, since they are the result of the data-dependent obfuscation
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technique of Lemma 9. Luckily, this issue can be easily resolved so that we can show
perfect privacy for user 1. The main idea is to use the fact that as stated above, at least n2 of
the users are not impacted by the de-correlation step. As we see below, these users will be
sufficient to ensure perfect privacy for user 1 (which may or may not be in the setU).
Let us explore the distributions of Qˇu = qˇu for users in the set U. For any correlated
pair of users, the method of Lemma 9 leaves the one whose pu is farthest from 12 intact.
Since pu’s are chosen independently from each other and each user is correlated with only
one user, it is easy to see that for users in the set U, the qˇu’s are i.i.d. with the following
probability density function
fQˇ(qˇu) = 2 fP(qˇu)
∫ max(qˇu,1−qˇu)
min(qˇu,1−qˇu)
fP(x)dx.
Therefore, the setup is the same as Theorem 1 in Chapter 2 where we want to prove perfect
privacy for user 1, and we have n2 users who are independent from user 1 and their parameter
qˇu is chosen i.i.d. according to a density function. However, we need to check that the
density function fQˇ(qˇ) satisfies the condition δˇ1 < fQˇ(qˇu) < δˇ2 for some δˇ1 and δˇ2 on a
neighborhood qˇu ∈ [pu − ′, pu + ′]. First, note that
fQˇ(qˇu) = 2 fP(qˇu)
∫ max(qˇu,1−qˇu)
min(qˇu,1−qˇu)
fP(x)dx.
< 2δ22 = δˇ2.
Next,
fQˇ(qˇu) = 2 fP(qˇu)
∫ max(qˇu,1−qˇu)
min(qˇu,1−qˇu)
fP(x)dx.
> 2δ21 |1 − 2qˇu | = δˇ1.
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Thus, as long as pu , 12 , the condition is satisfied
3. Therefore, we can show perfect
privacy for user 1. Note that here, in the second step, we need to apply a second stage of
obfuscation and apply anonymization according to Theorem 1 in Chapter 2. Nevertheless,
since the noise level an → 0 for this second stage, the asymptotic noise level will stay the
same as that for step 1, i.e.
a(u,u′) = aˇ(u,u′) = |Cov(Xu(k),Xu′(k))|
max{pu, pu′,1 − pu,1 − pu′} .

Now, the above method can be extended to the case where sl > 2. Let sl = 3. From
Figure 4.9, there are two different situations in this case:
1. Case 1: As shown in Figure 4.9b, user 1 and user 2 are correlated, and user 2 and
user 3 are correlated. In the first step, we de-correlate user 2 and user 3 based on
Lemma 9. Now, we face a similar situation as that in the case sl = 2 (as shown in
Figure 4.9a), and we de-correlate them based on Lemma 9. Hence, we can make all
of the users independent from each other and then according to Theorem 11, we can
achieve perfect privacy for all of them.
2. Case 2: As shown in Figure 4.9c, all three users are correlated to each other. In the
first step, we use Lemma 9 to make user 1 and user 3 uncorrelated. Now, we have a
similar situation as case 1, so we can make all the users independent from each other
and then, according to Theorem 11, we can achieve perfect privacy for all of them.
Discussion 8: Note that obfuscating data by adding non-zero asymptotic noise may degrade
utility significantly. Therefore, in practice, it is usually not possible to de-correlate all
3The case pu = 12 has zero probability, and thus need not be considered. Nevertheless, the result can be
shown for pu = 12 , as all we require is a number of users proportional to the length of the interval in the
vicinity of pu .
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(a) sl = 2. (b) sl = 3: Case 1. (c) sl = 3: Case 2.
Figure 4.9: Three different ways which 3 users can be correlated to each other.
Table 4.3: Summary of the results for the case anonymization is employed as a PPM for
"no privacy" as a function of number of adversary’s observations per user (m). Here, s is
the size of group of users whose data traces are dependent, r is the number of possible
values for each user’s data point, |E | is the size of set of edges in the Markov chain, and
the results hold for any α > 0.
Users’ data model
Independent users [73] Dependent users
m m
Two-state i.i.d. model Ω
(
n2+α
)
Ω
(
n
2
s +α
)
r-state i.i.d. model Ω
(
n
2
r−1+α
)
Ω
(
n
2
s(r−1)+α
)
r-state Markov chain model Ω
(
n
2
|E |−r +α
)
Ω
(
n
2
s( |E |−r)+α
)
dependent users without imposing substantial utility degradation. In addition, in order to
convert correlated data to independent data, users should collaborate together and disclose
their private data to each other, which degrades privacy unless users trust each other. In
such a setting, a possible approach in applying our technique is to only add de-correlation
noise to the data of highly-dependent users (e.g., spouses and close friends), and leave data
of less-dependent users (e.g., co-workers) unchanged.
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Table 4.4: Summary of the results for the case both obfuscation and anonymization are
combined to be employed as a PPM for "no privacy" as a function of number of adversary’s
observations per user (m) and the amount of noise level (an). Here, s is the size of group
of users whose data traces are dependent, r is the number of possible values for each user’s
data point, |E | is the size of set of edges in the Markov chain, and the results hold for any
α > 0.
Users’ data model
Independent users Chapter 2 Dependent users
m an m an
Two-state i.i.d. model Ω
(
n2+α
)
O
(
n−1−β
)
Ω
(
n
2
s +α
)
O
(
n−
1
s −β
)
r-state i.i.d. model Ω
(
n
2
r−1+α
)
O
(
n− 1r−1−β
)
Ω
(
n
2
s(r−1)+α
)
O
(
n−
1
s(r−1)−β
)
r-state Markov chain model Ω
(
n
2
|E |−r +α
)
O
(
n−
1
|E |−r −β
)
Ω
(
n
2
s( |E |−r)+α
)
O
(
n−
1
s( |E |−r)−β
)
4.7 Summary of the Results
Consider a setting with n total users. As in Chapter 2, privacy depends on two param-
eters: (1) m = m(n), the number of data points after which the pseudonyms of users are
changed in the anonymization technique, i.e., smaller m implies higher levels of anonymiza-
tion; and (2) an, which indicates the amplitude of the obfuscation noise, i.e., larger an
implies higher levels of obfuscation.
When there are a large number of users in the setting (n → ∞) and each user’s dataset
is governed by an i.i.d. process with r possible values for each data point (e.g., r possible
locations), we obtain a no-privacy region in the m(n) − an plane. Figure 4.10a shows the
no-privacy region for the case when there exists inter-user dependency, and Figure 4.10b
shows the no-privacy region when the users’ traces are independent across users. There
exists a larger no-privacy region in the presence of inter-user dependency; therefore, we
find that dependency between users weakens their privacy.
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(a) The dependent case. (b) The independent case.
Figure 4.10: Representations of the no-privacy region in the case of dependent and indepen-
dent users. Note that m(n) is the number of the adversary’s observations per user (degree
of anonymization), and an is the amount of noise level (degree of obfuscation). Here, the
size of the group of users whose data traces are dependent is equal to s.
In addition, for the case where users’ datasets are governed by an irreducible and ape-
riodic Markov chains with r states and |E | edges, we obtain similar results, again showing
that inter-user dependency degrades user privacy.
The summary of the results is also shown in Tables 4.3 and 4.4.Note that for only
anonymization case, an initial extension in Gaussian case with known covariance matrix is
also presented in [114].
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CHAPTER 5
LEVERAGING PRIOR KNOWLEDGE ASYMMETRIES IN THE
DESIGN OF IOT PRIVACY-PRESERVING MECHANISMS
5.1 Introduction
Emerging technologies such as the Internet of Things (IoT) [31] promise to revolu-
tionalize users’ lives by adapting to each user’s specific needs and habits as gleaned from
their data traces. However, this necessitates that the data of an immense number of users
are interconnected, thus posing intrinsic threats to user privacy and leaving sensitive in-
formation vulnerable [85]. There has been significant work on privacy-preserving mecha-
nisms (PPMs) [6, 10, 18, 30, 33, 39, 40, 45, 71, 74, 96, 99, 102]. These PPMs can largely be
categorized into two groups: anonymization and obfuscation. Anonymization techniques
enhance privacy by removing the information that discloses the personal identity from data
sets [18, 33, 45, 71, 74, 96, 102]. In contrast, obfuscation techniques enhance privacy by
using misleading, false, or ambiguous information [6, 10, 30, 39, 40, 99]. These two classes
of techniques have one common problem: that they degrade system’s utility to enhance
privacy [29, 99].
Recently, a new method termed “remapping”, which is similar to posterior data pro-
cessing in database systems, has emerged as an effective method to exploit asymmetries in
the privacy problem to substantially improve system utility without a corresponding loss in
privacy for a PPM that employs obfuscation [12]. In particular, remapping is employed in
scenarios where a friend (e.g. an IoT application) exists that does not have prior statisti-
cal information about user behavior, whereas the adversary in the environment has perfect
The work presented in this chapter was submitted in [113].
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statistical information about the user’s behavior. This may occur, for example, when each
intended recipient is either naive or only looking at a single datum or small set of data from
the user, whereas the adversary is sophisticated and has access to data across a large time
period from the user.
In such a case, the adversary can use their statistical advantage to obtain a better esti-
mate of the user’s data than the friend. Remapping recognizes this fact and reveals a more
accurate version of the data that the adversary would have been able to obtain anyway using
their statistical advantage, so there is no loss in privacy, but which will improve the accu-
racy for the user’s friend. Hence, by recognizing this asymmetry, utility has been improved
at no loss in privacy versus a scheme that did not do remapping; a simple example of the
mechanism is demonstrated in Section II. Not surprisingly, this approach has garnered a
growing amount of interest in the privacy community [51, 72, 79, 80, 82], hence motivating
a more fundamental analysis.
Here, we take the first information-theoretic look at this remapping technique. We in-
troduce a simple information-theoretic model to explain how the utility can be improved
without a loss in privacy. Next, we employ our model to explore important aspects of
remapping that have not been considered. As acknowledged briefly in [12], a risk of remap-
ping is that it relies critically on accurate knowledge of the adversary’s statistical model.
In particular, if the adversary does not have accurate statistical information and the user
employs remapping, we discuss that privacy is compromised in two separate ways: (i)
the adversary obtains a more accurate version of the data than they would have had without
remapping; and (ii) the adversary is able to improve their statistical knowledge of the users’
data beyond what they would have been able to do without remapping. Interestingly, we
will see that the second type of leakage is increased if the obfuscation noise is increased.
We provide the first analysis of the loss of privacy due to each of these factors.
After analyzing the loss in privacy under standard remapping [12], we next turn to
countermeasures. We introduce a random remapping algorithm, where data points are in-
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dependently remapped with some probability. For a given utility for the intended recipient,
this approach greatly complicates model improvement at the adversary versus deterministic
remapping approaches, thus it improves the privacy-utility trade-off.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we present the frame-
work: system model, metrics, and definitions. We next demonstrate in Section 5.3 how the
current remapping technique proposed by [12] increases utility while satisfying the same
level of privacy if the adversary has the perfect prior. In Section 5.4, we quantify infor-
mation leakage caused by the mentioned remapping technique [12] if the adversary does
not have a perfect prior. In particular, we show that leakage about the distribution of true
data is a serious issue. Motivated by this, in Section 5.5 we propose our new method called
"Randomized Remapping" to improve the privacy for a given utility in this situation. This
method provides a trade-off between leakage of distribution of true data and the utility.
5.2 System Model, Definitions, and Metrics
We assume a system with one user who creates a length-m sequence X of data:
X = [X(1),X(2), · · · ,X(m)] ,
where X(k) denotes the user’s true data at time k which should be protected from a potential
adversary. To preserve the privacy of the user’s true data, the obfuscated data is obtained by
adding noise (W) to (X). In other words, the reported noisy version of data (Y) is obtained
as Y = X + W, where
W = [W(1),W(2), · · · ,W(m)] .
Y = [Y (1),Y (2), · · · ,Y (m)] .
As shown in Figure 5.1, there exists an “intended” friend (e.g., an IoT application)
who doesn’t have prior statistical knowledge about the user behavior and a “sophisticated”
adversary who has knowledge about the prior behavior of the user (piAdv). The adversary
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Figure 5.1: System Model: Case where additive obfuscation (without remapping) is applied
to the user’s data points. The (naive) intended friend does not have a prior distribution for
X and hence employs Y for the user’s data. A sophisticated adversary, who possesses a
prior distribution for X, can use this prior to obtain a better estimate of the user’s data.
observes the noisy reported data Y and uses it to find the estimate X˜Adv, which denotes the
estimate of the adversary given her observed data (Y) and her knowledge of the prior about
the user (piAdv) as X˜Adv = E [X|Y, piAdv]. As a result, there exist asymmetries in knowl-
edge and/or sophistication between the intended friend and the adversary. The remapping
technique, which is introduced by Chatzikokolakis et al. [12], exploits these asymmetries
to publish a more accurate version of data that the sophisticated adversary would have been
able to obtain anyway. As shown in Figure 5.2, each reported data is remapped into the
best possible data point according to the perfect prior information of the adversary.
Figure 5.2: Remapping: X is the user’s true data, W is the amount of noise added through
the obfuscation process, Y is the noisy reported data after applying obfuscation, and YR
is the remapped data which is the best possible estimate of the adversary according to her
perfect prior knowledge about the user.
Data Sample Model: We adopt a Gaussian model that facilitates analysis. User traces
are assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian series, and each
data point is drawn from a normal distribution with mean µ variance σ2s , X(k) ∼ N
(
µ,σ2s
)
.
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We also assume there exists some underlying prior for the distribution of the mean (µ); we
also take this to be Gaussian, and hence assume µ ∼ N
(
0, σ2µ
)
.
Obfuscation Mechanism: The obfuscated data is obtained by passing the data through an
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel. Hence, Y, the reported data of the user, is
the sum of the true data, X, and the noise, W, where all W(k) are i.i.d. with respect to time
and are drawn from a zero-mean normal distribution with variance equal to σ2w. Thus, we
have
Y = X +W ∼ N
(
µ,σ2s + σ
2
w
)
.
Sophisticated Adversary Model: Here, the adversary logs the user’s data over time to
generate a prior about the behavior of the user and performs an inference attack to estimate
the best possible data given this generated prior. Note that the remapping literature [12]
has considered a perfect prior for the adversary. In reality, the adversary, however strong,
cannot have exact knowledge of the user’s whereabouts, so she cannot build the perfect
prior. In this paper, different adversarial settings have been considered: in Section 5.3,
we assume an adversary with perfect prior, and in Section 5.4, we assume an adversary
with imperfect prior. It is critical to note that the adversary knows the mechanism of the
obfuscation, but she does not know the exact value of the noise which will be added during
obfuscation and does not have any other auxiliary information or side information about
user’s data.
Remapping Mechanism: In the absence of remapping, and given the perfect prior for the
adversary, the adversary can estimate X, using the reported noisy version of the data (Y)
as:
YR = E [X|Y, µ] = σ
2
w
σ2s + σ
2
w
µ +
σ2s
σ2s + σ
2
w
Y, (5.1)
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where YR is the estimate of the adversary given the observed data (Y) and her perfect
knowledge of the prior (piAdv). Remapping simply notes that, since the adversary obtains
YR anyway (as shown in Figure 5.2), we might as well provide it to the applications to
improve the utility [12].
Metrics: Here, the mean squared error (MSE) is employed as a metric to quantify both
utility degradation and privacy (In Appendix 5.6, we also include mutual information as
a measure of privacy leakage). In this paper, “ UD ” denotes the MSE of the intended
application/friend which quantifies utility degradation. Also, “ P ” denotes the MSE of
the adversary about the true data and “ P` ” denotes the MSE of the adversary about the
distribution of the true data. Note that both “ P ” and “ P` ” quantify the level of privacy.
5.3 Case 1: Perfect Knowledge of the Adversary
In this section, we assume the adversary knows the exact value of the mean (µ).
5.3.1 Without Remapping Technique
Without remapping, the user’s intended friend, which is oblivious to the prior knowl-
edge of the user, observes only the noisy data (Y ). Thus, the MSE of the application which
quantifies the utility degradation can be calculated as:
UD(I)NR = E
[(
X˜App − X
)2]
= E
[(Y − X)2] = σ2w . (5.2)
In comparison to the user’s friend, the sophisticated adversary obtains X˜Adv = E [X |Y, µ].
As a result, the MSE of the adversary which quantifies the level of privacy is calculated as:
P(I)NR = E
[(
X˜Adv − X
)2]
= E
[(YR − X)2] = σ2wσ2s
σ2s + σ
2
w
. (5.3)
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5.3.2 With Remapping Technique
In this case, both the adversary and the user’s friend observe the same reported data,
X˜Adv = X˜App = YR = E [X |Y, µ]. Now, the MSE of the adversary and the MSE of the
application are equal and can be quantified as:
UD(I)R = P(I)R = E
[(YR − X)2] = σ2wσ2s
σ2s + σ
2
w
. (5.4)
Since the intended friend/application is oblivious to the prior statistical knowledge
about the user behavior, the MSE of the adversary is always smaller than or equal to the
MSE of the application (P ≤ UD). From Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2, we can conclude the
remapping technique provides the best utility among techniques satisfying the same level
of privacy in the case of perfect knowledge of the adversary [12].
5.4 Case 2: Imperfect Knowledge of the Adversary
Here, we assume the adversary has a noisy version of the prior information, as might
be obtained from a learning set of limited length. Specifically, the adversary has µˇ = µ+E ,
where E has a zero-mean normal distribution with variance equal to σ2e , as would be the
case if µˇ were the minimum mean square estimate (MMSE) based on prior observations
with additive Gaussian obfuscation. We consider not only the leakage of true data (X) but
also the leakage of distribution of true data (µ), which is a serious issue.
5.4.1 Without Remapping Technique
If remapping is not employed, the user’s intended friend observes the reported data (Y ).
Thus, the MSE of the application is
UD(I I)NR = E
[(
X˜App − X
)2]
= E
[(Y − X)2] = σ2w . (5.5)
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In contrast, the sophisticated adversary uses both Y = µ+ S +W and µˇ = µ+ E to improve
her knowledge not only about the true data (X) but also about the distribution of the true
data (µ), (Here, we write X = µ + S, where S ∼ N(0, σ2s )). Thus,

µˇ
Y

=

1 0
1 1


µ
S

+

E
W

.
Thus, the adversary has µ˜Adv = E [µ|Y, µˇ] and X˜Adv = E [X |Y, µˇ]. In the first step, we
should calculate the conditional expectation E [X |Y, µˇ] required for the minimum mean
square error estimator (MMSE). Note that the MMSE estimate in the case of bivariate
Gaussian variables has a nice linear form, which will be called linear minimum mean square
error (LMMSE) estimator. Using linear MMSE, S and µ given µˇ and Y have linear forms
as
µ˜Adv = a0 + a1Y + a2 µˇ, (5.6)
s
S˜Adv = b0 + b1Y + b2 µˇ, (5.7)
where a0, a1, a2, b0, b1, and b2 are to be determined in order to minimize the MSE.
Note that the linear MMSE should satisfy:
• E
[
X − X˜Adv
]
= 0, in other words,
– E [µ] = E [µ˜Adv] .
– E [S] = E
[
S˜Adv
]
.
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• Cov
(
X − X˜Adv, µˇ
)
= 0, in other words,
– Cov (µ, µˇ) = Cov (µ˜Adv, µˇ) .
– Cov (S, µˇ) = Cov
(
S˜Adv, µˇ
)
.
• Cov
(
X − X˜Adv,Y
)
= 0, in other words,
– Cov (µ,Y ) = Cov (µ˜Adv,Y ) .
– Cov (S,Y ) = Cov
(
S˜Adv,Y
)
.
In order to satisfy the conditions of linear MMSE, a0, a1, a2, b0, b1, and b2 are calcu-
lated as
a0 = b0 = 0.
a1 =
σ2µσ
2
e(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
) (
σ2s + σ
2
w
)
+ σ2e σ
2
µ
.
b1 =
σ2s
(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
)
(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
) (
σ2s + σ
2
w
)
+ σ2e σ
2
µ
.
a2 =
σ2µ
(
σ2s + σ
2
w
)(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
) (
σ2s + σ
2
w
)
+ σ2e σ
2
µ
.
b2 =
−σ2s σ2µ(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
) (
σ2s + σ
2
w
)
+ σ2e σ
2
µ
.
Thus, µ˜Adv = E [µ|Y, µˇ] is
µ˜Adv =
σ2µσ
2
e(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
) (
σ2s + σ
2
w
)
+ σ2e σ
2
µ
Y+
σ2µ
(
σ2s + σ
2
w
)(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
) (
σ2s + σ
2
w
)
+ σ2e σ
2
µ
µˇ.
Also, remember X˜Adv = E [X |Y, µˇ] = µ˜Adv + S˜Adv, thus, we have
X˜Adv =
σ2s σ
2
µ + σ
2
s σ
2
e + σ
2
µσ
2
e(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
) (
σ2s + σ
2
w
)
+ σ2e σ
2
µ
Y+
σ2µσ
2
w(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
) (
σ2s + σ
2
w
)
+ σ2e σ
2
µ
.
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Now, the MSE of the adversary about the distribution of true data (µ) is calculated as:
P`(I I)NR = E
[
(µ˜Adv − µ)2
]
=
σ2e σ
2
µ
(
σ2s + σ
2
w
)(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
) (
σ2s + σ
2
w
)
+ σ2e σ
2
µ
. (5.8)
and MSE of the adversary about true data (X) is calculated as:
P(I I)NR = E
[(
X˜Adv − X
)2]
=
σ2s σ
2
w
σ2s + σ
2
w
+
σ4wσ
2
e σ
2
µ(
σ2s + σ
2
w
) ( (
σ2µ + σ
2
e
) (
σ2s + σ
2
w
)
+ σ2e σ
2
µ
) . (5.9)
Extension to m observations: In the next step, we assume the adversary observes m
observations of the user, and tries to use all of her observations to make better estimations
about both true data (X) and the distribution of true data (µ). Note that she has
• µˇ = µ + E .
• Y (k) = µ + S(K) +W(k), for k ∈ {1,2, · · · ,m}.
The adversary should calculate µ˜Adv = E [µ|Y, µˇ] and X˜Adv = E [X|Y, µˇ].
Using linear MMSE, S(1) and µ given µˇ and Y have linear forms as
µ˜Adv = a0 + a1Y (1) + a2Y (2) + · · · + amY (m) + am+1 µˇ, (5.10)
and
S˜(1)Adv = b0 + b1Y (1) + b2Y (2) + · · · + bmY (m) + bm+1 µˇ, (5.11)
where ak’s and bk’s are to be determined in order to minimize the MSE.
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In order to satisfy the conditions of linear MMSE, we have
a0 = b = 0
a1 =
σ2µσ
2
e(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
) (
σ2s + σ
2
w
)
+ mσ2e σ2µ
,
b1 =
σ2s
(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
)
(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
) (
σ2s + σ
2
w
)
+ mσ2e σ2µ
+
(m − 1)σ2s σ2µσ2e(
σ2s + σ
2
w
) ( (
σ2µ + σ
2
e
) (
σ2s + σ
2
w
)
+ mσ2e σ2µ
) .
ak =
σ2µσ
2
e(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
) (
σ2s + σ
2
w
)
+ mσ2e σ2µ
, for k ∈ {2,3, · · · ,m}.
bk =
−σ2e σ2µσ2s(
σ2s + σ
2
w
) ( (
σ2µ + σ
2
e
) (
σ2s + σ
2
w
)
+ mσ2e σ2µ
) , for k ∈ {2,3, · · · ,m}.
am+1 =
σ2µ
(
σ2s + σ
2
w
)(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
) (
σ2s + σ
2
w
)
+ mσ2e σ2µ
bm+1 =
−σ2s σ2µ(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
) (
σ2s + σ
2
w
)
+ mσ2e σ2µ
.
Thus, µ˜Adv = E [µ|Y, µˇ] can be calculated as
µ˜Adv =
m∑
k=1
σ2µσ
2
e(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
) (
σ2s + σ
2
w
)
+ mσ2e σ2µ
Y (k)
+
σ2µ
(
σ2s + σ
2
w
)(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
) (
σ2s + σ
2
w
)
+ mσ2e σ2µ
µˇ.
Also, remember X(1)Adv = E [X(1)|Y, µˇ] = µ˜Adv + S˜(1)Adv, thus, we have
X(1)Adv =
(
σ2s σ
2
µ + σ
2
s σ
2
e + σ
2
µσ
2
e
) (
σ2s + σ
2
w
)
+ (m − 1)σ2s σ2µσ2e(
σ2s + σ
2
w
) ( (
σ2µ + σ
2
e
) (
σ2s + σ
2
w
)
+ mσ2e σ2µ
) Y (1) (5.12)
+
m∑
k=2
σ2e σ
2
µσ
2
w(
σ2s + σ
2
w
) ( (
σ2µ + σ
2
e
) (
σ2s + σ
2
w
)
+ mσ2e σ2µ
)Y (k)
+
σ2µσ
2
w(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
) (
σ2s + σ
2
w
)
+ mσ2e σ2µ
µˇ.
(5.13)
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Now, the MSE of the adversary about the distribution of the true data (µ) can be calculated
as
P`(I I)NR = E
[
(µ˜Adv − µ)2
]
=
σ2e σ
2
µ
(
σ2s + σ
2
w
)(
σ2s + σ
2
w
) (
σ2µ + σ
2
e
)
+ mσ2e σ2µ
, (5.14)
and the MSE of the adversary about user’ true data at time k, X(K), can be calculated as
P(I I)NR = E
[(X(k)Adv − X(k))2]
=
σ2s σ
2
w
σ2s + σ
2
w
+
σ4wσ
2
e σ
2
µ(
σ2s + σ
2
w
) ( (
σ2s + σ
2
w
) (
σ2µ + σ
2
e
)
+ mσ2e σ2µ
) . (5.15)
5.4.2 With Remapping Technique
If the remapping technique is employed, our friend observes the remapped data, so, the
MSE of the application can be quantified as:
UD(I I)R = E
[(
X˜App − X
)2]
= E
[(YR − X)2] = σ2s σ2w
σ2s + σ
2
w
. (5.16)
However, the adversary observes not only YR, but also µˇ, and uses both of them to estimate
µ˜Adv and X˜Adv. In other words,

µˇ
YR

=

1 0
1
σ2s
σ2s +σ
2
w


µ
S

+

E
σ2s
σ2s +σ
2
w
W

.
Using linear MMSE, S and µ given µˇ and Y have linear forms as
µ˜Adv = a0 + a1YR + a2 µˇ, (5.17)
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and
S˜Adv = b0 + b1YR + b2 µˇ, (5.18)
where a0, a1, a2, b0, b1, and b2 are to be determined in order to minimize the MSE.
Note the linear MMSE should satisfy:
• E
[
X − X˜Adv
]
= 0, in other words,
– E [µ] = E [µ˜Adv] .
– E [S] = E
[
S˜Adv
]
.
• Cov
(
X − X˜Adv, µˇ
)
= 0, in other words,
– Cov (µ, µˇ) = Cov (µ˜Adv, µˇ) .
– Cov (S, µˇ) = Cov
(
S˜Adv, µˇ
)
.
• Cov
(
X − X˜Adv,YR
)
= 0, in other words,
– Cov (µ,YR) = Cov (µ˜Adv,YR) .
– Cov (S,YR) = Cov
(
S˜Adv,YR
)
.
In order to satisfy the conditions of linear MMSE, a0, a1, a2, b0, b1, and b2 are calcu-
lated as
a0 = b0 = 0,
a1 =
σ2e σ
2
µ
(
σ2s + σ
2
w
)
σ4s
(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
)
+ σ2e σ
2
µ
(
σ2s + σ
2
w
)
b1 =
σ4s
(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
)
σ4s
(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
)
+ σ2e σ
2
µ
(
σ2s + σ
2
w
)
a2 =
σ4s σ
2
µ
σ4s
(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
)
+ σ2e σ
2
µ
(
σ2s + σ
2
w
)
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b2 =
−σ4s σ2µ
σ4s
(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
)
+ σ2e σ
2
µ
(
σ2s + σ
2
w
)
Thus, µ˜Adv = E [µ|YR, µˇ] can be calculated as
µ˜Adv =
σ2µσ
2
m
(
σ2s + σ
2
w
)
σ4s
(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
)
+ σ2e σ
2
µ
(
σ2s + σ
2
w
)YR
+
σ4s σ
2
µ
σ4s
(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
)
+ σ2e σ
2
µ
(
σ2s + σ
2
w
) µˇ.
Remember X˜Adv = E [X |YR, µˇ] = µ˜Adv + S˜Adv, so we have
X˜Adv = YR.
Now, the MSE of the adversary about the distribution of true data (µ) can be calculated as
P`(I I)NR = E
[
(µ˜Adv − µ)2
]
=
σ4s σ
2
e σ
2
µ
σ4s
(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
)
+ σ2e σ
2
µ
(
σ2s + σ
2
w
) , (5.19)
and the MSE of the adversary about true data (X) can be calculated as
P(I I)R =E
[(
X˜Adv − X
)2]
=
σ2s σ
2
w
σ2s + σ
2
w
. (5.20)
Extension to m observations: Now, we assume the adversary observes m observations
of the user, so, she has
• µˇ = µ + E .
• YR(k) = µ + σ
2
s
σ2s +σ
2
w
S(k) + σ2s
σ2s +σ
2
w
W(k), for k ∈ {1,2, · · · ,m}.
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The adversary should calculates µ˜Adv = E [µ|YR, µˇ] and X˜Adv = E [X|YR, µˇ]. Using linear
MMSE, S(1) and µ given µˇ and YR have linear forms as
µ˜Adv = a0 + a1YR(1) + a2YR(2) + · · · + amYR(m) + am+1 µˇ, (5.21)
and
S˜(1)Adv = b0 + b1YR(1) + b2YR(2) + · · · + bmYR(m) + bm+1 µˇ, (5.22)
where ak’s and bk’s are to be determined in order to minimize the MSE. In order to satisfy
the conditions of linear MMSE, we have
a0 = b0 = 0
a1 =
σ2µσ
2
e
(
σ2s + σ
2
w
)
σ4s
(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
)
+ mσ2e σ2µ
(
σ2s + σ
2
w
) .
b1 =
σ4s
(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
)
σ4s
(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
)
+ mσ2e σ2µ
(
σ2s + σ
2
w
) + (m − 1)σ2e σ2s σ2µ (σ2s + σ2w)
σ4s
(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
)
+ mσ2e σ2µ
(
σ2s + σ
2
w
) .
ak =
σ2µσ
2
e
(
σ2s + σ
2
w
)
σ4s
(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
)
+ mσ2e σ2µ
(
σ2s + σ
2
w
) , for k ∈ {2,3, · · · ,m}.
bk =
−σ2µσ2e
(
σ2s + σ
2
w
)
σ4s
(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
)
+ mσ2e σ2µ
(
σ2s + σ
2
w
) , , for k ∈ {2,3, · · · ,m}.
am+1 =
σ4s σ
2
µ
σ4s
(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
)
+ mσ2e σ2µ
(
σ2s + σ
2
w
) .
bm+1 =
−σ4s σ2µ
σ4s
(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
)
+ mσ2e σ2µ
(
σ2s + σ
2
w
) .
Thus, µ˜Adv = E [µ|YR, µˇ] can be calculated as
µ˜Adv =
m∑
k=1
σ2µσ
2
e
(
σ2s + σ
2
w
)
σ4s
(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
)
+ mσ2e σ2µ
(
σ2s + σ
2
w
)YR(m)
+
σ4s σ
2
µ
σ4s
(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
)
+ mσ2e σ2µ
(
σ2s + σ
2
w
) µˇ.
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and X(1)Adv = E [X(1)|YR, µˇ] = µ˜Adv + S˜(1)Adv, so, we can conclude
X(1)Adv = YR(1),
As a result, the MSE of the adversary about the distribution of the true data (µ) can be
calculated as
P`(I I)R = E
[
(µ˜Adv − µ)2
]
=
σ2e σ
2
µσ
4
s
σ4s
(
σ2µ + σ
2
e
)
+ mσ2e σ2µ
(
σ2s + σ
2
w
) , (5.23)
and the MSE of the adversary about true data at time k, X(k), can be calculated as
P(I I)R =E
[(X(k)Adv − X(k))2]
=
σ2s σ
2
w
σ2s + σ
2
w
. (5.24)
5.4.3 Discussion: Leakage of the Statistical Model
By (5.19) and (5.23), we can conclude that increasing the obfuscation noise somewhat
surprisingly increases the leakage about the distribution of the true data (µ) when remap-
ping is employed. Note that YR = E [X|Y, µˇ] depends on two parameters: 1) µˇ = µ + E
and 2) Y = X + W; thus, if we increase the obfuscation noise by increasing σ2w, YR relies
less on Y and more on µˇ. Now in the extreme case, where σ2w goes to infinity, the observed
data (Y) is useless and, as a result, YR = E [X|Y, µˇ] = µ. Hence, remapping leaks complete
information about the statistical model (µ) as σ2w goes to infinity.
5.5 Randomized Remapping
As derived in Section 5.4, the remapping technique can leak a lot of information about
the distribution of the true data (µ) if the adversary does not have the perfect prior about
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the user. Here, we introduce a new technique called randomized remapping to improve
privacy. This technique provides a trade-off between the leakage of the distribution of the
true data (µ) and the leakage of true data (X). In the randomized remapping, we have an
unfair coin where the probability of a head is equal to pH . For each data point, we toss the
coin and if a head is observed, the remapped data (YR) is released, and if a tail is observed,
the noisy version of data (Y ) is released. As a result,
Z =

YR, with probability pH,
Y, with probability of 1 − pH,
Here, user’s friend observes Z , thus, the MSE of the application can be calculated as,
UD(I I I)Rand = E
[(Z − X)2] = pH σ2w
σ2w + σ
2
s
+ (1 − pH)σ2w . (5.25)
However, the adversary observes both Z and µˇ = µ + E to estimate the true data (X) and
distribution of the true data (µ). We can calculate P`(I I I)Rand which indicates the MSE of the
adversary about the distribution of true data (µ) as:
P`(I I I)Rand = E
[
(µ˜Adv − µ)2
]
. (5.26)
Figure 5.3 shows the MSE of the adversary about the statistical model (P`(I I I)Rand) versus the
MSE of the intended application/friend (UD(I I I)Rand).
We can also calculate P(I I I)Rand which indicates the MSE of the adversary about the true
data (µ) as:
P(I I I)Rand = E
[(
X˜Adv − µ
)2]
. (5.27)
Figure 5.4 shows the MSE of the adversary (P(I I I)Rand) versus the MSE of the intended appli-
cation/friend (UD(I I I)Rand).
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Figure 5.3: The MSE of the adversary about the statistical model (µ) versus the MSE of the
application for three cases. Case 1: remapping technique is not employed (pH = 0), Case 2:
a randomized remapping technique is employed with pH = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8, and Case
3: standard remapping [12] is employed (pH = 1). Here, we assume σ2µ = σ
2
e = σ
2
s = 1
and σ2w is swept from 0 to 1 with steps of 0.1.
From Figures 5.3 and 5.4, we can conclude that the standard remapping leaks a lot
of information about the statistical model, while providing the best privacy level about the
user’ true data. Here, the randomized remapping provides a much better trade-off compared
to standard remapping. The value of pH is a design parameter, so, based on the application
requirements and privacy requirements, the appropriate amount of pH should be chosen.
5.6 Appendix
Here, the mutual information is employed as a metric to quantify both utility and pri-
vacy. In this paper, ”U” denotes the mutual information between the true data and signal re-
ceive by the intended application/friend; this quantifies the system’s utility. Likewise, ”L”
denotes the mutual information between the true data and the adversary’s observations;
this quantifies the information leakage. Note that the level of privacy can be quantified as
H (X |Y ) = H (X) − I (X;Y ), where H(.) is the entropy and I(.) is the mutual information.
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Figure 5.4: The MSE of the adversary about the user’ true data (µ) versus the MSE of the
application for three cases. Case 1: remapping technique is not employed (pH = 0), Case 2:
a randomized remapping technique is employed with pH = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8, and Case
3: standard remapping [12] is employed (pH = 1). Here, we assume σ2µ = σ
2
e = σ
2
s = 1
and σ2w is swept from 0 to 1 with steps of 0.1.
Table 5.1: Results of case 1: Perfect knowledge of the adversary.
Utility Leakage of true data
Without Remapping 0.5 ln
(
σ2w+σ
2
s +σ
2
µ
σ2w
)
0.5 ln
(
σ2w+σ
2
s
σ2w
)
With Remapping 0.5 ln
(
σ2w+σ
2
s +σ
2
µ
σ2w
+
σ2µ
σ2s
)
0.5 ln
(
σ2w+σ
2
s
σ2w
)
Here, our goal is to minimize the information leakage to maximize the level of privacy at
the highest possible utility.
5.6.1 Case 1: Perfect Knowledge of the Adversary
In this section, we assume the adversary knows the exact value of the mean (µ). The
results for the case the remapping technique is employed and the case remapping technique
is not employed are shown in Table 5.1.
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Table 5.2: Utility for case 2: Imperfect knowledge of the adversary, one observation.
Utility
Without Remapping 0.5 ln
(
σ2w+σ
2
s +σ
2
µ
σ2w
)
With Remapping 0.5 ln
(
σ2w+σ
2
s +σ
2
µ
σ2w
+
σ2µ
σ2s
)
Since the intended friend/application is oblivious to the prior statistical knowledge
about the user behavior, we always have L ≤ U. As you can observed in Table 5.1, we can
conclude the remapping technique provides the best utility among techniques satisfying the
same level of privacy in the case of perfect knowledge of the adversary [12].
5.6.2 Case 2: Imperfect Knowledge of the Adversary
Here, we assume the adversary has a noisy version of the prior information, as might
be obtained from a learning set of limited length. Specifically, the adversary has µˇ = µ+E ,
where E has a zero-mean normal distribution with variance equal to σ2e , as would be the
case if µˇ were the minimum mean square estimate (MMSE) based on prior observations
with additive Gaussian obfuscation. We consider not only the leakage of true data (X) but
also the leakage of distribution of true data (µ), which is a serious issue. The results for
the case the remapping technique is employed and the case remapping technique is not
employed are shown in Tables 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4.
Extension to m observations: Next, we assume the adversary observes m samples
from the user, and tries to use all of her observations to make better estimations about
both the true data (X) and the distribution of the true data (µ). The results for the case the
remapping technique is employed and the case remapping technique is not employed are
shown in Tables 5.5 and 5.6.
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Table 5.3: Leakage of true data for case 2: Imperfect knowledge of the adversary, one
observation.
Leakage of true data
Without Remapping 0.5 ln
(
σ2s +σ
2
w
σ2w
+
σ2e σ
2
µ
σ2w(σ2e +σ2µ )
)
With Remapping 0.5 ln
(
σ2s +σ
2
w
σ2w
+
σ2e σ
2
µ (σ2s +σ2w)
σ2s σ
2
w(σ2e +σ2µ )
)
Table 5.4: Leakage of the statistical model for case 2: Imperfect knowledge of the adver-
sary, one observation.
Leakage of the statistical model
Without Remapping 0.5 ln
(
1 +
σ2e σ
2
µ
(σ2s +σ2w)(σ2e +σ2µ )
)
With Remapping 0.5 ln
(
1 +
σ2e σ
2
µ (σ2s +σ2w)
σ4s (σ2e +σ2µ )
)
Table 5.5: Leakage of true data for case 2: Imperfect knowledge of the adversary, m obser-
vations.
Leakage of true data
Without Remapping 0.5ln
(
σ2s +σ
2
w
σ2w
+
σ2e σ
2
µ
σ2w(σ2e +σ2µ ) +
(m−1)σ4e σ4µ /(σ2e +σ2µ )
(σ2s +σ2w)(σ2s σ2e +σ2s σ2µ+σ2e σ2µ )+(m−1)σ2s σ2e σ2µ
)
With Remapping 0.5 ln
(
σ2s +σ
2
w
σ2w
+
σ2e σ
2
µ (σ2s +σ2w)
σ2s σ
2
w(σ2e +σ2µ )
)
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Table 5.6: Leakage of the statistical model for case 2: Imperfect knowledge of the adver-
sary, m observations.
Leakage of the statistical model
Without Remapping 0.5 ln
(
1 +
mσ2e σ
2
µ
(σ2s +σ2w)(σ2e +σ2µ )
)
With Remapping 0.5 ln
(
1 +
mσ2e σ
2
µ (σ2s +σ2w)
σ4s (σ2e +σ2µ )
)
5.6.3 Randomized Remapping
In the randomized remapping, we have an unfair coin where the probability of a head is
equal to pH . For each data point, we toss the coin and if a head is observed, the remapped
data (YR) is released, and if a tail is observed, the noisy version of data (Y ) is released. As
a result,
Z =

YR, with probability pH,
Y, with probability of 1 − pH,
Here, user’s friend observes Z , thus, the utility level can be calculated as:
U(I I I)Rand = I (X; Z) = 0.5pH ln
(
σ2w + σ
2
s + σ
2
µ
σ2w
+
σ2µ
σ2s
)
+ 0.5 (1 − pH) ln
(
σ2w + σ
2
s + σ
2
µ
σ2w
)
However, the adversary observes both Z and µˇ = µ + E to estimate the true data (X) and
distribution of the true data (µ). We can calculate L`(I I I)Rand which indicates the leakage of the
statistical model (µ) as:
L`(I I I)Rand = I (µ; Z | µˇ) . (5.28)
Figure 5.5 shows the leakage of the statistical model (L`(I I I)Rand) versus the level of the system’s
utility (U(I I I)Rand). A key point here is that randomized remapping provides a much better
trade-off compared to standard remapping.
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Figure 5.5: The leakage of the statistical model (L`(I I I)Rand) versus the level of system’s utility
(U(I I I)Rand) for three cases. Case 1: remapping technique is not employed (pH = 0), Case 2: a
randomized remapping technique is employed with pH = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8, and Case
3: standard remapping [12] is employed (pH = 1). Here, we assume σ2µ = σ
2
e = σ
2
s = 1
and σ2w is swept from 0 to 1 with steps of 0.1.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
The Internet of Things (IoT) enables users to share and access information on a large
scale and provides many benefits to individuals (e.g., smart homes, healthcare) and indus-
tries (e.g., digital tracking, data collection, disaster management). However, such benefits
are provided by tuning the system to user characteristics based on potentially sensitive in-
formation about their activities. Thus, the use of IoT comes with a significant threat to
users’ privacy: leakage of sensitive information.
Two main privacy-preserving techniques are anonymization and obfuscation, where
the former is hiding the mapping between data and the users by replacing the identification
fields of users with pseudonyms, and the latter is perturbing the user data such that the
adversary observes false but plausible data. Although these methods have been addressed
widely, statistical inference methods can be applied to them to break the privacy of the
users. Furthermore, achieving privacy using these methods comes with a cost: reducing
the utility of the system for the users. Hence, it is crucial to consider the trade-off between
privacy and utility when employing privacy-preserving techniques, and to seek to achieve
privacy with minimal loss of functionality and usability. Despite the growing interest in
IoT privacy, previous works do not offer theoretical guarantees on the trade-off between
privacy and utility. In this dissertation, we took a foundational approach to understand the
theoretical limits.
Firstly, in Chapter 2, we have considered both obfuscation and anonymization tech-
niques to achieve privacy. The privacy level of the users depends on both m(n) (number of
observations per user by the adversary for a fixed anonymization mapping) and an (noise
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level). That is, larger m(n) and smaller an indicate weaker privacy. We characterized the
limits of privacy in the entire m(n) − an plane for the i.i.d. case; that is, we obtained the
exact values of the thresholds for m(n) and an required for privacy to be maintained. We
showed that if m(n) is fewer than O
(
n
2
r−1
)
, or an is larger than Ω
(
n− 1r−1
)
, users have per-
fect privacy. On the other hand, if neither of these two conditions is satisfied, users have
no privacy. For the case where the users’ patterns are modeled by Markov chains, we ob-
tained a no-privacy region in the m(n) − an plane. Note that in this work we obtained the
requirements on anonymization and obfuscation for “perfect” user privacy when traces are
independent between users.
Secondly, in Chapter 3, we considered the discrete case, in particular, when the observa-
tion sequences are binary sequences, and we focus on the non-asymptotic case where users’
data samples are i.i.d.. Then we analyzed the ability of a strong adversary, who knows the
prior distribution of users’ behavior, to correctly identify users’ data samples as a function
of the rate of anonymization and degree of obfuscation. We obtained the exact expression
for two cases: case 1) only the anonymization technique is used to achieve privacy; case
2) both anonymization and obfuscation techniques are used to achieve privacy. We have
shown that the level of privacy of the users depends on three factors: Number of users (n),
number of observations per user (m), and noise level (a). We also provide numerical and
simulation results for the correct probability in identifying a given user with different pa-
rameter settings to investigate the degree to which privacy is protected for various values
of n, m, and a. The results were then used to answer a compelling question left open in
Chapter 2: can the two techniques could be used productively together in the finite case?
In contrast to what previous asymptotic results suggest, we find that the two techniques can
be used in conjunction to provide privacy when neither is sufficient by itself.
Thirdly, in Chapter 4, we assumed users have correlated data traces, as relationships
between users establish dependence in their behavior. Then, we demonstrated that such
dependency degrades the privacy of PPMs, as the anonymization employed must be signif-
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icantly increased to preserve perfect privacy, and often no degree of independent obfusca-
tion of the traces can be effective. We have also presented preliminary results on dependent
obfuscation to improve users’ privacy.
Finally, in Chapter 5, we have provided an information-theoretic investigation of the
technique of “remapping” which has been introduced in the privacy literature to improve
the utility of a naive intended recipient while maintaining the same level of privacy against
a sophisticated adversary, in particular one with a prior distribution of the user’s data. We
first formulated and analyzed remapping under the standard assumption of perfect knowl-
edge of the prior at the adversary. Then, we showed that if the adversary has imperfect
knowledge of the statistics of the user data, the proposed remapping technique introduces
leakage about not only the true data but also the user’s statistical model. Finally, we pro-
posed a new method termed “randomized remapping” which makes it difficult for the ad-
versary to improve their statistical model at a given utility, thus providing a better utility-
privacy trade-off than standard remapping. Since the work here was done under a Gaussian
model to facilitate analysis, future research will consider an extension of the analysis and
countermeasures to more general models.
Future research in this area needs to characterize the exact privacy/no-privacy regions
when the underlying statistical model for users’ data are not known. Moreover, for the case,
we might not have any clue on what patterns the adversaries obtain. It is also important
to consider different ways to obfuscate users’ data sets and study the utility-privacy trade-
offs for different types of obfuscation techniques. In addition, since the work in Chapter 5
was done under a Gaussian model to facilitate analysis, future research will consider an
extension of the analysis and countermeasures to more general models.
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